π, A-G², H¹

A

SPECULATIVE SKETCH

OF

EUROPE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF

MONSIEUR DUMOURIEZ.

TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED

STRICTURES

UPON THE CHAPTER RELATIVE TO

GREAT BRITAIN.

Eruit edificat mutat quadrata rotundis.

Hor.

DUBLIN:

Printed for J. Moore, and J. William.

1798.

'78... 15006

PREFACE.

HISTORY affords no example of events ſo extraordinary, ſo important to the human race, as thoſe which have given birth to the following Speculative Sketch.

In 1797, the fate of Nations was decided by a ſingle individual, and changed in an inſtant by his arbitrary nod.

Extraordinary Men dart through the orbits of revolving centuries like comets, and baffle the Political Aſtronomer to calculate their effects. Man takes their eccentric journies for aberrations, till the amazing effects of theſe phenomena, prove them to have appeared at the command of Providence, whoſe Decrees are equally abſolute and incomprehenſible.

Before the preliminary Treaty of Leoben was ſigned, Buonaparte might, notwithſtanding his heroic genius, have been ſhut up and famiſhed among the Mountains of Styria;

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cut off from Italy, and forced, ſhould he again enter it, to recommence its conqueſt, by paſſing over the bodies of the confederated Auſtrians and Venetians. Neither the talents nor the courage of this extraordinary General could have extricated him from this formidable criſis, had not the propitious deſtiny of France excited in the Court of Vienna a ſalutary conſternation; a panic that compelled the Emperor to conclude a precipitate Peace, when a fortnight's delay would unavoidably have changed the face of his affairs.

The retreat of the courageous Arch-Duke Charles, to an impregnable poſt on the Danube, from whence he effectually protected Vienna, and the defenſive preparations in that Capital well executed by General Mack, placed it in a place of ſecurity againſt the attack of Buonaparte.

That General was then menaced on either flank; by the army of the Tyrol on his left, and that of Hungarian Inſurrection on his right. He was deſtitute of proviſions and of money, and at a diſtance of near eighty leagues from Italy. With that country his communication was cut off by the loſs of Trieſt, and the general riſing of the Venetians, for which they have been puniſhed by the Auſtrians themſelves.

The Venetian Army had become maſters of Verona, whoſe fortreſſes alone were now occupied by a few French Troops: and theſe muſt

ſoon

ſoon have ſurrendered to General Laudun. This General had already arrived there from the Tyrol, and had joined the Venetians, when he received the unexpected and fatal order to ſuſpend all hoſtilities, and return to the Tyrol.

In fact, the Auſtrian Generals had ſo ill defended the paſſage of the Lahn, and of the Upper Rhine, that it might be expected the French would again advance as rapidly as in the preceding Year; that they would ſoon remove the Seat of War into the Upper Palatinate and Bavaria.

But even in that caſe the poſitions Generals Werneck and La Tour would have taken in their retreat, would by concentrating the War, have given a more united ſtrength to the Arch-Duke Charles, who would thereby have been enabled to ſuſtain their attack: an attack ſo much the more dangerous to the French, as they would have been at too great a diſtance from their frontiers: and would again have left four places of ſtrength, as in their former incurſion, between them and their ſupplies or line of retreat, in caſe of ill ſucceſs.

The retreat of the Auſtrians from the Banks of the Rhine to the Danube, might have been executed without precipitation, and by falſe marches; but with whatever rapidity the French might advance from the Rhine to Bavaria, and the frontiers

of Bohemia, it would require more than a month to arrive near enough to Buonaparte to concert meaſures with him. On his part he could not have waited ſo long without being compelled to decide, either on retiring into Italy, in order to ſuppreſs the inſurrection of the Venetians, or deſperately to attack Vienna, and the Arch-Duke.

That Prince might have refuſed to riſk a battle if he did not wiſh to expoſe the fate of the Houſe of Auſtria, to the ſhock of deſperation. As to Vienna, defended by the ſkilful General Mack, and an army of more than 30,000 men, and protected by the vicinity of that of the Arch-Duke Charles, that City could not be ſuddenly taken by Buonaparte, without ſiege artillery, proviſions, or money; with an army harraſſed, weakened, ſurrounded on all ſides, and whoſe communication with Italy, from whence he muſt derive his ſupplies and ammunition, was entirely cut off.

1ſt. If he attacked that Capital by main force, it was an act of deſperation that muſt, according to every probability, involve his total ruin. Had he been ſucceſsful and entered the City, he would doubtleſs have done much miſchief, but he would have been preſently overpowered by the freſh Army of the Arch-Duke.

2d. He

2d. He could not attempt to retreat by Bavaria, in order to form a junction with General Moreau, becauſe he would have had to traverſe the Mountains of the Archbiſhopric of Saltzburg, ſtrongly defended by the Imperial Troops, whom the Arch-Duke might have reinforced as well as the diviſion that defended the Tyrol.

3dly. If he was deſirous to direct his retreat into Italy, he might have been intercepted by General Laudun, and the Venetians at Ponteba and the other paſſes of Carinthia. His right might have been turned by the Hungarian Army, and then vigorouſly purſued by that which defended Vienna. His retreat would even have deprived him of the confidence of the Italians, as yet not well confirmed in their Revolution, and perhaps all the French Troops would have been maſſacred by thoſe very Nations whom they had emancipated and armed.

One of theſe three alternatives he muſt neceſſarily have taken in leſs than a week, for he could not have continued longer in the ſame poſition, and had only one means to extricate himſelf: a means which he ſeized with an addreſs that does him at leaſt as much honour as the brilliant military exploits that placed him in ſo critical a ſituation. This meaſure was to take advantage of the conſternation of the Court of

Vienna,

Vienna, to hold out to it the irreſiſtible allurement of an important intereſt, and to negociate ſo advantageouſly for the Emperor, as to induce him to conclude an immediate Peace.

Never was a French Army ſo near the *Furcæ Caudinæ*; never did a General extricate himſelf with more addreſs. The advantages granted by Buonaparte to the Emperor, in the Negociation of Leoben, were proportionate to the magnitude of his danger, and are a proof of its exiſtence. But his motives were concealed behind the veil of myſtery. The events that followed that preliminary treaty, have rendered thoſe advantages ſtill more conſiderable on either ſide.

It is vain to ſeek in theſe tranſactions, the principles of morality and univerſal juſtice, ſo pompouſly diſplayed, both in the foundations of the Conſtitution of the French Republic, and the emphatic Proclamations of Courts. The probity of Kings and Nations reſembles not that of individuals; their policy has never altered, and will ever be the ſame.

The ancient, the feeble, the unfortunate Republic of Venice has fallen a victim to the intereſt of Auſtria, and to the vengeance, whether juſt or otherwiſe, of the French Republic. Her death warrant was ſigned at Campo Formio. Dalmatia, ſeveral provinces

of

of Terra Firma, Venice herſelf are become an advantageous indemnity for the Milaneſe, the Netherlands, and Upper Auſtria.

The ceſſion of this laſt Province to the Duke of Modena, leaves a certainty of its future reintegration, by hereditary deſcent in the Auſtrian Dominions; unleſs France, ever attentive to remove ſo powerful a neighbour, has ſtipulated by a ſecret article that it ſhall never revert to that power.

To the Duke of Modena's dominions, the Princeſs of Conti is heireſs. All the property of the Houſe of Bourbon is confiſcated by the French. Modena will therefore be the property of that Republic. This ſyſtem of juriſprudence is worthy of the preſent age, or rather it has exiſted in all periods. And thus it was, that Venice acquired the Kingdom of Cyprus.

Every thing is myſterious in a negociation where the contracting powers are reciprocally indemnified at the expence of others. The Empire has opened the Congreſs of Raſtadt, without knowing what has already been fixed in its favour, or to its prejudice. And the different States conſtituting the Germanic body, confiding in the repeated Proclamations of their head and chief, have ſent their Deputies to that Congreſs with full powers founded on the preſervation of the integrity of the Empire.

The

The French however ſoon withdrew a part of the veil that enveloped the myſtery of their negociations. The evacuation of Mentz by the Imperial troops preciſely at the moment when the French were prepared to ſeize it, without allowing time either for the empire or its own ſovereign to introduce a garriſon and artillery to preſerve this key of Germany, at leaſt till the peace now negociating at Raſtadt ſhould decide upon its fate, indiſputably proves that its ceſſion was ſtipulated before-hand by the Emperor.

All that part of the empire to the left of the Rhine clearly appears to be included in that ceſſion, ſince the French, without waiting the reſult of the Congreſs at Raſtadt, and without encountering any claim on that ſubject, ſo haſtily divided this rich conqueſt into departments and municipalities, like the other territories of the great Republic.

The retreat of the Emperor's armies towards his hereditary dominions developes another myſtery in the Negociation of Campo Formio. The Archbiſhopric of Saltzburg, and a part of the Bavarian ſucceſſions appear to have been another compenſation for the unconteſted and even facilitated ceſſion of Mentz, and all the left Bank; as Dalmatia and the Venetian State form the imdemnity for recognizing the Ciſalpine Republic, for

Upper

Upper Auſtria, and the Auſtrian Netherlands.

This great Negociation which affects the fate, the intereſts, and above all the opinion of Europe, conceals other myſteries that the reſult of the Congreſs of Raſtadt will ſhortly bring to light. Although nothing is yet known beyond the Treaty of Campo Formio, although the Emperor is the only apparent Negociator with the French Republic, there are other Powers who muſt, like him, be indemnified and compenſated.

The Empire is like a diſh waiting to aſſuage the avidity of ſeveral famiſhed gueſts. It is on the eve of being carved out, and a morſel given to each according to his ſize and appetite. Let us not anticipate the minutiæ of this political repaſt. Soon we ſhall behold new geographical partitions that will again change the extent, the power, the intereſts, the views, the cauſes of alliance and of enmity of the ſovereignties that will conſtitute the European Republic at the end of the preſent century.

We ſhall take a haſty view of the probable influence of this territorial Revolution, and its ultimate effects on the powers that have not yet been mowed down by this moral as well as political Revolution.

Two events which offer themſelves to our conſideration will ſhortly enable us to unfold other myſteries in the policy of theſe conquerors,

conquerors, and of thoſe powers who, fearing to oppoſe them, ſeek to be their gleaners. The firſt is the incorporation of the Biſhopric of Baſil, in the French Republic, the protection granted to the Revolutioniſts of the Pays de Vaud, and the general revolutionization of the Helvetic League.

The other is the war declared in fact by the Ciſalpine Republic againſt the Pontifical Government, and the departure of Buonaparte, the Ambaſſador, after the popular commotion and tragical death of General Duphot. This event, ſo contradictorily related by both parties, cannot be judged of at this diſtance from its ſcene. But whatever was its real cauſe, the French Directory have decreed its revenge, and have charged their Army of Italy with its execution.

At the ſame time they are not inattentive to their particular intereſts. Commiſſaries were immediately ſent off to ſeize the reſt of the precious monuments of antiquity, and doubtleſs the rich plate of the churches of Rome. The French Army are about to coin money in the church of St. Peter, to enable them to combat the heretics of England.

The following ſpeculative ſketch will repreſent the events relative to each country, whoſe political ſituation will be exhibited as reſulting from the changes produced by the French Revolution, and from the inevitable influence and effects of this grand cataſtrophe.

All

All the books of juriſprudence, all the treaties, even the foundations of the politics, and balance of Europe, (though improperly ſo called) are now become mere objects of empty curioſity, no longer deſerving to be ſtudied or conſulted, and may for ever be buried in the duſt of immenſe libraries.

The tranquillity of the North was founded on the Treaty of Oliva, in 1660. In 1770, the Great Frederick and the celebrated Catherine II. created for Poland a ſyſtem of partition to which Auſtria was compelled to accede. The Treaty of Oliva has been annulled by this new ſyſtem of policy, ſo ſummary and ſo convenient, and Poland has been deſtroyed.

The tranquillity of the reſt of the Empire was eſtabliſhed on the baſis of the Treaty of Weſtphalia in 1648. The Treaty of Vienna in 1756, which united the Intereſts of the Houſe of Auſtria with that of Bourbon, has deſtroyed that foundation and pledge of ſecurity to the Powers of Europe, has ſubjected France to the policy of Vienna, engaged her in expenſive wars, and from conſequence to conſequence has ultimately produced the French Revolution.

The tranquillity of the ſeas and of the colonies of European powers was founded on the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. The revolt of the Americans, the alliance of Louis XVI. with that people have created another independent

pendent nation, inoculated France with the Revolutionary germ, and given a ſhock to commerce and to the colonies, whoſe ruin has been completed by philanthropy; that philanthropy whoſe dictates, although juſt in principle, have been groſsly miſunderſtood, and more improperly applied, by the Legiſlators of France.

Thus then have all the foundations of tranquillity, ſecurity, and property among nations been broken up; and the great Revolution begun in France in 1789 has completed the chaos. Could the powers of Europe have remained mere ſpectators of this great event, its action would have been confined to France alone. Its effects would have been naturally ſlow; its influence on the reſt of Europe almoſt inſenſible. It would even have been beneficial. For it would have been accompanied neither by crimes, diſorders, by maſſacres, nor by the wildeſt extravagancies of opinion.

But the ſyſtem of partition has produced the war, and the ſame ſyſtem now becomes the great medium of peace. For the French having had the fatal advantage of being always victorious, are now become a conquering nation. Forgetting the principles on which they grounded their Revolution, they have adopted the ſyſtem of political partition in faſhion all over Europe ſince the year 1792.

This example was given them by the heads of thoſe very nations that cry out moſt loudly againſt the uſurpative policy of the new Republicans.

publicans. The late King of Pruſſia ceaſed combating the French, only to unite with Auſtria and Ruſſia, in the partition of Poland. Thus the ancient Sarmatians are effaced from the annals of the world, though not without the hope of again exiſting as a nation. Avengers of the liberty of Poland are forming in the Armies of the three partitioning Powers, and above all, in that of the celebrated Buonaparte. We may foreſee that event, though it is impoſſible yet to predict its epocha. But if the Revolutionary ſpirit continues thus to march with gigantic ſteps, it will not long be delayed. Till that event, however, arrive, we muſt, in this ſpeculative ſketch, entirely omit this people, ſince they cannot act a part among the nations of Europe.

STRICTURES

UPON THE

CHAPTER OF ENGLAND.

"Je me charge de mes Ennemis :—Dieu me garde de mes Amis."

NOTWITHSTANDING the curioſity which muſt be excited by whatever comes from the pen of M. Dumouriez, the ingenuity with which he has traced out his "Speculative Sketch of Europe," and the general utility of its tendency, the influence under which the Chapter upon England is written, ſo diſſimilar to that which operated upon the Author whilſt diſcuſſing the intereſts of other nations, was a ſufficient reaſon for withholding this Tranſlation. The ſeparate publication however of that very Chapter in an Engliſh dreſs, rendered it deſirable that the work at large ſhould be preſented to the public, to enable it to form a judgment of its purport from the context, and not from a partial extract; but that while juſtice was done to the Author in that reſpect, what may be termed the libellous, and is doubtleſs the miſchievous, part, his conſiderations on this country ſhould receive ſuch animadverſions as may counteract the effect it is calculated

culated to produce. The impartial reviewer of the deſtinies of the other nations of Europe diſappears from the inſtant in which the name of this country is pronounced. He ſees in us nothing but a diſpirited, exhauſted, and half revolutionized people. He denies us in facts, that patriotiſm which he had admitted in words. He pronounces our fate to depend upon the reſolves of two powers, which have each ſucceſſively proſtrated themſelves at the feet of France, and have now withdrawn their Forces into the heart of Germany, while the doom of the Empire is ſubjected to the unbiaſſed conſideration of a Diet, ſurrounded by French Armies, thoſe Armies which, by occupying a far greater extent of that Empire than is now in diſpute, have more than foreſtalled the event of its deliberations.

His " nationality," and a lingering grudge for a treatment, which he has even now ſufficiently juſtified; appear to have borne down his judgment, and confuſed his principles. Whilſt he vilifies our reſources and courage, and exalts that of the enemy, he proffers the guidance of his own experience, and far and juſtly famed military genius, to the enterpriſing ſpirit of the French Scipio; nor when he offers the thunderbolt to the graſp of France, does he extend the Ægis, which might repel it, to the arm of her competitor. The hand, which drove the combined powers of Auſtria and Pruſſia from France, and was to have planted the tri-coloured flag on the Tower of London, now chalks out to a happier rival the track which he himſelf would fain have trod, and which he deems muſt lead to the ſummit of glory, and the empire of the world.

But

But if we diſallow the truth of this picture of the internal ſtate of Great Britain, ſhould we not alſo conſider how far the means of conqueſt, which he indicates, are adequate to the end in view? Were we the divided and diſtracted people which he paints, or were we immerſed in that torpid lethargy which has betrayed ſome of the fineſt countries of Europe into the hands of the French, no means would be inadequate, the mere phantom of invaſion alone would perhaps appal us into paſſive deſpair. But this high-minded people, now burſting forth into arms with enthuſiaſtic patriotiſm, are not to be told that a race which their forefathers have ſo often made to fly before them, when once landed on our ſhores is irreſiſtible; and that whilſt *un homme Roi* can effect the ſalvation of the Empire, whoſe frontier towns are actually occupied by the enemy, this *Populus Virorum*, this nation of men, is impotent to effect its own. The ſame motives however, which lead us to miſtruſt his candor whilſt deſcanting on our deſtinies, ſhould induce us to give him full credit where he views the chances of France in an unfavorable light. His arguments to prove that the invaſion muſt and will take place carry conviction along with them; and if he, though living in retirement in a neutral country, proſcribed by his own, and a ſtranger to the whirlwind of paſſions which agitate it, is, what may almoſt be termed ſanguine about the ſucceſs of the expedition; can we be ſurpriſed that the Directory, inflamed with the exaggerations of the moſt rancorous of our traitors, drunk with the blood and ſpoils of nations, and mad with the luſt of univerſal ſway, and ſtill more mad with the workings of the deepeſt national envy and vindictiveneſs, ſhould look down upon us as their inevitable and eaſy prey? We muſt be as certain that the attempt will be made, as we ſhould be of the event of the attempt againſt a free and powerful people, armed almoſt to a man

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in their own defence, and with all hope of ſuccour, all proſpect of retreat irretrievably cut off from their enemy. If any other motive were wanting to thoſe which have rouſed us to ſuch manful exertions, where could a ſtronger one be found than in the picture M. Dumouriez traces as the inevitable conſequences to France of the failure of this mighty effort. He promiſes us (and the bleſſing will come in ſpite of the prophet) a prompt and ſucceſsful termination of the moſt tremendous ſtruggle, which mankind ever witneſſed or was engaged in, the triumph of right over wrong, of good over evil, the omen and the guarantee of well-earned glory, and permanent peace and proſperity to Britain.

Before we conſider his ideas upon the practicability of a deſcent, let us caſt a rapid eye over the obſervations upon the events of the War, which are introductory to them, and indeed are in part the baſis upon which they reſt.

M. Dumouriez tells us that in the naval ſtruggle between the French and Engliſh, the glory of the former has been the more difficult to attain, and the moſt brilliant. We often hear that language is revolutionized; and truly this muſt be a ſpecimen of it, unleſs he conſiders as glory the being beaten in every direction; if ſo, it is one we will not diſpute with his countrymen; it has not been of very difficult attainment to them; and our unrevolutionized underſtandings can ſcarce conceive its brilliancy. This applies a little to his next remark, that if we bear off the palm of ſkill, we muſt yield that of courage to our Enemies. If he means, that our Sailors have not been worked up to the ſummit of their Valour, becauſe the utmoſt efforts of their Enemy have been inſufficient to drive them to the higheſt bent and deſperation of it, and that he who is worſted muſt be the braver man, as having borne more and undergone ſuch an exceſs of danger as to be driven from the fortitude which bore him up

under

under it to intimidation and ſubmiſſion, we have nothing to ſay to his aſſertion. We can ſafely ſay however, that if France had directed her principal exertions to her Navy, (and ſhe was too politic to do it) ſhe would have ſpared us the neceſſity of maintaining an expenſive Army on the Continent, and without obliging us to keep up a much larger force at Sea than we actually had, would have given a turn to the War—the moſt popular, the moſt economical, and the moſt advantageous to this country. The examples he cites, to ſhew how ſucceſsfully ſhe might have done it, do not prove much. Colbert, by giving to France all the advantages Nature held out to her Commerce, laid a foundation for a Navy, which was imprudently connived at and ſuffered to accumulate by the miſtaken and vicious policy of this Country. What Commerce had France in 1793?—The French Navy was ſo far from being augmented to eighty ſail of the line *in the ſpace of two years* by Lewis XVI. that it is notorious, it had been the object of unremitting attention of the Government of that Country from 1763, the year of the Peace of Paris. But if a large portion of thoſe Navies found their way into the Britiſh Ports, we might ſurely have looked forward to as large a ſhare in the fruits of the labours of our Enemy in this War as in any preceding one.

We next find it ſtated vauntingly, that Richery deſtroyed the fiſheries of Newfoundland; that the French reconquered Corſica, and drove us out of the Mediterranean. Is there a ſyllable of this well founded? This Admiral Richery, with ſix ſail of the line, fell in with three of ours, and having taken one of them a French prize, which was in tow and under jury-maſts, and had only ſuch a complement of hands as was ſufficient to navigate her, did not venture to approach the other two who braved his attack. He then ſuffered himſelf to be blocked up for a conſiderable time in the Harbour of Ca-

diz, by Admiral Mann with ſix ſail of the line; and when at length he contrived to ſteal out, the whole miſchief he effected at Newfoundland was merely of a predatory nature; he burnt a few boats and fiſhing ſtages at one of the out ports, but did not make the ſmalleſt attempt upon the principal ſettlement, or upon our naval force there, which conſiſted only of a fifty gun ſhip and three frigates, and which never quitted its ſtation. The French fleet was twice brought to a partial engagement with ours in the Mediterranean: in the firſt*, they loſt two line of battle ſhips, and one in the ſecond†. It was thus they drove us out of the Mediterranean, and reconquered Corſica, our relinquiſhment of which originated ſolely in the expence and precarioufneſs of our connection with that fickle and faithleſs people, when Spain became our foe, and when from the inſignificance of the French marine in that quarter we could venture to turn upon our new enemies our whole force in thoſe ſeas. Our troops and frigates occupied Elba three months after Earl St. Vincents left the Mediterranean in queſt of the Spaniards, in our operations againſt whom we experienced not the moſt trivial diverſion from that fleet at Toulon, of which M. Dumouriez aſſerts the re-eſtabliſhment; and our ſquadron of frigates occupied the Archipelago till after the battle fought off Cape St. Vincents. If their navy does begin to exiſt again at Breſt, at leaſt it has given as yet but little ſigns of life.

When we grant the poſſibility of a deſcent, muſt we equally admit the truth of thoſe mortal apprehenſions which he contends, our Government muſt feel, at ſeeing the attention of the French again turned to the Sea? What commerce will foſter their navy? Of which of the qualities he attributes to his countrymen are we deſtitute? and are there none which we poſſeſs excluſively? With what conſciouſneſs

* March 14, 1795. † July 13, 1795.

conſciouſneſs of preceding events, with what actual qualifications and pretenſions to ſucceſs, with what reſpective ſtrength do the two nations ſtart anew for the palm?

We next learn that Toulon and Dunkirk, eſpecially, have proved to us the invincibility of the French by land. He exclaims:

"*Sinite arma viris et cedite ferro.*"

Has the regeneration of the foe then been the ſignal for our degeneracy? The Britiſh forces in Toulon, at no one time ever amounted in ſoldiers, ſailors, and marines, to 3000 men. The defence of that place, which was commanded by heights on all ſides, depended entirely upon that of thoſe heights againſt a land attack. Our troops diſplayed repeatedly the moſt active gallantry in this warfare; a variety of circumſtances impeded any unity of exertion in the motley garriſon, which was made up of troops of various nations, ſome of whom were quite unuſed to war, and which had to ſtruggle againſt a multiplicity of obſtacles originating in the nature of its compoſition; and when the enemy, at length between 30 and 40,000 ſtrong, broke through the line of defence, which neceſſitated the evacuation of the place, we know that he did not make his irruption through a Britiſh poſt. At Dunkirk the defeat of the covering army, whoſe cavalry was unable to act, on account of the nature of the country, and whoſe infantry was entirely compoſed of auxiliaries, alone occaſioned the retreat of the Britiſh troops, after they had repulſed three ſallies from the place, and borne down, with the moſt brilliant courage, the obſtacles which the French had oppoſed, not only by land but by ſea, to their ſitting down before it. Nor did the enemy attempt the ſlighteſt interruption to that retreat. But did theſe "*bis victi Phryges*" perform not one atchievement which might render this invincibility of their enemy in ſome degree problematical? If the conſciouſneſs

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of it exiſted any where, it muſt have been amongſt our troops; and had it exiſted, Britain would not have had to boaſt of perhaps the brighteſt exploit of the war (ſince the queſtion is merely of valour,) the ſtorming of Lincelles*; the heroic enterpriſe of the handful of men who turned the fortune of the battle of Tournay†; and the almoſt romantic proweſs diſplayed by her cavalry on the plains near Cateau‡. This is not the firſt time that Mr. Dumouriez has ſhewn how much he is ready to do, to keep as well as poſſible with the French armies; and one muſt really imagine that he compoſed this paragraph with the national cockade in his hat,

The fate of this country is however, according to M. Dumouriez, to depend in all reſpects on the iſſue of the deliberations at Raſtadt—If peace ſhould be eſtabliſhed between the Empire and France, our Commerce is to be utterly ruined. Our trade to Bremen, Hamburgh, the Baltic, and the whole of the North of Europe is at once to ceaſe. Is it then to be a condition of Peace with the *Emperor*, that the ports of neutral States, Pruſſia, the Hanſe Towns, Sweden, Denmark, and Ruſſia, ſhould be ſhut againſt us, the three laſt being independent of the Empire, and not parties to the Congreſs? When we loſt the direct trade to France, it ſhifted to Flanders, from thence to Holland, and from thence to Hamburgh. Let us here imagine the caſe in which we ſhould be excluded from the Hanſe Towns; we ſhould be put to the inconvenience of going to Ports a little further to the North. New ports may be opened to us on the Continent, ſhould war be renewed, but we have little to fear from further excluſions. If, however, in theſe ſtrange and eventful times, the moſt improbable, and nearly impoſſible thing ſhould happen, that the other Nations of Europe, great, powerful, and independent,

* 18th of Auguſt, 1793. † 22d of May, 1794.
‡ 24th and 26th of April, 1794.

ent, as ſome of them are, ſhould bend to the yoke of the tyrants, and become parties againſt the only Country, ſtruggling to ſave itſelf and the world, and endeavour to exclude us from any Traffic with them, the blow would be far from mortal; not all the arretés of the Directory, or the ordinances of the other Powers of Europe, could prevent their people from ſupplying themſelves from hence with articles indiſpenſably neceſſary to them, and which they could get no where elſe; a neceſſity which is encreaſed by every act of devaſtation committed by the Enemy. But if even (to take the extremeſt caſe) this aſſertion ſhould turn out to be unfounded, we ſhould ſtill ſurvive the effects of that diſappointment. All our European exports are inconſiderable, when compared with thoſe to the Eaſt and Weſt Indies, and America. The exports of 1797 exceeded conſiderably thoſe of the years 1794 or 1795 (which again exceeded the average of the latter years of the laſt Peace) and were ſcarcely, if at all, affected by the meaſures of the French, except in as far as we were injured by the diſtreſs and miſery of the countries with which they fraterniſed. The exceſs of exports in 1796 beyond thoſe of 1797 was owing to the unuſual extent of orders received from the Weſt Indies and N. America in the former year. The actually languiſhing ſtate of our manufactures, in conſequence of the excluſions alluded to, is beſt anſwered by the authentic ſtatements recently laid before Parliament; but the folly of ſuppoſing our remittances from the Colonies are to be interrupted by the Privateers of the enemy, ſo as to occaſion real diſtreſs, is too extravagant, even for a Frenchman. The captures of our unprotected Ships, the owners of whom choſe that they ſhould puſh for a market, without waiting for convoy, have, it is true, been numerous; but that harveſt will very

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ſoon be cut off, if the Law, lately propoſed*, to prevent the ſailing of Merchantmen without convoy, ſhould be ratified by the Legiſlature. The aliment of the piratical War will thus be cut off, and the Enemy will be deprived of the wealth which he derived from the adventurous ſpirit of our Merchants and Manufacturers. His Privateers, in which ſo much confidence is placed, will be rendered completely harmleſs; the maritime parts of France, which have been enriched by plunder, will become diſcontented; the Seamen will take to other employments; and the Directory will be deprived of almoſt the laſt reſource of their Navy.

We now come to perhaps the moſt hideous caricature, that jaundiced malice ever ſuggeſted, or that ever came from the pallet of intereſted prejudice—the picture of the public mind and internal ſtate of this country. When a man repreſents things otherwiſe than as they are, I muſt ſuppoſe that he paints according to his wiſhes; I have therefore to congratulate M. Dumouriez upon having found an opportunity of diſcharging ſuch a maſs of moral bile.

The oppoſition, the ſpirit of revolution, the diſcontents of large bodies of manufacturers thrown out of bread and employment, the decay of our commerce, the miſtruſt which ſtoppages of payment and bankruptcies muſt occaſion in mercantile tranſactions, the embarraſſments of the Bank, the activity of the French in fomenting diſcord in the three kingdoms, the neceſſity of maintaining a great army to protect our ſhores againſt inſult, and the immenſity of the expence attending it, the danger of keeping the whole nation under arms amidſt the prevalence

* The ſavings to Great Britain and Ireland from this meaſure, are eſtimated at near 3,000,000; the loſs to the enemy will be of courſe the ſame, excluſive of the piracies committed on the Ships of Americans, and other neutral Powers, who it may be expected, will put themſelves under the protection of our Convoys.

prevalence of univerſal diſaffection and deſire of innovation, are very properly claſſed together; theſe are the real calamities which he declares are alone ſufficient to exhauſt the reſources and courage of the nation.

That oppoſition, which ſo long ſerved as a ſhield to thoſe doctrines which alone could have cankered the heart and conſumed the vitals of this country, and has been the effective ally of the evil principle in this conflict, is now driven from its place by the burſt of public opinion, divided in itſelf it can ſcarcely be conſidered as having any political exiſtence, and, whatever be the event of the foreign conteſt, is ſunk itſelf into nullity. Their other auxiliaries, ariſing out of the decay of our commerce and manufactures, are not likely to be much more ſerviceable to the French than thoſe, whom they conſider as their friends in the Houſe of Commons, or thoſe who are their real friends out of it. Of the latter, the number is not conſiderable, notwithſtanding the induſtry that has been uſed to increaſe them. The Bank was never more flouriſhing nor its credit more ſubſtantial; the predictions of miſchief to reſult from the ſtoppage of payment in ſpecie has been proved to be falſe; and it is now evident, that if the meaſure was wiſe and beneficial at the moment, it was equally ſo proſpectively. We know that if the threats of an invaſion ſhould be executed, no inconvenience would now ariſe from it to the Bank, an advantage which we preſume will endure as long as the ſtruggle; its paper has never been depreciated in the ſmalleſt degree, though every expedient was uſed to effect it; and it is now underſtood to be ſubſtantially richer than in any former period. Bullion alſo is flowing into the country, beyond all former example, the natural conſequence of our flouriſhing commerce and manufactures.—Another hope however ſtill remains to our inveterate enemies, if the expectations already ſtated

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ſhould fail them. We are to be exhauſted, and at length utterly deſtroyed by the enormous expenditure in our defence againſt the menaced invaſion. The charges for our navy are high, and we have a large army to pay; but with reſpect to the ruin to be brought on us by arming the nation, M. Dumouriez will find himſelf greatly deceived; the people (and to whom does this forbode danger?) are every where flocking to the ſtandard of their Sovereign and the Conſtitution, in a manner unexampled in any country; a * very large proportion of them without any pay, or allowance whatever, and others at a very trifling coſt to the public. It is admitted however that our expence on the whole is unavoidably great; but, let it be remembered, our reſources are alſo great. Does M. Dumouriez ſee in the voluntary contributions for the defence of the ſtate (ſo conſiderable notwithſtanding the accumulation of the aſſeſſed taxes) the indubitable ſymptoms of a diſeaſed public mind? Will he take the terms upon which the loan § has been raiſed, more favourable than thoſe of the preceding year, as the teſt of that panic which muſt mark every money tranſaction by the exorbitancy of its conditions, when means and credit are worn out? Is our courage no more, becauſe the nation riſes in arms with one electric impulſe to cruſh the invading, and, as he wiſhes us to believe, invincible foe?

So much for M. Dumouriez's colouring! Would it have been poſſible to gueſs for whom the picture was meant, had he not taken the precaution of writing the name of England at the bottom of it?

Under theſe circumſtances of the country, it is needleſs

* In the town of Liverpool alone, 4,000 men are eprolled, to ſerve at their own expence in all reſpects; 2,800 of theſe are already under arms.

§ It is well known in the city that immenſe payments are already made in advance on the loan; which was of £.17,000,000, and was negotiated at nearly the actual price of the ſtocks, and without the funds having been affected by it, to the extent of 1*l.* per cent. The prices of the funds were higher when the loan was ſettled, than they were before the invaſion was denounced by the Directory laſt Winter.

needleſs to remark in how different a point of view whatever he advances as to the Invaſion bears, except ſuch conſiderations as are purely military. In viewing his two plans for effecting a deſcent, we ſhould not gain credit for much ſincerity, if we combatted the difficulties which he repreſents as amounting to almoſt a phyſical impoſſibility of tranſporting a large army acroſs the Channel; or for much prudence, if we conteſted his opinion on the practicability of invading us in ſmaller bodies. We may, however, ſay with reſpect to the latter, that the two examples which he alleges, by no means prove the facility of it. When Hoche's expedition ſailed from Breſt, the Admiral who commanded our Fleet, acting under the impreſſion at that time general here, turned his attention entirely to Portugal; a natural miſtake, but one which can never again recur in this War. The aſſertion that Ireland was loſt to us, had the 8 or 9000 men compoſing Hoche's army been landed there, when at that moment they would not have found a friend in the South of Ireland, and would have had their retreat infallibly cut off, is worthy of any of the Republican Journaliſts who are not ſent to Cayenne. There is no doubt but that ſuch a Squadron as that which tranſported the legion of banditti to Wales, and was compoſed of two frigates and two corvettes, may eaſily eſcape obſervation; but the built which gives them ſwiftneſs prevents their tranſporting any number of men, and they had only in fact 1150 ſoldiers on board; they were too few to attract our attention, or create delay to each other; the troops were landed with nothing but their firelocks and a few bags of biſcuit; and beſides, after the failure of Hoche's expedition, it was impoſſible for us to ſuſpect or be on our guard againſt the attempt, eſpecially as it was ſuch a one as to this moment, M. Dumouriez is himſelf unequal to gueſs the motives for it. It is right to ſay thus much, becauſe if before the arrival of the French in Bantry Bay we indulged

in an over-weening confidence in the ſecurity our Fleets afforded us, we now ſeem to have gone too far into the contrary extreme, though of the two it is doubtleſs the ſafeſt and the moſt ſalutary.

With reſpect to the obſtacles which he oppoſes to the poſſibility of our cruiſers maintaining their ſtations in the Channel, there is no doubt but that they may be accidentally blown from off a port; but his tides* that run without exception, whether ebbing or flowing, at the rate of three leagues an hour, his nearly invariably conſtant and periodical† Eaſterly or Weſterly winds, and the extreme difficulty of keeping to windward, and of reſiſting this imaginary current, cannot but excite the ſmile of a Britiſh ſeaman; nor can he view with much more gravity, the other cauſes which are alleged as indiſpenſably compelling him to put frequently into port.§ In the year 1759, the port of Breſt was ſo cloſely blocked up for ſix months, that not a boat could paſs in or out of it. In the courſe of the laſt year, Earl St. Vincent's fleet remained between ſeven and eight months before Cadiz, without once quitting its ſtation. The Channel fleet was off Breſt nearly the whole of the ſummer; and our North Sea fleet, after having blockaded the Texel for twenty-two weeks, when it returned into Port for water, proviſions, and to refit, completed thoſe operations *in three days*, which even the Dutch (who are ſo much ſuperior to the French in nautical matters) conceived could not be done in leſs than *three weeks*. In fact (except any epidemical complaint ſhould chance to exiſt) our cruizers always return into

* Their averaged courſe is leſs than three knots an hour; but M. Dumouriez when at *Cherbourg*, probably heard of the race of Alderney, and taking *partem pro toto*, as his countrymen are rather apt to do, aſſigned its extreme velocity to all the tides of the channel.

† What meteorological journal, or what weathercock did the ingenious Frenchman conſult?

§ M. Dumouriez ſeems here to have made great uſe of the *Voyage de Paris à St. Cloud par Mer*. The fact is, that the French could never keep their ſeamen out on a cruize for any length of time, and he imagined we found the ſame difficulty.

into Port with their men in better health and ſpirits than the exceſſes, into which they unavoidably fall when in Port, allow them to put to ſea with. But under what juſtification can M. Dumouriez cover himſelf for having made a poſitive ſtatement reſpecting the ſquadrons commanded by Johnſtone and Carteret in the Channel in the laſt war, when no ſuch ſquadrons ever exiſted; nor indeed can any facts, of the nature of thoſe ſo circumſtantially announced, be traced out.

I will not cavil at his aſſertions of the practicability of effecting a *partial* deſcent: but it is whimſical to ſee in what manner, when he has convinced himſelf of it, he preſſes into his ſervice whatever may facilitate it. All the veſſels he makes uſe of from Breſt to Eaſt Frieſland, whether doggers, ſchuyts, chaſſemarées, or of whatever conſtruction (and they are infinite) are without an exception "admirable ſailors; all take the ground equally well;" their crews, whether French, Flemiſh, or Dutch, are "daring and enterpriſing." Again, "*Pars pro toto*;" what is partially true, (it can be aſſerted from poſitive experience, and indeed it is notorious) is to a much greater extent unfounded. And how is it poſſible that the maſters of all of them ſhould be "perfectly well acquainted with our coaſts?" they are not concerned in our coaſting, not even in our ſmuggling trade. Some of their fiſhermen perhaps have a partial knowledge of it, as the Dutch of the Mouth of the Thames, and the French of ſome parts of our South-Weſt coaſt. But let us ſmooth theſe difficulties for him, and even let him land his men, and all the articles with which he ſtates they muſt be encumbered, uninterruptedly, and in as ſhort a ſpace of time as that to which he confines them, and without inſiſting upon the embarraſſment which muſt ariſe from the ſurf occaſioned by a wind ſufficiently full upon our coaſt to carry over, to the exact point aimed at, his heterogeneous flotilla, many

ny of the veſſels of which cannot be ſuppoſed to be weatherly. However ill ſupported many of his arguments are, there are certainly others by which it might be ſhewn that the project of throwing 10 or 15,000 men upon our ſhores is perfectly practicable. But how will he victual them when there? We have too large an extent of coaſt for it to be poſſible for our cruiſers, whilſt we are uncertain what ſpot the Enemy will attack, to protect with certainty every part of it; but, his diſembarkation, once effected, leaves no doubt about the point to be watched: and though M. Dumouriez ſuppoſes a part of his invading flotilla to return back to port as ſafely as it came, and, without waiting for a change of wind or of tide, again ſends it off laden with proviſions for the French camp, and makes the veſſels paſs and repaſs with as much regularity and eaſe, as he would draw diagonals from the oppoſite angles of a parallelogram, there is no ſeafaring man who would not conſign to inſtant famine the devoted army, whoſe dependence for proviſions, whilſt we are maſters of the ſea, ſhould reſt on ſo infinitely precarious a ſupply. The meaſures concerted all along the coaſt deprive them of any poſſibility of reſource from the country in which they land.

M. Dumouriez then aſſumes that the Invaders would have perfect leiſure to entrench themſelves, but his grounds for ſo doing are not particularized. There are very many points of the coaſt upon which 10,000 men could be brought to act, before the enemy could fortify himſelf upon them; but there are none on which a certain force, ſufficient to moleſt him, and to impede his throwing up works, could not be almoſt inſtantaneouſly collected; and if it is our policy, it is evidently no leſs our inclination, to adopt that plan of reſiſtance.

But let us ſuppoſe their intrenchments completed,

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and that we are compelled to beſiege them in form. There is little ſimilarity in the circumſtances, under which we ſhould act in ſuch a caſe, and thoſe under which the Auſtrians attacked the works thrown up at Fort Kehl, the inſtance cited by M. Dumouriez. They were then, though finally victorious, exhauſted and worn out with ſuch fatigues and viciſſitudes of a long and bloody campaign, as have ſeldom been paralleled, while the garriſon not only received punctually every thing requiſite from its comrades who occupied the other ſide of the Rhine in and about Straſburgh, but was itſelf relieved as regularly as a picket would have been. M. Dumouriez ſays not how long thoſe works were conſtructing; ſix weeks was the time, according to the beſt information I can obtain, and during which they ſuffered no interruption. The other points of advantage, which he aſſigns to the Imperialiſts, will beſt be conſidered together with his allegations in the next paragraph.

Theſe allegations are the woeful liſt of our military deficiencies: "We are unequal to the toils and "delays of ſuch a ſiege, and have neither gene-"rals, engineers, nor a battering train." How was the ſtrong and well-fortified town of Baſtia taken? By a detachment of Britiſh ſeamen and marines, or ſoldiers acting as ſuch, inferior in number to the garriſon of regularly-diſciplined troops, and who had no tents but ſuch as were made of ſails, and no other battering train than the lower deck guns of line of battle ſhips. As to the merits of generals, a ſcope may be properly left for opinion; but it would have been more becoming in him, who loſt the deciſive battle of Nerwinden, to have ſpoken in a leſs affirmative tone of thoſe, who have ſuſtained with honour the reputation of the Britiſh arms on the continent of Europe, in America, and in the

Eaſt and Weſt Indies, and have often led our troops to victory; and whatever M. Dumouriez may think, or chuſe to appear to think, we ſee with chearful confidence the direction of our armies committed to their hands.

How is it poſſible to avoid giving a flat contradiction to his aſſertion reſpecting our engineers, or rather reſpecting their non-exiſtence, whilſt it is notorious that their corps, coupled with the artillery, is the beſt conſtituted and inſtructed of any in our ſervice, and is at leaſt equal to any in Europe. The fortifications of Gibraltar, which baffled the combined efforts of France and Spain, were traced out by their hands; and it will ſhake another of his dogmas, if he conteſts the ability with which the batteries were conſtructed at St. Marcou,* where ſome thouſands of his invincible countrymen were repulſed with ſlaughter by a handful of troops, compoſed of marines, invalids, ſeamen, and artillery, in all about 200. How M. Dumouriez can announce that one of the fineſt, if not the firſt eſtabliſhment of ordnance in Europe is deſtitute "of a battering train," we know not. Even were he in the right, we have ſhewn that our heavy ſhips' guns are no inadequate ſubſtitutes for it; and he will allow that we have enough of thoſe, ſhould there not be at Woolwich an adequate number of howitzers, which otherwiſe our ignorant engineers might prefer for the purpoſe of rendering the enemy's camp untenable.

However,

* For the particulars of this attack, vide Gazette, May 12th, 1798. It had required two months preparations. All the fiſhermen on the coaſt had been preſſed, and the four frigates at *Havre* diſmantled to man the gunboats, which compoſed the whole ſtrength applicable to ſuch an expedition from *Chereburgh* to *Havre*. We may accept this omen of the reſult of the grand expedition as reaſonably, as we do it triumphantly.

However, let us ſuppoſe three or four bodies, each of between 10 and 11,000 men, to be ſo entrenched upon our coaſt, as to oblige us to bring down battering cannon againſt them: it is notorious that we have now actually on foot a regularly-diſciplined force ſufficient to enable us, beſides keeping a large army in the field for any emergency which might ariſe, to ſurround each of theſe detachments with ſuperior numbers, and ſuch a cloud of cavalry as to prevent the poſſibility of their ſtirring out of their intrenchments. Their communication by ſea would be cut off; and we could bring againſt them, in the courſe of a few days, a hundred, or whatever number we choſe, of 32-pounders, from our arſenals or from our men of war, which would beat their earthen redoubts to powder. Beſides, what cover, or bomb-proofs, would they have to protect them from ſhells? Reaſoning by analogy from facts which have taken place, how long can it be imagined that the period of reſiſtance which we could experience on any one point could poſſibly laſt? and what then is there in M. Dumouriez's projected operations, even were his ſketch of the internal ſtate, and feelings of the nation as correct a picture, as I have endeavoured already to ſhew it to be a groſs and total and, I think, voluntary, miſrepreſentation, to juſtify a tittle of the terrifying deductions, with which he threatens us?

He then exclaims, "What * effect upon France will the loſs of 10,000 men produce?" A trifling one certainly as to mere numbers, and as to ſentiment, and feeling and humanity; but a moſt powerful one of intimidation upon thoſe who are to follow them, when they learn, that not a man of their comrades, who put foot upon Engliſh ground, had eſcaped captivity or death.

* Why has the capture of the Hercule, and the circumſtances of it been ſo carefully concealed in France?

The concluſions of M. Dumouriez are,

1ſt. That if 60 or 80,000 French overcoming the obſtacles to a grand diſembarkation, effect a landing (divided and diſaffected, as a great part of the nation is) they are in ſufficient ſtrength to conquer and revolutionize Great Britain.

2dly. That ſeveral partial deſcents will have nearly the ſame effect, and render a grand attack more practicable.

3dly. That the threat alone of invaſion, if perſevered in, will deſtroy us.

4thly. That nothing can put an end to this menace, but a general war or a general peace, which can reſult from the event of the Congreſs at Raſtadt alone.

Let M. Dumouriez anſwer for his own conſiſtency. In his chapter upon France, he pronounces the Engliſh nation to be as "high-minded, as energetic, and as animated, both by patriotiſm and national hatred, as his own countrymen," and deſcants upon the eaſy poſſibility of our land forces alone effecting the total and irreparable failure of the grand expedition; and in the next page he ſtates, that any conſiderable delay, or the final dereliction of the project, would ſuffice to rouze the French army to vengeance, and the ſubverſion of their own government.

We may add,

1ſt. That where the invading enemy will be harraſſed from the inſtant of his diſembarkation, will find the whole of the country laid waſte up to the ſpot on which our armies will be collected to receive him, that thoſe armies greatly ſuperior in numbers, highly diſciplined*, poſſeſſing all the advantages attending the carrying on of war at home, and animated by every motive which can exalt the human mind,

* Under what circumſtances did M. Dumouriez drive the Auſtrians and Pruſſians out of Champagne?

mind, are ſupported by the whole nation in arms, nothing but ſhame and defeat can be the lot of the invader.

2dly. That from the conſiderations already offered, the plan of partial deſcents is not more calculated, than the preceding one, to anſwer the ends of the French in their grand attempt.

3dly. That the French Rulers, whoſe armies have long ſubſiſted entirely upon the plunder of Foreign Nations, muſt be unable to maintain them at home for any conſiderable time; and that, were it poſſible, they are appriſed by M. Dumouriez himſelf, that it could not be done with impunity to their own Government.

4thly. That the menace of invaſion cannot very much longer ſurvive the delay of its execution, and if not executed, cannot expire without diſgrace and puniſhment to thoſe who ſhall have made it an inſtrument to delude and extort its laſt reſources from their own nation, without a real intention of bringing it to the trial. That as our ſafety depends upon the failure or the relinquiſhment of the invaſion; and that as to the one, or the other of thoſe events, through our own ſtrength, or the inadequacy of the enemy's means, we can, under the bleſſing of Providence, thus confidently look forward as at no very diſtant period, no nation is ſo exempt from the influence of the event of the deliberations at Raſtadt as *This*, which appears to be the only one either willing or able to ſave itſelf. Nearly the whole of the evils, which could ariſe from the pacific reſult of that Congreſs, aſſembled to regulate and ratify *preconcerted projects of indemnification and plunder*, have been already felt by us; and the advantages which would accrue from the rupture of it would be extenſive and immenſe. In the one event we have little to loſe, and in the other much to gain.

I truſt it will not be imputed to theſe Strictures, in which I have endeavoured to confine myſelf cloſely to the text of M. Dumouriez, that by ſhewing the difficulties attending a deſcent, they tend to relax that energetic ſpirit which pervades the Nation; for no one can be more deeply convinced, that it is the exiſtence of, and the perſeverance in that ſpirit, which can alone render thoſe difficulties inſurmountable. I ſhould regret too, if I could be reproached with having permitted myſelf too much aſperity with regard to the Author of a very able, and, for the moſt part, a very uſeful Work; but where his candour and impartiality have deſerted him, it was ſurely a juſt object, if not a duty, for an Engliſhman to ſtrive to reſcue the National Character from degradation, and to endeavour to obviate the effect of wilful miſrepreſentations, which he muſt have intended to intimidate and enfeeble the country in the hour of its danger, by depreciating our credit and our reſources, and diminiſhing and depreſſing our public ſpirit, and our means of reſiſtance.

A SPECULATIVE

A SPECULATIVE SKETCH OF EUROPE.

CHAP. I.

AUSTRIA.

BEFORE the French Revolution Auſtria was the firſt power in Europe, not only on account of her hereditary dignity as head of the German Empire, but of the ſtrength of her armies, the extent and poſition of her territories, and her influence in the political affairs of Europe. Her alliance with France afforded her a ſecurity againſt the neceſſity of war with every nation towards whom ſhe was unwilling to be herſelf the aggreſſor.

She might even have avoided the unfortunate war in which ſhe has been engaged with France. In fact her influence in that country would not have been ſo powerful over a mixed government as with an unlimited monarchy. Her connexion as exiſting between the two nations would not have been ſo cloſe as that between two allied cabinets; but if ſhe loſt the ſovereignty ſhe had aſſumed over a weak government, ſhe was at leaſt certain to find more ſtability, leſs caprice and leſs intrigue among a whole people than in the avenues of a throne, the ſucceſſion of princes or the changes of adminiſtration.

By the preſent war Auſtria has loſt her ancient hereditary dominions in the Netherlands, which afforded her the moſt intimate and advantageous connexions with England, France and Holland. She has loſt the fertile plains of Lombardy, from which, however, ſhe never derived all the advantages they

they offered. She has loſt her influence in Italy, where a branch of her houſe vegetates, as it were, in a precarious ſoil at the head of a petty ſtate, that muſt ſoon be abſorbed by the democratic revolution: that revolution, whoſe ſtrides in Italy are too rapid to be reſiſted, and which, before the end of the preſent century, will unite all her ſtates federally, though perhaps not indiviſibly, in one ſingle body politic.

She has loſt all communication with the Rhine, by ceding that part of Auſtria which approaches it, to the Duke of Modena, with the hope indeed of recovering its poſſeſſion by hereditary deſcent, unleſs the policy of France ſhould have foreſtalled her by providing obſtacles to ſuch an event.

In fine, ſhe will loſe by the diſmemberment of Germany, and by the conſequent diſſolution of her political aſſociation the ſolid though ideal influence attached to the head of the empire.

And what are her compenſations? She has gained in the courſe of the war a part of Poland, whoſe territorial extent would more than double the Netherlands, and whoſe population equals a third of their inhabitants.

She has gained, as an indemnity for Lombardy, all the Venetian territory on *Terra-firma*, from the Lake of Garda to Rovigo; the ſuperb city of Venice, the Frioul, Iſtria, and Venetian Dalmatia; amounting to twice the extent of country ſhe poſſeſſed in Lombardy, compriſing twice as many ports and twice the commercial and naval advantages ſhe ever poſſeſſed.

By the concentrated poſition ſhe gives her troops in their retreat from the Rhine, it ſeems probable ſhe will ſoon poſſeſs herſelf of the Archbiſhopric of Saltſburg, of the banks of the Inn and of the Danube, from Donawerth, Ingolſtadt and Paſſau to Vienna; and this concentric form of territory adds force and coheſion to her hereditary ſtates. The peace of Raſtadt, ſhould it take place, will declare the fate of the Duchy of Neuburg, the Upper Palatinate and the reſt of Bavaria.

It appears that, honour excepted, Auſtria has gained much by the war. Her dominions, even her population, is conſiderably augmented. Her ſtrength and power are more concentered. Her new poſſeſſions in Italy cover Hungary and Croatia, and open a moſt advantageous market, deſtined to give life to thoſe rich provinces hitherto languiſhing for the means of commerce. She has now fewer objects of ambition

bition and policy, of diſtant wars and ruinous expences. She has more reſources to procure, by the channels of commerce and agriculture, that ſpecie of which her iſolated and literally *Mediterranean* poſition made her hitherto feel the want.

Leſs attached to the imperial dignity by the diſſolution of a body politic which conſtituted the glory of that auguſt title while it encumbered it with perplexities, ſhe can in future view the reſt of Germany but as an intermediate country ſeparating her from the French republic, with whom having no longer any point of contact, it ſhould ſeem ſhe has no longer any grounds of conteſt.

If ſhe remain at peace with France, Auſtria ſeems no longer to want the aid of alliances.

Her natural enemies are, to the ſouth-eaſt, Turkey, a country too feeble and too ill-governed to controul her; to the eaſt-and north-eaſt, Ruſſia, by means of her Poliſh poſſeſſions; to the north and weſt, Pruſſia, by means of ſimilar acquiſitions, by Sileſia and even by the Upper Danube. This will happen ſhould the houſes of Saxony and the Palatinate ever form a league with Pruſſia, as they naturally muſt, the one to recover her allodial; the other her hereditary domains.

Her greateſt danger, however, is on the ſide of Italy. By her Venetian acquiſitions, which conſtitute her principal force, and ſhould procure her the moſt important future reſources, ſhe may, before that happy period arrives, be exhauſted and ruined. The Venetians, full of their ancient zeal for the ariſtocratic government, hurried on by their indignation at the outrages of the French and the vehemence of Ciſalpine democracy, muſt in the firſt inſtance regard the Auſtrians as their liberators. The ſentiment, however, cannot laſt. That people will for ever remember that, for a thouſand years they have exiſted as a republic. To them even the mildeſt yoke will be inſupportable. The nobles themſelves will prefer exiſting as members of a free nation, to being vaſſals of a Germain ſovereign. The pride of the Court will be as incorrigible at Vienna as the love of liberty in the Venetians. The vicinity of the Ciſalpine Republic, that conſtant ſource of conſpiracies, that ſure aſylum for malecontents and factionaries, will electrify the moſt timid. The reſpect for Kings is ſinking, the reſpect for the people is riſing. The time will arrive when the Venetians will again be a free people.

Such

Such is the irreſiſtible progreſs of human nature, of public opinion, and of that revolutionary ſpirit which has ſpread over Europe. Its force and rapidity are enſured by the great ſuperiority of free nations over monarchic governments; demonſtrated by this aſtoniſhing war, and by the peace that will be its reſult.

The danger to the Houſe of Auſtria is, alas! too real. Her poſſeſſions in Italy are precarious, and will become a ſource of important wars.—Either Auſtria will deſtroy the Ciſalpine Republic and take advantage of the revolutions of Italy to uſurp the greateſt part of it, or Venice will be united, either indiviſibly or federally, with the Italian Republic. And then the revolutionary ſpirit will ſpread through Dalmatia and Iſtria into Croatia and Hungary.

It would, however, by no means accord with the intereſts of France to foment the inſurrection of the Venetians againſt the houſe of Auſtria, after having delivered that people into her hands. Neither would it be good policy for the French to favour the rapid increaſe of the Ciſalpine Republic, or the acceſſion of the reſt of Italy to join her revolution. But every democratic government is impetuous, imprudent, deſtitute of method; hurried on by preſent circumſtances, and urged by men of ephemeral power. And although the French Directory may not deſire the aggrandiſement of her offspring the Ciſalpines, ſtill leſs will they be diſpoſed to ſee the power of Auſtria increaſed by their deſtruction.

The French will neceſſarily act the part of the Romans in the quarrels of Antiochus with the Greek republics. As umpires they will be too powerful not to impoſe in the end a ſevere and inexorable law.

Events already preparing in other parts will connect themſelves with the diſputes of Italy. And Venice, one of the objects of the preſent war, will either emancipate herſelf from Auſtria, or the Emperor will be the conqueror of Italy. But it is much to be feared the Court of Vienna will ultimately there be puniſhed where ſhe has been moſt to blame.

The chapters on Switzerland and Turkey will diſplay a connexion of dangerous circumſtances that will contribute, as it were, to beſiege the houſe of Auſtria even in her remote *arrondiſſement*, where ſhe ſeems to have circumſcribed herſelf by her peace with France, in order to be ſecure from her revolutionary contact.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

PRUSSIA.

THE conduct of the French Directory in the month of January 1798, unveils another of the myſteries that conceal her ſecret and antecedent arrangements, whoſe developement will be completed (ſhould it take place) by the peace of Raſtadt. The negociations of France with Pruſſia are unknown: but it muſt have been with the conſent of that power that the French have lately (on the 17th January) incorporated the Duchy of Cleves and the County of Mœurs with the Great Republic.

It is more than probable the King of Pruſſia had alſo been previouſly appriſed of the firſt peremptory condition delivered at the Congreſs of Raſtadt to the Plenipotentiary of the Emperor by thoſe of France, and which were refuſed by him and the other members of the Germanic Body. This condition, which is to ſerve as a baſis to the negociations, compriſes the ceſſion of all the left bank of the Rhine to the French Republic. That demand was both preceded and followed up by ſteps of ſeverity and rigour. The French troops on the 26th January carried the Tete-de-pont of Manheim ſword in hand, and threaten to take poſſeſſion of the city itſelf, though ſituated on the right bank, in the ſame manner as they occupy the fortreſs of Kehl, Weteravia and Duſſeldorf; and doubtleſs they will ſoon, in like manner, ſeize Ehrenbreitſtein by force, if it is not voluntarily given up.

The French Directory not only ceaſe to conceal their intention of taking the Rhine for their boundary, but they dictate to the Germanic Body aſſembled at Raſtadt the very conditions of that ceſſion. They will ſend them the plan of partition, which, by the extinction of the Eccleſiaſtical Sovereignties and Imperial Cities, will afford indemnities to the princes whoſe dominions were on the left bank of the Rhine, and thus entirely change the face of Germany.

We need not here conſider with what ſeverity France exerciſes the right of ſuperior ſtrength; or how Germany is diſgraced by ſubmitting to ſo rigorous a law. The Germa-

nic

nic Body is an aggregate of great and ſmall ſtates, having no common intereſts, no common bond of union. In Germany, there are Auſtrians, Pruſſians, Heſſians, Saxons, Bavarians, &c. &c. but no German nation, and therefore no national honour.

Here then are the diſadvantages of a nation of federaliſts. The Dutch, the Swiſs, and the Italians, have ſuffered the very ſame inconveniencies; and have been unable to reſiſt a maſs of twenty-five millions of men, united in a ſingle republic, one and indiviſible. The French and Engliſh are the only nations of Europe that can be actuated by rational patriotiſm.

But to return to Pruſſia. It is highly probable, that beſides the eſtates ſhe loſes to the left of the Rhine, ſhe will alſo be obliged to cede Wezel to the French. For that nation cannot be ſuppoſed to leave, in the poſſeſſion of ſo powerful a ſovereign, a fortified city, which, in time of war, would intercept the navigation of the Rhine, and become a threatening military poſt againſt Holland and the Netherlands.

The indemnities of this ſovereign muſt neceſſarily be equivalent to what he cedes, and proportioned to his power and his complaiſance to the Directory. The City of Neuremburg, together with a few ſcraps taken from the Biſhopric of Aechſtadt, from the Teutonic order, and from ſome miſerable Imperial Cities, on which the Court of Berlin has for ſome years paſt made various attempts, though fruſtrated by that of Vienna, would be too inconſiderable a compenſation.

The true policy of France which her plan of negociation proves her to underſtand, is to remove from within her limits the two principal powers of Germany; and on the other hand, to bring them cloſer to each other, in order that their mutual jealouſy continually keeping them in arms, they may become mutually weakened: That thus they may no longer be injurious to France, whether ſhe adopt a pacific, or purſue her ſyſtem of conqueſt: A ſyſtem congenial to the petulance of a democratic government, ever agitated by faction, ever unequal to her expenditure, whoſe very exiſtence demands a conſtant warfare.

As no other part of Germany offers ſo ſuitable an indemnity to the King of Pruſſia, as the North, we may preſume it will be found in the circles of Lower Saxony and Weſtphalia, which preſent ſeveral Free Cities and Eccleſiaſtical

aſtical Sovereignties, beſides the Electorate of Hanover. This domain the French declare they ſhall moſt certainly take from the King of Great Britain: a ſtep, however, which it is by no means prudent to permit.

In fact, the North of Germany appears to be ſecured from infraction by a treaty of neutrality, as yet reſpected, and by the declarations of the King of Pruſſia. The fate of that part of Germany depends entirely on the character of the young Monarch who at ſo critical a moment is undergoing the ſevereſt trial.

Whatever be the reſult of the internal combat between principle and policy in that Prince's breaſt, he will immediately be forced by the incorporation of his domains on the left bank of the Rhine with the French Republic, categorically to declare for or againſt the integrity of the empire. He will either be the ſaviour or the deſtroyer of the Germanic Conſtitution. We may even believe, that this imperfect conſtitution excites no intereſt in the great powers it combines, ſince it is favourable but to the ſmaller members of the aſſociation.

Does good policy permit then its deſtruction, in compliance with the magiſterial plan and propoſal of a conquering nation, that ſpreads every where around her the ſeeds of democracy and diſorganization? Is not this feudal aſſociation the very Ægis of Royalty? Will not this partition, the reſult of ſuperior force, this involuntary change of ſovereigns, irritate the people, thus ceded, exchanged, and ſold like herds of cattle? The revolutionary ſpirit, the promulgation of the Rights of Man, the love of equality, will they not produce a dangerous commotion in the midſt of this topographical revolution on which the people themſelves have never been conſulted? Do we not already behold this perturbation ſo natural to ariſe, ſpreading through the domains of Baden, of Darmſtadt, and of the Black Foreſt? And will not the example of the ſudden revolution of Switzerland haſten the progreſs of this conflagration?

Can the King of Pruſſia flatter himſelf, that he has the certain means to prevent the propagation of the ſame ſpirit in his own dominions? Ought he not to dread the ſpread of democracy ſtill more than he deſires the augmentation of his territory? Does he not perceive that the fall of the Germanic Body is the reſult of a mortal combat between democracy and feudality, and that this barrier deſtroyed, he is but a ſtep from

from the very extinction of Monarchy? Does he not foreſee that triumphant democracy eſpouſed by an impetuous nation which periodically conſecrates (by its anniverſary of a national ſtain) the horrid oath of hatred to kings will take advantage of the diſturbances excited by the inquitous partition of Germany to annihilate Royalty itſelf, and eſtabliſh in every country a repreſentative and municipal government?

But ſhould the King of Pruſſia refuſe his aſſent to the firſt article, propoſed by the French negociators at Raſtadt, of ceding the whole left bank of the Rhine to France, which the has preliminarily incorporated and municipaliſed; that article which involves the partition of Germany and the deſtruction of its conſtitution; he will be forced to renew the war with France. Of this who can entertain a doubt? Who can doubt that the King of Pruſſia is placed in a moſt dangerous dilemma? It is for him to conſult his ſtrength, his courage, and his principles; and the fate of Europe depends on his deciſion.

We cannot reaſon on the ſuppoſition of his refuſal, and of the war which would be its conſequence, becauſe at preſent ſuch an event appears by no means probable. Let us ſuppoſe then that yielding to circumſtances and to neceſſity, he ſhould conſent to the diſmemberment of Germany, and to the ceſſion of the left bank of the Rhine to France. In that caſe he will be amply compenſated. His domain increaſed by one third of Poland, and rounded towards Germany, will be more concentrated in appearance; will poſſeſs more real ſtrength.

He will continue the protector of the North of Germany, at leaſt as far as the Weſer. He will have great intereſts, and an important influence in the heart of Germany, by the increaſe and the rounding of his domain of Anſpach: provided however he ſhould not exchange them for ſome other territory in order to form an indemnity for the houſe of Deux-ponts or of Orange.

It is probable he will have few points of contact with the French Republic, and conſequently few common objects to conteſt.

His natural enemies will be Ruſſia, on account of Poland; but principally Auſtria. The enmity of Pruſſia and Auſtria will ever be implacable both between the nations and their courts. It is founded alas! on mutual injuries, on ancient wars, on national jealouſies, and on reciprocal defections, whenever

whenever policy has allied them againſt a common enemy. Their provocations are heavy, their reſentments deep. The French have taken advantage of them, and will take advantage of them again.

But the King of Pruſſia's moſt dangerous enemy, whoſe progreſs will be ſtill more rapid in peace than in war itſelf; who is ever active, and knows no repoſe, is Democracy. To this enemy neither treaſures nor armies are a barrier. He exhauſts the one, he ſeduces the other; he ſurrounds and penetrates in every direction the Pruſſian dominions. He at once beſieges and undermines the throne. And that Prince muſt inevitably be buried under its ruins, unleſs he fly to his tent and change the character of ſovereign for that of warrior. He alone can reſtore to degraded Germany her courage. He alone can reſtore to Royalty its reſpect and its dignity; by ſhewing himſelf a *Hero-King*.

Should he without loſs of time decide on this line of conduct, he may yet be the ſaviour of Switzerland, of Swabia, and of Franconia, from the democratic perturbation already introduced there. He will rally around him, Ruſſia, the other Northern Powers, the whole of Germany, and even the Houſe of Auſtria: who has only abandoned the common cauſe when ſhe was exhauſted, and was herſelf baſely forſaken by her allies. He will ſave England:—Yes, he will ſave Europe. He will ſave the laws, the public morals, the royal dignity, and himſelf. Should he decide otherwiſe, he will himſelf be one of the firſt victims, to the democratic revolution. He will himſelf have forged the inſtruments of his own deſtruction.

The ſafety of Pruſſia and of her Monarch exiſts but in a general war with France; or, in a univerſal peace, which ſhould ſtipulate and fix the intereſt of the fifteen Powers, haſtily ſketched in this political picture. That peace can only be the effect of the moſt ſerious preparations for general war, and (if the threat be inſufficient), muſt be preceded by the reality. Already has a falſe prudence given time to complete the revolution of Switzerland. Already the torrent of democracy is there preparing to inundate and overwhelm the German Empire.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

THIS body politic cannot be better deſcribed than in the commencement of the Arts poetica of Horace. An incoherent ſyſtem of juriſprudence, as voluminous as its ſovereignties are numerous, ſupported this Gothic edifice, whoſe architecture would ſcarcely bear a ſingle glance from the eye of reaſon. Its antiquity, the inactivity of the neighbouring nations, the weakneſs and inertneſs of its various ſtates, the counterbalance eſtabliſhed by the Houſe of Brandenburg, to prevent Auſtria from acquiring univerſal plunder, or in order to ſhare with her the ſpoil, the even conteſt between two chriſtian ſects, that almoſt equally divide the Empire, ſecured the exiſtence of the Germanic Conſtitution, whoſe various ſovereigns were ranged around the ſtandards of Auſtria and of Ruſſia. Political wars agitated this country from time to time for the intereſts of particular courts or families. But the intereſts of their ſubjects had no ſhare either in theſe wars, or the treaties in which they terminated.

So little of public ſpirit or of patriotiſm dwelt in this ſhapeleſs maſs, that when a foreign power was at war with the Empire, it was within that Empire itſelf it found the moſt active allies, the moſt numerous auxiliaries. Germany is a nurſery of ſoldiers. The two great ſovereigns at the head of the Germanic body maintain armies diſproportioned to the population of their dominions and to their treaſures. The petty princes ſell themſelves, or their ſubjects, either to theſe two great potentates, or to foreign ſtates. But no ſooner is it requiſite to unite a nation, the moſt warlike in Europe, in defence of their country and conſtitution, than it is found impoſſible to give conſiſtency to this body, thus divided by oppoſing intereſts, and by the mutual hatred and jealouſies of its inhabitants.

The French Revolution has unveiled the ſecret cauſe of weakneſs in the Germanic body. Its members are ill combined. They have ill concerted their operations, and no ſooner has their individual intereſt, well or ill underſtood, been found

found at variance with that of the body at large, than they have mutually forſaken each other. The French armies have uſurped the whole left bank of the Rhine, have carried ruin and devaſtation into the very heart of the Empire, and have left behind them ſhame to its ſovereigns, and a revolutionary ſpirit among their ſubjects.

All Germany has now laid down her arms and humbly ſues for peace. A congreſs which will cover the Germanic body with eternal ſhame, while it ſeals its deſtruction, is aſſembled at Raſtadt. The German armies, in conſequence of a ſuſpenſion of arms, are withdrawn more than thirty leagues from the Rhine, while the French occupy Wetteravia, freely traverſe Weſtphalia, and lay under contribution the countries rendered neutral by an armiſtice to which they do not conform: while ſurrounding this unfortunate congreſs, they have poſſeſſed themſelves of Mentz, of Manheim, and the Biſhopric of Baſil, and threaten ſtill greater outrages, if the plenipotentiaries of the Empire, occupied more than a month with mutual diſputes of form, do not immediately accept as the baſis of negociation the ceſſion of the left bank of the Rhine to France: A condition which, under the title of indemnities, involves the partition of the ſovereignties of the Empire.

The world has thought this plan of indemnity may be eaſily executed, by ſuppreſſing the eccleſiaſtical ſovereignties, and dividing their domains among thoſe ſecular princes, who are to receive compenſations. This is the laſt blow aimed at the Catholic religion; and it is levelled by the Houſe of Auſtria herſelf!—Yes. As the government of the earth is not of divine right, this theocracy muſt naturally be annihilated at the cloſe of a philoſophic age, that has extended its daring views to ſtill greater exceſſes. But it is a ſingular fact, that as a remedy for the loſſes cauſed by the French revolution, they imitate the example it has given of ſtripping the clergy of their poſſeſſions.

The free, Imperial, and Hanſeatic towns, are a ſecond claſs of members of the Empire. Their exiſtence, to the number of fifty-one, in the centre of this feudal chaos, is almoſt miraculous. Nothing does more honour to the German character than the tranquillity they have enjoyed amid the wars of ambition that have ſo often deſolated Germany. It is amazing that neither feudality ſhould have ſubjugated theſe petty republics, nor any one of theſe raiſed itſelf on

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the ruins of the feudal ſyſtem. It was reſerved till this æra of metaphyſics, at the ſame moment to preach the rights of man, and to deſtroy theſe inſtitutions, founded on liberty and the moſt ſacred right of property. But their cauſe will be eſpouſed by none, for they conſiſt but of the people!

Theſe will probably be the ſecond victims to the ſyſtem of partition. Each of them will be loſt in the poſſeſſions of one of the great powers who are to receive ſuch indemnities as convenience ſhall appropriate to them. It is eaſy to foreſee however, that cities driven to deſpair by the loſs of their liberty, will be no very valuable acquiſition. The greateſt and richeſt of them will be the moſt difficult to ſubjugate. They will not only preſerve but propagate that genius of liberty and independence, of which the revolutionary ſpirit will take advantage to overturn every throne.

But let us quit the Germanic conſtitution, her eccleſiaſtical ſtates, and her free cities, which, if the peace of Raſtadt takes place, it will annihilate. The title of Emperor will then become an empty name, and even fall into diſuſe. Germany will be divided between ſeven ſovereigns: Auſtria, Pruſſia, Heſſe, Saxony, the Palatine, Wurtemburg, and Brunſwick. Each of theſe ſeven planets will be ſurrounded by ſatellites deſtined at length to become food for the maſſes that will abſorb them.

Each of theſe ſeven ſovereigns will be ſomewhat more powerful than before. But as objects of diſpute will be more numerous, as there will no longer be a centre of union; as the diet of the Empire, (that tribunal of Amphictyons) will exiſt no more, or fall into contempt; as the general juriſprudence of Germany, violated and deſtroyed by the peace of Raſtadt, will no longer be a barrier againſt individual ambition, wars will follow each other in more rapid ſucceſſion, they will be excited and continued by the policy of France.

Germany will be further than ever from forming a ſolid body, or the Germans an individual nation. That country will again become the theatre of ambition and political fanaticiſm. The princes whoſe domains border on the frontiers of the French Republic, will become her allies in the ſame manner as the kings of Pergamus and Bithynia were allied to the French. They will employ the troops of theſe princes againſt the other Sovereigns of Germany, as they do the Spaniards and the Piedmonteſe againſt England and Auſtria.

This is the moſt favourable ſuppoſition for Germany with regard to the miſerable effects of the peace propoſed to be made at Raſtadt. But a different reſult begins to aſſume much greater probability. The Revolutionary ſpirit will perhaps conſtantly fruſtrate the plans marked out by the policy of France. The people of Germany will refuſe to accede to a ſyſtem of partition. Threatened with a change of Sovereigns without being themſelves conſulted, they will prefer liberty, and above all democracy, after the example of that triumphant people who ſo imperiouſly decide upon their fate. The whole myſtery is diſcovered. National guards, municipalities, a repreſentative government, the plunder of the clergy, the expulſion of the nobles, all founded on equality, be it real or miſtaken.—With an exemplar of theſe before them, it requires but a few daring demagogues to revolutionize a province in an inſtant.

There exiſts at preſent a revolutionary *propaganda*, whoſe miſſionaries are extremely active and more experienced than ever. It has a ſeminary in Italy, in Switzerland, on the long extended banks of the Rhine, and in every metropolis. Peace will open new fields for its activity, and ſecure it fortreſſes in the very heart of Germany. In the North, Hamburg—Francfort, and Augſburg, in the South, will be its revolutionary ſchools, whence ſwarms of miſſionaries will ſpread with rapidity around the ſovereigns who have, with equal puſillanimity and injuſtice, been the deſtroyers of their own conſtitution (important even in its weakneſs), will then be eaſily deſtroyed by their own ſubjects in their turn. The proclamation of the Ambaſſador Mengaud to the Swiſs, declares that the French will engage immediately to ſupport all thoſe nations who ſhall demand their aſſiſtance to eſtabliſh democratic liberty. What will then be the ſtate of Germany? We ſee already what begins to be that of Italy.

What remedy can be oppoſed to the evils that threaten Auſtria? The ſhameful conferences of Raſtadt broken off, a national war, union, and a *Hero-king* who will revive the German Eagle with no other ambition than to be the ſaviour of his country—or a univerſal peace throughout Europe, preventing or terminating that general war.

CHAP. IV.

SWITZERLAND.

SWITZERLAND is the bulwark and the key of Germany. Her federal ſyſtem, the difference between her various governments, the ſmallneſs of her component ſtates, neutralized as it were the ſtrength of this warlike nation. Having loſt by the revolutions of France, of Holland, of Venice, and of Genoa, a lucrative market for 30,000 of her warriors, ſhe now finds a ſuperabundance of her youth at home that endangers her exiſtence.

As long as the French government left the Swiſs at peace, they did not feel that burden, becauſe the expenditure of the emigrants, and the ſupply of the armies, have ſpread a maſs of ſpecie over the country, and have turned all their natural activity towards the channels of mercantile operations and commercial profit. Every thing is now changed. The revolutionary propaganda has now been ſix years at work. The ſucceſſes and the threats of Buonaparte has ſpread a panic among all governments. Ariſtocracy is trembling, democracy is in motion, and deſires to ſhake off the depreſſion in which it has till now with conſiderable injuſtice been retained. The world know the deſpotiſm which the government of Friburg exerciſed towards the inhabitants of Gruyere, that of Bern to the Pays de Vaud, thoſe of St. Gal and Zurich to their peaſantry, the Griſons to the Valteline, &c.

The French Government began by wreſting Porentruy from the Biſhopric of Baſil. The Swiſs made no reſiſtance. From that æra the fall of the government of Bern was predicted.

After this the French revolutionized Geneva, and made it a kind of Fauxbourg St. Antoine.—The Swiſs preſerved the ſame ſilence. Then it was propheſied that either Geneva would be the bridge by which Monarchy would re-enter France, or Anarchy ſpread itſelf over Switzerland.

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The Valteline then roſe againſt its booriſh governors; and Switzerland preſerved the ſame ſilence.

At length the French government, ſeeing Germany at their feet, judges that the fruit is ripe: and therefore, deſpiſing the ſlow methodic ſteps of policy, ſeizes at once the reſt of the Biſhopric of Baſil, takes under its protection and revolutionizes the Pays de Vaud, and demands money of the Swiſs; ſowing at the ſame time the ſeeds of faction, innovation and anarchy in their principal Cantons.

Thus have they been at once outraged and menaced. What will be the reſult? Perhaps they will take arms to defend themſelves againſt a democratic revolution. They will then be ſurrounded and attacked, Soleure and Friburg from the Biſhopric of Baſil, and Bern, from the Pays de Vaud; while the Gallo-Ciſalpines will arrive by the Lakes of Wallenſtadt and Zurich, and another colony enter the very heart of the Canton of Bern by Mount St. Gothard. It demands but a ſix weeks campaign, ſhould the Swiſs be left to themſelves without a hope of diverſion or aſſiſtance from any other power. Then will Switzerland be ruined: it will be anarchized.

Should this not be the caſe, the Swiſs, diſunited among themſelves and conſcious of their weakneſs, will obey every command the Directory may impoſe. Then will they ſtrip themſelves of all the ſpecie they have amaſſed with more avidity than foreſight during all the calamities of France. Then will ariſtocracy be totally baniſhed from their governments. Then will the Pays de Vaud be free either as a petty republic, or by being united to Geneva: or it will be incorporated with France, becauſe French is the language of the country. Perhaps the French Directory will even extend its ſyſtem of incorporation as far as Friburg and Bern, and take for the limits of the Great Republic, on that ſide, the Kandell and the Aar. Should they even be contented with ſecuring the Pays de Vaud, either as a diſtinct republic, or as a French department, ſtill France will not be thereby prevented from keeping in a ſtate of dependence the whole of democratiſed Switzerland, thus become convenient for every purpoſe to which ſhe would in future convert it.

By democratiſing and ruining Switzerland the French Directory will revive the activity and military energy of that nation. They will procure a moſt warlike vanguard, for their project ever uniformly purſued, of revolutionizing and

extinguiſhing every ſovereignty but that of the people. Switzerland is no longer a barbarous country of impaſſable mountains, where a handful of men can ſtop the progreſs of a powerful army. The gigantic victories of the Swiſs depended as much on the topography of their country as on the valour of their ruſtic heroes. The Swiſs are no longer the ſame people: their country is no longer the ſame country. Their mountains are now cultivated and adorned with rich and happy villages, and, except a few intercepting glaciers, they have great roads like thoſe of France, affording an eaſy communication between their principal towns, and laying the country open in every direction from its frontiers to its center. The heavieſt artillery may now be conveyed to every part. There is not a defile or a wood from the ſuperb road of Geneva to Schaffhauſen; from thence to Zurich, or from Zurich to Conſtance. Thus in the firſt war France may be engaged in with the houſe of Auſtria, now rendered blind by the fear of preſent dangers to the ſtill greater dangers of futurity, the French will ſet out from Switzerland (then become their military poſt) in lieu of ſetting out from the borders of the Rhine. They will enter Germany by Schaffhauſen and Conſtance, while the Gallo-Ciſalpines arrive by the Tirol and the Frioul. The former will incorporate with themſelves by the way a numerous and excellent infantry of Swiſs, driven from their country by miſery, electrified by democracy, enemies to Kings, and lovers of novelty.

Such will doubtleſs be the reſult of the quarrel with Switzerland, ſince Germany, panic-ſtruck and almoſt brutalized by egotiſm, abandons them to their fate: not foreſeeing that Switzerland, in her preſent ſtate, is the Ægis of Germany, which after a diminution of one third of her ancient extent is menaced with revolution in all her points of contact with France. And ſuch is doubtleſs the great plan of the Directory in the quarrel they have excited with Switzerland. This is not a mere conjecture or ſurmiſe. It is proved by a ſeries of tranſactions and of facts, on which the eyes of all Europe are fixed, while democratic indiſcretion, and particularly that of the French, leaves no doubt upon the ſubject.

It appears by the oath of the Helvetic confederacy renewed at the Diet of Arau on the 25th of January, that the Swiſs are aware of their dangerous ſituation, and that they are deſirous

ſirous to extricate themſelves, without injury to their liberty or their honour.

Baſil alone has broken her alliance, and in ſo doing has acted unwiſely. For now this little Republic no longer forms a part of any body-politic whatever, while her poſition on the left bank of the Rhine ſhould warn her that, like Mulhauſen, ſhe muſt infallibly be incorporated in the French Republic. Geneva muſt expect the ſame fate, and the Pays de Vaud will follow.

But the Republic of Baſil, while committing this error, to which it will owe its deſtruction, has given an excellent example to the other Cantons, by admitting to the rights of Citizens her ſubjects, inhabitants of the country, and by re-eſtabliſhing that legal equality which is the only ſolid baſis of every Republican Government, and even of every well conſtituted Monarchy. Nothing is more oppoſite to the very exiſtence of a Republic than the ariſtocracy of ſeveral of the Cantons; than the rigorous ſubjection in which they hold a number of their Bailiwicks, becauſe they were at different periods acquired by conqueſt; and perſiſting to refuſe them the rights of Citizens, for which they have themſelves ſo valiantly fought.

If the Cantons who are thus circumſtanced have the wiſdom to imitate, with ſome modification, the example of Baſil, they will ſhut the door againſt the Revolutionary Demon that now diſturbs their peace. They will increaſe their real force by adding to the number of their citizens, and by forming to themſelves a conſtitution of more ſimplicity, and more agreeable to juſtice and to nature. They will inſpire all their neighbours with confidence and reſpect, and again become the bulwark of liberty, and a barrier to ambition. They will then, by adhering firmly together, be the arbiters of Germany and the ſtandard of the oppreſſed.

This reform ought not—cannot originate in the general diet. It would involve dangerous diſcuſſions and conſequences. Each Canton ought to have generoſity enough to adopt it *proprio motu* vigorouſly and ſincerely. The remonſtrances of the ſubjugated Bailiwicks are juſt. Their oppoſition to the law of ſuperior force is natural. If the Cantons are obſtinate, their ſubjects will find external aid, and Switzerland will be conquered by France, and diſtracted by a civil war. That people, hitherto the wiſeſt nation of Europe, ought alſo to be the moſt eſſentially free. Their fate is in

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their own hands. They may chuſe between anarchy and the moſt purely conſtitutional republican liberty. But they have not a moment to loſe.

The danger that threatens Switzerland is moſt imminent. That country may moſt effectually oppoſe it, by firmneſs abroad and wiſdom at home. She may avert a revolution, by a prudent reform and an unalterable union of the whole nation. What is paſſing at Raſtadt muſt influence the fate of Switzerland, and *vice verſa*.—Firmneſs in the Helvetic body may revive the courage of the Germans: the renovated vigour of the Germans may ſtrengthen the firmneſs of the Helvetic body.

Since the 25th January, when this chapter was concluded, Switzerland is democratiſed with the moſt fatal attendant circumſtances. Should ſhe by this ſudden revolution form herſelf into one ſingle body and nation—ſhould ſhe obtain the extinction of a federal ſyſtem, ever feeble and diſunited; ſhould ſhe have the wiſdom to avoid diſmemberment, and continue independent, ſhe will ſuffer but half the evil of a revolution. But it is far more probable the French will keep ſomething more than mere influence in tha country, and that the violent democracy of the Swiſs will be followed by that of Germany. This will happen unleſs, through the means of a general war with France, in which the Swiſs (harraſſed and plundered by theſe reformers) may take part, events ſhould take place ſo favourable as to produce an univerſal peace, wherein the intereſts of Switzerland may be decided on with wiſdom.

CHAP. V.

ITALY.

THE ſpirit of revolutions had ceaſed to diſturb the peace of Italy from the period when Charles V. completed the deſtruction of liberty in that country. Except three or four feeble republics, a theocratic ſtate, too weak to form a temporal, too ſtale for a ſpiritual power; and a kingdom erected for the Houſe of Savoy by its great alliances, and ſecured by its poſition, the verſatility of its politics, and other *circumſtances*, (a term ſufficiently vague to deſcribe the blind

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decrees of fate, which none can either alter or evade) the Houſes of Auſtria and of Bourbon had, after long and bloody wars, divided between them the reſt of that delicious country.

This ſtrange diviſion of Italy conſiſted of the kingdoms of Sardinia and Naples; the four Republics of Venice, Genoa, Lucca, and St. Marino, (for this laſt is alſo a free ſtate); the three Duchies of Milan, belonging to the Emperor; Modena, of which he had the reverſion, and Parma, belonging to a branch of the houſe of Bourbon; the grand Dutchy of * Tuſcany, belonging to the houſe of Auſtria; and laſtly, the Eccleſiaſtical State.

Theſe eleven ſovereignties, ſo unequal and ſo different from each other, were governed by laws and forms of government of the moſt oppoſite nature. No country has been more fertile in writers on government and political economy than Italy. Yet none have in this reſpect been more under the influence of chance, or the arbitrary will of her governors.

The general character of the Italians is deep reflection, reſerve, inſeparable attachment to their miſtreſs, and that indolence which ariſes from the excellence of their climate and the facility of agricultural production. Their country may be conſidered as the terreſtrial paradiſe of Europe, and almoſt without labour ſpontaneouſly ſatisfies all the wants of man, and offers him the moſt luxurious productions of nature.

The Italians poſſeſſed every enjoyment but that of liberty. They were more diſtinctly than any other nation divided into three claſſes; nobles, who did nothing, driven by *ennui* around a circle of the moſt frivolous enjoyments, ſhabby ſplendour, etiquette and titles; citizens, who ſervilely exerciſed every mechanic art, at once bowing and laughing at a powerleſs nobility; and cultivaters of the earth, who alone were raiſed almoſt to the dignity of freemen. Yet their ruſticity was the object of raillery and contempt among the inhabitants of cities, while they were revenging on their tyranniſing lords by badly paying them, and reſerving the beſt of their productions for themſelves. No ſooner had a townſman acquired a competence by trade aud induſtry, or a countryman by his labour or the ruin of his lord, than they quitted their caſt, and as the poor petty ſovereigns of Italy were always driven to expedients for money, bought a patent of nobility, and paſſed their life in lazy luxury and unprofitable idleneſs.

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* This has vanity created diſtinctions between dignities of the ſame claſs, In proof of this, we may inſtance the ridiculous title of the Biſhop of Liege. Sa Celſitude, which, though no one underſtood, conferred exalted dignity on its poſſeſſor.

With ſuch a character, whoſe great feature was habitual indolence, the revolutionary ſpirit could not have birth in Italy. Every idea of the Majeſty of the People was there totally effaced, broken and deſtroyed, by this ſtrange ſubdiviſion into petty ſovereignties. Yet no country ſo adapted again to ſeize and propagate the idea, for in none had the people been ſo majeſtic. For this, it was enough to awaken them from their lethargy, and preſent before their eyes the image of their ancient ſplendor.

Till the French revolution had paſſed the Alps, the Italians, who ſeldom read any public prints, which at beſt were partial and unfaithful, never formed themſelves into political ſocieties, becauſe it was prohibited by the government. They, therefore, conſidered the French as madmen, whom their Imperial and Royal Majeſties would quickly deſtroy. The reſerve and apathy therefore of the Italians acquired new ſtrength. Accuſtomed to their enjoyments and their ſlavery, they guarded themſelves againſt this epidemic diſorder, which ſeemed only calculated to diſturb their tranquillity.

But they have beheld the King of Pruſſia forced into a peace with the French republic; Heſſe, Saxony, and Swabia, ſucceſſively detached from the German League; and Spain prevented from avenging the chief of her houſe, and the intereſts of its unfortunate branches, to form an alliance againſt England. They have beheld the Royal Defender of the Alps receiving the law of the vanquiſhed; Holland conquered and revolutionized; the Auſtrians obliterating the memory of one defeat with the ſlaughter of another; the Imperial Armies driven with facility from the Milaneſe; and a nation, of whom they had till then entertained but a mean idea, covered with trophies. Since that period, the reflective character of the Italians, neceſſarily led them to place to account of liberty, that exalted energy by which the nation it inflamed, is rendered invincible. By this habit of reflection the popular ambition of the Italians was inſtantly awakened.

One circumſtance accelerated the progreſs of the revolutionary ſpirit in Italy. The French invaſion put tranquillity, indolence, and pleaſure, to the rout. Whatever moderation their conquerors were willing to employ, the neceſſity of proviſioning and maintaining above 100,000 men forced this ſober, indolent, and conſequently, avaricious people, who preferred contentment to labour, to undergo the moſt toilſome exertions. They were forced to divide the fruits of the earth with conquerors, intent on plunder, who like their

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anceſtors, the Gauls, entered their country naked and ſtarving. Beſides this, exceſſive contributions were levied on them. The Italians therefore diminiſhed their burdens by ſacrificing their ſovereigns, their nobles, their clergy, and thoſe phantom governments that had ſo feebly defended them from invaſion.

And what was the conſequence? Reflection has reſtored to the Italians their ancient popular dignity. The preaching and the example of the French, their own privations, and their wants, have accelerated this moral revolution. The Italians are an ingenious, a courageous, and an enterpriſing people. But their indolence drew a veil over their good qualities, from which the poniard of miſery has at length torn it away. The Houſe of Bourbon and the Germans have not been able to oppoſe this revolutionary exploſion. Their rod of iron is broken, and the French, who now occupy the place of thoſe ultramontane ſtrangers, have a talent peculiar to themſelves, of every where inoculating their principles and arriving at liberty by licentiouſneſs. The Italians ſcarcely dreaded the French, whom they conſidered at the moſt as a momentary ſcourge, perhaps, as a beneficial ſtorm; for they delivered them from the yoke of the *barbarians*. Perhaps, they imagined their conquerors could have no pretext either to eſtabliſh themſelves in their country, or to ſubjugate its inhabitants. Should they find they have been deceived, they will become their moſt implacable enemies.

Already have we ſeen the auſtere *Aſcetiſm* of Liberty ſpringing up ſince the year 1789, among the indolent inhabitants of monaſteries and of cities. Nobles, Monks, Prieſts, Lawyers and Phyſicians, have ſpread their Revolutionary writings throughout Italy, and have formed conſpiracies that have always been diſcovered, ſuppreſſed, and puniſhed—yet have ever ſprung again into exiſtence. Piedmont, Genoa, Rome, and Naples, have been moſt diſtracted by theſe diſturbances. Venice has been exempted from them by means of her ſtate inquiſition and ſecret puniſhments. And Tuſcany has defended herſelf againſt them by the precaution of her Government in wearing the maſk of approbation towards all the exceſſes of French Jacobiniſm.

The revolutionary ſpirit, when it has thoroughly infected Italy, will however encounter an important obſtacle in the clergy. Should the church be confounded with the deity,

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the miniſters of religion with religion itſelf, the latter will be deſtroyed with the former as it was in France. Should the prieſts be enlightened by the terrible example of the French clergy, which is far from probable, and have the wiſdom to ſeparate ſpiritual from temporal objects, religion will ſtill ſubſiſt, but will ſtrengthen the Revolution even by teaching it moderation.

A ſecond obſtacle, the ſubdiviſion of Italy into petty ſovereignties will, for a long time, prevent the Italians from forming themſelves into a ſingle nation. This diviſion deprives Italy of the advantages of a common centre or point of union, and may make the revolution of that country degenerate into a chaos of petty ſtates, ſome Republican, ſome governed by Princes. And theſe will be continually deſtroying each other; as happened during the ſeven or eight centuries of blood, from the fall of the Weſtern Empire to the time of Charles V.

This chaos, and the diſtractions and civil wars that will reſult from it, will conſtitute the firſt revolutionary epocha of that country, and can only ceaſe when one or more of her petty nations ſhall have acquired ſufficient ſtrength to form a point of federal union, more ſolid than the Germanic body, the Helvetic Confederacy, or the United Provinces; Aſſociations too weak to reſiſt the more active ambition of one or more of their parts, or the the ſhock of external force.

With regard to the union of all theſe ſubdiviſions in one nation of Italians, reſembling the Roman republic or that of France, it can only take place by means of conqueſt, as was the caſe with the former. In fact it is a chimera that cannot be attempted. The French Republic would not permit it from a regard to their own intereſt. We cannot then in ſpeculating on probabilities, foreſee any thing more than a federative union of the different ſtates of Italy. We ought, therefore, to conſider them diſtinctly.

CISALPINE REPUBLIC.

We ſhall begin this inveſtigation with the Ciſalpine Republic, as the eldeſt of the family.—This Republic conſiſts of the Duchy of Milan: The reſt of its territory is compoſed of the ſpoils of the Duke of Modena, and of ſome

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ſhreds taken from the Venetian Republic, and the Domains of the Pope.

No province of Italy vied with Lombardy in riches and fertility. Nature there anticipated the wiſhes of the inhabitants, and ſpared their labours. They were, therefore, the moſt inactive of all the Italians, the leaſt diſturbed by care, the moſt indifferent by whom they were governed. Secure from the attack of thoſe ſubtle reaſonings on liberty and political œconomy, that diſturb the repoſe of nations without rendering them happy, the Lombards ſeem totally deſtitute of every inclination to Republicaniſm.

The Milaneſe had ever been the theatre of war and of tyranny under her own Dukes. The houſes of Auſtria and of France had long diſputed its poſſeſſion. The blood of foreign armies had ever deluged the ſoil of Lombardy. But from the year 1748, and particularly ſince the treaty of Verſailles in 1756, which put an end to the diſputes between thoſe powers, Lombardy had enjoyed the ſweets of perpetual peace. From that period ſhe was reconciled to the Auſtrian yoke. Their national antipathy at length almoſt ſubſided.

The Court of Vienna governed Lombardy with conſiderable mildneſs. It had the wiſdom to employ Milaneſe troops in her armies, and opened the door of ambition and of honour to the nobility of that Duchy. She even drew from thence many excellent Officers, and many celebrated Generals. The police of Auſtria was ſevere as well in the Milaneſe, as in her other dominions, eſpecially in regard to the Preſs. Liberty of thought, therefore, was there confined within very narrow limits, and the ſpirit of innovation had made but a ſmall progreſs antecedent to the arrival of the French.

The Lombards, by being long accuſtomed to the yoke, by the reſtraints of a ſtrict government, by continual communication with the different nations under the dominion of the Houſe of Auſtria, by the advantages procured for their nobility in the armies of a warlike power, had almoſt exchanged their national character of Italians for that of Auſtrians. All their prejudices had taken the deepeſt root. That in favour of nobility was ſupported by a tribunal of heralds, inſtituted in 1770, as a repoſitory for the proofs of nobility, and to enforce the laws concerning the order of nobles. Their government was military, and a council of war had even the ſuperintendence of the affairs of the metropolis.

No province in Italy appeared leſs calculated for the reception of the revolutionary ſpirit: none of her inhahitants were

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ſo far from adopting her ideas of liberty and equality: none had leſs need of a change of conſtitution, or were leſs in a condition to effect it. No where had the ſpirit of philoſophy made a ſmaller progreſs.

Whoever had taken a ſuperficial view of France before the epocha of 1789, might have thought, that revolutionary diſpoſitions were not more natural to that country than to Lombardy. But there was a conſiderable difference between them. Notwithſtanding the precautions of authority againſt the liberty of thought, Voltaire, Rouſſeau, Freret, Boulanger, Helvetius, the Encyclopediſts, the Œconomiſts, had for more than half a century, unremittingly attacked every ſpecies of prejudice, and even the moſt uſeful principles: thus undermining a government, at once feeble and deſtitute of dignity or foreſight. The diſorder of its finances had thrown it into the hands of the nation, and the nation violently reſumed their rights.

On the contrary, the Lombards were neither enlightened, oppreſſed, nor miſerable. They were no way prepared for a Revolution. Though French impetuoſity, and the example of licentiouſneſs (which always ſeduces the people, becauſe they miſtake it for the enjoyment of liberty) have miſled them—on the other hand, the imprudence, the unaccommodating temper, the inſolence, the avarice of the conquerors, would have reconciled them to their ancient maſter, had he been but able to preſerve the poſſeſſion of Mantua.

But the incredible ſucceſſes of Buonaparte, the repeated defeats of the Auſtrians, and their being ſo ſhamefully forſaken, have cauſed democracy to triumph. The nobility having no firm ground to ſtand on have been cruſhed without reſiſtance; the Ciſalpine Republic exiſts, and Milan is its capital.

Already does this Republic maintain an army; already has ſhe incurred a debt of ſixty-three millions of livres; already does ſhe exhibit the turbulence of a free nation, require wars for her ſubſiſtence, and pant for plunder and aggrandiſement.

Democratic impetuoſity led the French at firſt to exceed the bounds of wiſdom and policy in favour of the Ciſalpines. But the Directory ſoon corrected itſelf with regard to their true intereſts. It ſeemed natural that the little Republic of Genoa ſhould be united to Ciſalpinia. But France has taken advantage of their mutual averſion to enſure their ſeparation. It is France that formed the deciſion, that Genoa ſhould have a ſeparate government, and a diſtinct conſtitution.

Notwithſtanding

Notwithſtanding the exertions of the Ciſalpines to foment a revolt, the French Directory has prevented Piedmont from being revolutionized. The French Republic is the Ægis of the King of Sardinia againſt Ciſalpine democracy. The Directory have good reaſon to prefer as a neighbour, a weak King to a reſtleſs and ambitious Democracy, whoſe governors already in their imprudent declamations, ſpeak of reviving the Roman Republic. As long as the French keep Mantua, and an auxiliary force in Italy to protect Ciſalpinia, or rather to keep her in ſubjection, the King of Sardinia has nothing to fear. But ſhould circumſtances cauſe the French to withdraw from Italy, that King will loſe his crown unleſs the ſame circumſtances ſhould involve the deſtruction of the Ciſalpine Republic.

The Duchy of Parma, under the protection of France, is a reſtraint to Ciſalpine ambition, by giving her a boundary ſhe is forced to reſpect. The Duke will be forced to cede to the republic his poſſeſſions beyond the Po, which will now become the barrier of his dominions.

But the ceſſion of the dominions of Venice to the Emperor, the demarcation of the boundaries acroſs the Lake of Garda and along the courſe of the Adige, and above all, the ceſſion of Legnago, an advanced poſt, that in time of war may intercept the communication of Ferrara, Reggio, Modena, and Bologna, with Lombardy, are the greateſt blow the Directory have aimed againſt the ambition of the Ciſalpines.

The Directory employs the Ciſalpine army againſt Rome. But ſhe will pay them as ſhe does her own ſoldiers, by giving them a ſhare of the plunder: without ſuffering the republic to be aggrandized. The French appear throughout to have ſaid to the Ciſalpines, "We will that you be free; we "command it. But we forbid you to arrogate the right of "incorporation reſerved to the *Parent-Republic*."

The ſeverity of this law diminiſhes, no doubt, conſiderably the gratitude of the Ciſalpines; who will emancipate themſelves as ſoon as they are able, and will then become enemies to the founders of their liberty. In the mean time they rob all their neighbours, Piedmont, Parma, and even the Emperor, for their new boundaries. They have begun a war on their own account againſt the Pope, whether of their own accord, or at the inſtigation of the French. It was the approach of their armies that cauſed the diſturbances at Ancona, Civita-Vecchia, Peſaro, &c. and finally produced the fall of Rome. They are revolutionary inſtruments

in Italy. Yet it will probably be found they have not toiled for themſelves, and this will augment their deep reſentment.

The fate of the Ciſalpine Republic is ſtill precarious. It depends on what ſhall be determined at Raſtadt. Should a general war take place, France too much occupied with her own affairs, will be unable to afford her ſuccours ſufficiently powerful; and the Ciſalpines will either voluntarily return to the Auſtrian yoke. or be conquered. The reſt of Italy will then be preſerved from democracy. Should peace be made, the firſt war of the Ciſalpines will be againſt France herſelf; and it will be cauſed by their reſentment and their reſtleſs ambition.

SARDINIA, PARMA, TUSCANY, AND ROME.

THE three firſt of theſe would not furniſh articles ſufficiently intereſting to be treated of apart. Their ſovereignty is precarious; their lot humiliating and horrid. Harraſſed by Italian democracy, protected with rigour by that of France, abandoned to the influence of the moſt arbitrary and extravagant plans of policy, they will vegetate, uncertain of their fate, till either the French Directory decree a general plan for *Republicanizing* Italy, or a revolution that is more than poſſible will change the condition of democratic France, and conſequently of her appendages, the Batavian, Lemanic, and Ciſalpine Republics, &c. &c.

The fate of Rome will probably be ſoon determined, and the expiring authority of the Pope buried with the preſent Pontiff, who now in his 80th year, is curſed with a longevity that has only witneſſed his deſtruction. The fall of the Catholic Religion will be the conſequence, and then even ſhould circumſtances change it will be difficult to re-eſtabliſh it.

NAPLES.

The kingdom of Naples is better conſtituted, better ſituated, and more compact than that of Sardinia. It has not like that country dangerous neighbours, conſtant cauſes of war, and unavoidable routes and paſſes for troops. It is rich, though its population is not proportioned to its extent; and

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it has a considerable commerce, though susceptible of still greater activity. Its government has always been bad, and its inhabitants, particularly the Sicilians, turbulent. The Kings of Naples and of Sicily, have ever been ambitious and restless, or weak men governed by their courtiers, and influenced by external politics; which, considering their topographical situation, could never have affected them.

Sicily is severely oppressed by the finance, and very ill conducted in regard to culture, arts, and industry. The Kings of Naples, as well as those of Sardinia, ought to abandon their fixed residences, and divide their time with Cagliari and Sicily. The latter, indeed, deserves a decided preference. For the King would be richer, more powerful, more beloved and respected, as well as more secure from external influence at Palumo than at Naples. It would, however, be necessary to alternate his residence between those cities, that he might not weaken the attachment of the Neapolitans.

It is a most extraordinary fact, that the Neapolitan government has been continually employed ever since the year 1789, in discovering and suppressing conspiracies ever ready to spring up anew: that all these revolutionary movements have been excited by the nobles, priests, lawyers, and military officers: and that these have as yet been unable to excite a revolt of that very numerous class of true *Sans-Culottes*, the *Lazzaroni*, whose loyalty and devotion to their King have hitherto been proof against every attempt.

This class of men have, however, at various periods accomplished many dreadful revolutions. They for some time converted Naples into a Republic, or rather reduced it to anarchy, under the despotism of Massaniello and Gennaro, tyrants equally absurd with Marat and Robespierre, though not so cruel or so enlightened, and consequently less criminal.

There is no union between Naples and Sicily. That most dangerous principle of weakness, *divide et impera*, appears to be adopted by the Neapolitan government, which could not, however, but be a greater gainer by the union of those two people than by their division.

The Neapolitan is naturally attached to monarchy; but as he has ever been governed by foreign Kings, he is but feebly attached to each dynasty, and is fond of change.

The Sicilian is naturally attached to republicanism. But should the revolutionary spirit disturb the tranquillity of that island, each city would be desirous to form a republic, as in the

the time of Carthage and of Rome. The paſſions of theſe two nations are like their ſoil volcanic, and if a fermentation were once excited by means of pamphlets, periodical prints, clubs, and popular harangues, the revolution would be ſudden and dreadful. Such a fermentation is extremely dangerous, when it acts of itſelf: it might be rendered extremely uſeful, if put in motion by their king.

The fate of the King of Naples is rendered extremely precarious by the cataſtrophe of Rome. The democratic army is on his frontiers; the French marine ſtationed at Corſu keeps him in awe. He will be obliged to become tributary to France, in order to keep his ground. But this ſtate of uncertainty cannot long continue. Should peace be concluded at Raſtadt, a pretext to quarrel with him will be found, and he will quickly be deprived of his crown. For his exiſtence cannot accord with the revolutionary projects of France in Italy. Should a general war take place he may become the emancipator of Italy, and he cannot, conſiſtently with his own ſecurity, adopt any other ſyſtem.

GENOA.

NEVER has Genoa enjoyed a fixed conſtitution. Neither individuals nor the ſtate were ever long at reſt. Sometimes ſhe belonged to the Emperors, ſometimes to the Kings of France, to the Dukes of Milan, to Archbiſhops, or tyrannic individuals: to the Fregoſi, the Adorni, or the Dorias. Sometimes was Genoa governed democratically by a plebeian, ſometimes ariſtocratically by an Andrew Doria, to whom ſhe owed her liberty, and that form of government which ſubſiſted till the invaſion of Italy. At another time wholly commercial, ſhe covered the ſea with her fleets, and ravaged them with her corſairs:—happieſt ſince ſhe fell from her ancient elevation and glory, and exchanged them for repoſe.

Such was this tempeſtuous republic, deſtitute of revenues, of troops, of navy, and of ſtability. Hated or deſpiſed by her ſubjects, ſhe could neither govern, preſerve, nor conquer Corſica. She even rejoiced to be relieved from the burden of poſſeſſing it.

The French revolution happened too near Genoa, not to cauſe ſome diſturbance among a people ſo ſuſceptible of fermentation, and whoſe hiſtory had preſented a continual ſtruggle

gle between democracy and ariſtocracy. The Genoeſe are neither able to preſerve their liberty, nor to bear a yoke. Thus the revolution they have embraced muſt neceſſarily bring upon them new calamities without procuring them one ſolid advantage.

Every commercial ſtate, like Genoa, Geneva, or Hamburgh, requires a moderate degree of liberty, and a ſimple and ſtable conſtitution, which enſures the moſt invariable reſpect to property. If the government is too ariſtocratic, it cruſhes commerce by the pride of rank and the devouring conſumption of luxury. If too democratic, the lower claſſes are jealous and harraſs the merchant. The labourer then gives law to the manufacturer, the mariner to the ſhip-owner, and commerce and induſtry are driven away by a kind of anti-ſocial equality.

Genoa has undergone a democratic revolution, though not without reſiſtance and effuſion of blood. Buonaparte, when he enſured her exiſtence by aggrandizing her territory, gave the Genoeſe at his departure from Italy very wiſe and very *remarkable* advice.

Should the revolution be completed in Italy, Genoa will one day be the principal naval power of that country. And it is by ſea ſhe muſt then furniſh her contingent to the confederacy. She will then create a navy to protect her coaſts and her trade. If the port of Genoa is too ſmall or too inſecure for ſuch an eſtabliſhment, the Gulph of Spezia offers every accommodation to form a reſpectable navy. This ſtation woud be ſo much the more eligible, as it would give life to the *Riviera di Levante*, and Genoa being always neceſſarily a place of great trade, a navy that might interfere with this object would be more conveniently ſituated at ſome diſtance from it.

VENICE.

THE very idea of the ancient Republic of Venice, like the view of ſome monument of antiquity, impreſſes a kind of religious reſpect on the mind. Her hiſtory warms every heart that is ſuſceptible of patriotiſm—that is not inſenſible to the love of glory and of liberty. Yet her conſtitution was the

severest satire on the human heart. Its foundation was suspicion, and its pillars macchiavelism, despotism, and mystery. Venice since the league of Cambray, that last epocha of her splendor, was supported alone by the refinements of her crafty policy. Her government having from that time disarmed her citizens, whose courage it had debased, and distrustful of the mercenaries to whom in all ages it confided its defence, possessed vast authority, but was totally destitute of strength.

Such a constitution might appear sufficiently good, and even wise and prudent, as long as the balance of Europe and the tranquillity of Italy rested on the policy of courts, whose projects might be frustrated by jealousy, inactivity, or want of power. The wars of Europe, and its revolutions, were then mere children's play. The constitution of Venice might pass for a chef d'œuvre, because it was adapted to the weakness and effeminacy of the age, and of all its social institutions. But it was not able to oppose or resist either the torrent of conquest, or the revolutionary spirit.

This government, so much esteemed and admired for its wisdom, was totally destitute of foresight. They had not calculated, that the French revolution substituting the people in place of the prince was changing the whole of the political system, and replacing the frivolous intrigues of courts by the vigorous and energetic action of liberty. They ought to have foreseen, that unless they gave similar energy to their subjects they would be either carried away or overthrown by this revolutionary torrent. This government suppressed and fettered every passion: the revolutionary spirit has exalted them.

The constitution of Venice, like that of ancient Rome, concentrated all the power in the metropolis. But Rome sent forth victorious generals, and invincible legions composed entirely of Roman citizens. Every one was liable to military service, and that service led to all the dignities of the Republic. The right of citizen extended to the inhabitants of every town and province. Most of the senatorial families were foreigners. It was not necessary to be born at Rome, nor even of Roman origin, either to be a Roman citizen, or to arrive at the highest dignities.

Venice was a metropolis of moderate extent; the centre of a gloomy policy, of imbecility, and of aristocratic despotism. Destitute of activity, she spread the tranquillity of slavery over her provinces of Terra-firma, whose humiliated

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and apathetic inhabitants enjoyed, under a government in some degree mild, though at the same time jealous and severe, a sweet repose. A handful of untrained soldiers, ill-disciplined, without officers, without honor, without emulation, and without union, presented rather a multitude of *sbirri* than a regular army. Their fortresses were ancient, and had fallen to decay. Their navy was a mere nullity, and the last war of the Republic with the petty Regency of Tunis, proved how much her naval power had degenerated. Her peace with the States of Barbary had compleated its destruction!

A national spirit, however, was spread even through the provinces of *Terra-firma*, and waited but for opportunity to display itself. Though the Lion of St. Mark slumbered, it was easy to rouse him. When he awoke, the wisdom of the senate should have directed his first steps. They might then have preserved the respect and even the attachment of the people; and converted to their own advantage that revolutionary spirit which the successes of France had established in Italy, and which doubtless would break out either against the governments that should unskilfully oppose it, or in favour of those that knew how to direct it.

In 1795, appeared a work, written with profound political knowledge, by the Count of Curti, on the dangers that menaced this government, and the reforms it needed. It was entitled, *Mémoires Historiques et Politiques sur la République de Venise en* 1792. He there proves satisfactorily, that her institutions were good, and that all the evil arose from the abuses of an oligarchical authority. He proves, that the abolition of the council of ten, and above all, of the three odious offices, of State-inquisitors, together with a revived activity in the four *Quarantie* would have alone restored to this wise constitutionall its vigor.

But at the period when the worthy nobleman published that work with equal patriotism and moderation, notwithstanding the dangers that surrounded him, and the misfortunes of which he was the victim, the French revolution had not yet assumed that character of conquest and extension, which the feebleness, the perfidy, the unskilfulness of its enemies have given it, especially during the four last years. The French had not then passed the Alps. Italy still persevered in her pacific system; and the reforms proposed in that excellent work would yet have saved this Republic.

Now all is changed. The Republic therefore ought to have become respectable by her strength. Otherwise, she must

either be oppreſſed or deſtroyed. To acquire this force, ſhe ought not only to have totally annihilated the oligarchy that undermined her, but no longer concentrating the ariſtocracy in her metropolis, to have extended it over the whole of her dominions, and thereby united them in a common intereſt.

The firſt and moſt indiſpenſable ſtep was to have converted her *Helotes* of Terra firma and Dalmatia into citizens, leſt their firſt advance towards liberty ſhould oppoſe the intereſts of the metropolis. She ought either to have committed her *golden book* to the flames, or have ſwelled it with all the principal families of her provinces. Of theſe ſhe ought to have ſecured the attachment by giving them a ſhare in the government.

She ought to have brought to light her hidden treaſures, and to have excited the political ambition of the men thus regenerated, by civil and military offices: To have renovated her army and navy, and employed her ſenators in thoſe departments; to have inſpired them with ſentiments of honor and of patriotiſm; to have repaired and garriſoned her forts; and to have ſeriouſly prepared to repel the evils which the enthuſiaſm of liberty produces, when the government does not direct its ſteps.

With theſe meaſures which would have ſpeedily rendered Venice a vigorous and a reſpectable Republic; ſhe would have had no cauſe to fear the turbulence of the revolutionary ſpirit, which, in that caſe, would rather have been beneficial by reſtoring her ancient energy. The government would no longer have been compelled to ſupport its authority by diſtruſt and miſery. The *lions mouths* in her cities would then have been cloſed; her ſpies, her informers, her council of ten, and her three grand inquiſitors of ſtate, in whom reſided the whole action of this narrow government, would have vaniſhed.

This is the kind of revolution every true philantropiſt would have deſired for the Republic of Venice: and of ſuch a revolution that wiſe and ingenious people were worthy. Such a revolution, or rather ſuch a reformation would have been a model for the reſt of Italy. It might have rendered Venice the centre, or at leaſt the principal member of her federal union, whenever that country had experienced all thoſe changes which the revolutionary ſpirit muſt neceſſarily produce in half a century at moſt, and probably in a much ſhorter period.

Venice is no more. But ſhe will one day reſume her freedom. It is eaſier to paſs from ſlavery to liberty, than to become

come habituated to the former after having enjoyed the latter. We may even predict, that it is by Italy the French will be punished for their rage in revolutionizing all nations.

CHAP. VI.

TURKEY.

THE revolution of Turkey is an unavoidable consequence of that of Italy. Even should the French respect their ancient alliance with the Porte, and be too intent on their commercial interests to excite the Greeks to recover their ancient importance and break the fetters of a dreadful slavery, the Italians, regenerated to liberty and enthusiastically fond of novelty, will send forth a cloud of missionaries across the Adriatic Gulf.

The revolutionary propaganda that preaches the principles of democracy, is still more active than the propaganda of religion. In this age of reasoning, religious intolerance is at length extinguished. But as men seem destined to torment each other on account of opinions, political intolerance has succeeded it. And thus no sooner is democracy triumphant, than it spreads inquietude and turbulence around.

If powerful republics have a natural antipathy to royalty, democratic republicans add to this sentiment the hatred of aristocracy. Democracy is timid and suspicious. Its action depends on numbers. It ungenerously and without scruple employs the strength of a thousand against one. But if these thousand men see twenty or thirty oppose them, fear seizes and drives them to ferocity. Ever in alarm at the least appearance of united opposition, democracy persecutes aristocracy even to extinction; and this not only within its boundaries, but beyond them and every where around. The more numerous democracy is, the more is it desirous to increase. This constitutes its whole political system. With unremitting activity it struggles to overthrow every government that opposes it, and none is more opposed to it than that of Turkey.

The French were not willing to leave the Italians either the

the *glory* or the advantage of regenerating the Greeks. They have thrown an obſtacle in the way of their communication by ceding Venice and Dalmatia to the houſe Auſtria. They have taken monarchy itſelf as a barrier againſt the revolutionary torrent. The *Parent-republic* is willing to produce an offspring, but ſhe is jealous of her own fecundity, and deſires none but ſterile children.

France then has reſerved to herſelf all the advantage, all the profit of revolutioniſing European Turkey. And for this end ſhe has founded a department on the coaſt of Albania in the Ionian ſea. This department is rather military than commercial. Corfu is not favourably ſituated for commerce with the Archipelago; but it is a formidable naval ſtation. The poſſeſſion of Larta (the ancient Lariſſa) gives her a footing on that part of the Ottoman continental dominions. In theſe two places will be prepared the books deſtined to enlighten and electrify the Albanians and the Macedonians, already in revolt againſt their ſovereign, and whoſe revolutionary impulſe it is merely neceſſary to direct. There will then exiſt a chain of democratic territory, extending as far as Saloniki, whence the revolution will ſpread into the Iſlands of the Archipelago. One of its branches will extend to Laconia and Attica, another to Conſtantinople, and the Iſle of Candia will be rouſed from that of Corfu.

The rivalſhip of England will redouble the activity of theſe meaſures. Her commerce, totally ruined in the Levant, will be entirely in the hands of France. And the Greeks, after confining the Turks within the limits of Aſia, will eſtabliſh one or more democracies, whoſe ſtrength will enable them to throw off their dependence on the *parent republic*. But before they acquire that independence, France will long enjoy her ſuperiority in the Levant.

The eſtabliſhment of the French at Corfu, where they have collected all the navy and all the ſtores of the Venetian arſenal, is an inſurmountable obſtacle to the chimerical project of the houſe of Auſtria, of having naval eſtabliſhments in the Mediterranean. The French will confine that power to coaſting the Adriatic Gulf, and will not ſuffer the Imperial flag to expand beyond its limits. They will have it in their power to cramp its trade, to intercept it, and to deſtroy it, whenever they ſhall decide its deſtruction.

Every friend to humanity muſt wiſh for the emancipation of the Greeks; that brilliant nation of deſcendants from Miltiades, Solon, Socrates, Epaminondas, and Ariſtides; from painters, ſculptors, philoſophers, and poets, who, after twenty centuries have intervened, continue ſtill to be our models.

models. It has in all ages been the wish of philosophy to behold the barbarous Ottomans confined within the limits of Asia, and with them their fanaticism, their despotism, and their ignorance. But considering the circumstances of the times, the consequences of this event will be dreadful to the repose of Europe. They will complete its disorder and its confusion.

It is by Albania that the Polish legion of Dombrouski, reinforced by Arnians, Bosnians, and Greeks, will arrive at their frontiers and in the Ukrain, in order to reassemble and regenerate the Polish nation. It is by means of that regenerated nation that Russia will experience the vengeance of France, and be infected with the revolutionary spirit, whose extended arms embrace the whole of Europe, which is covered by its wings of fire.

CHAP. VII.

RUSSIA.

THE Russian empire, in consequence of its remoteness, the dispersion of its population over an immense extent of territory, the diversity of its languages, manners, and religions, the fanaticism of the reigning sect, the profound ignorance of all classes of her citizens, the preponderance of the Court, in which all the intelligence of the empire centers, the splendor of her throne, whence all rewards and distinctions flow; the punishments, the riches, the misery of the country; the union of power under the yoke of a most numerous and obedient army; has hitherto never had any cause of alarm but from the intrigues of courts, the revolts of a few barbarous provinces, or the revolutions of the imperial family.

Petersburg is not only the head but the heart of the empire, in which all the channels of its political existence anastomise. The tragical events that frequently disturb and stain the throne with blood, are incidents which the people behold without interest or emotion, because they have no influence on their well-being. The Crown may be worn by a man

man or by a woman, and its poſſeſſion be procured by crimes and violence: to the nation it is matter of indifference; he who wears it is the ſovereign and is obeyed.

It appears that ſuch a government ſhould be ſecure from the attacks of the revolutionary ſpirit: that ſuch a nation is inſenſible to its influence. A people who never read, who know nothing, who have not even a newſpaper, are even ignorant that there exiſts a great nation, who, after a ſeries of metaphyſical diſcuſſions, have overturned a throne that had ſtood fourteen centuries, have propagated their opinions by the bayonet, and conquered all the nations of Europe.

There is however a great city in that empire where ſcience is increaſing, and where hatred and jealouſy of the court rally the principles of independence; thoſe germs of future republicaniſm. That city is Moſcow. Already the aſylum of malecontents and critics, it will one day be a focus of revolution.

Catharine II. appeared to regard the French revolution as a political game, which ſhe might convert to her own advantage by lighting up the conflagration, by encouraging the French princes with great promiſes and ſlender ſervices, by urging Auſtria and Pruſſia with her alliance to a war, that, whatever ſhould be its reſult, muſt weaken them, and by joining the Engliſh navy with one of her ſquadrons, to diſcipline her marine without riſking its ſafety.

Having accompliſhed her object, by engaging Pruſſia and Auſtria in a war with France, ſhe thought the moment was arrived when ſhe might ſeize the reſt of Poland. This was the motive of the peace concluded by Pruſſia with France, that ſhe as well as Auſtria might have a ſhare in the plunder. Thus was the ambitious project of the Empreſs fruſtrated.

The defection of the King of Pruſſia gave a mortal blow to the coalition; the Empreſs was ſtill more indifferent to the general intereſt, and confined herſelf to affording the emigrants a trifling pecuniary aid. Her ſucceſſor has more nobly diſcharged that political obligation to the houſe of Bourbon, by offering an honourable aſylum to the unfortunate heir of Louis XVI. and by compenſating with an advantageous eſtabliſhment the perſevering courage of Conde's army, and the virtue of that prince, which has procured him the eſteem of all Europe, and even of the moſt furious democrats of France.

This line of conduct has, like all half meaſures, done more harm than good. The French revolution has thereby acquired more ſolidity, and Ruſſia has loſt the influence ſhe might

might have enjoyed over the reſt of Europe; by either joining the coalition with an irreſiſtable force, or by reſerving herſelf for a reſpectable mediation.

Now her fate depends as abſolutely as the reſt of Europe on the reſult of the congreſs at Raſtadt. Should peace be concluded, ſhould Germany be diſmembered, and Switzerland ſubjugated and democratiſed, as will in all appearance be the caſe, the revolutionary ſpirit, meeting no obſtacle to its progreſs, will ſpread with rapidity over Turkey, which the Poles, formed in Buonaparte's ſchool, will traverſe, to reenter their native country, through Bukowina and the Ukrain, while the French, ſailing out of Conſtantinople, will attack the Crimea.

Political embarraſſments will no doubt combine their force with this revolutionary war. The Perſians in Aſia, and the the Swedes towards Peterſburg, will take advantage of the diſtreſs of Ruſſia to recover the provinces of which ſhe has plundered them. Deſpotiſm will ſink beneath democracy, and this coloſſal empire will have laſted but a century.

Ruſſia can only exiſt by the rupture of the Congreſs at Raſtadt, by an armed mediation for the preſervation of the German integrity, and by a general and moſt energetic war with the common enemy, or a univerſal peace, that may eſtabliſh the tranquillity of Europe on the moſt ſolid baſis.

CHAP. VIII.

SWEDEN.

THIS power ſeems to have three diſtinct and oppoſite intereſts in the turn the affairs of Europe may take. The firſt is to have no ſhare in the conteſt; to watch the progreſs of the revolutionary ſpirit; to hold herſelf in readineſs to take advantage of it as ſoon as it ſhall attack the Empire of Ruſſia, in order to ſhake off her ſlavery to the Court of Peterſburg, to recover her ancient boundaries, to extend them to the Neva, and by gaining poſſeſſion of Peterſburg, to ſecure herſelf the Province of Livonia.

The ſecond intereſt of Sweden regards Royalty in particular.

cular. It is to fruſtrate the negotiations at Raſtadt, and unite in the common cauſe of kings againſt Democracy.

The third regards the proſperity of her ſubjects. It is to oblige France to reſcind her Decree againſt neutral veſſels, and in order to avoid oppreſſion on the part of the reſpective belligerent powers, to form a naval coalition, either with Denmark, Hamburg, Lubec, Naples, Turkey, and America, or a ſimilar alliance with England, in order to prevent an invaſion. For ſhould that attempt ſucceed, it will ruin Sweden, cauſe univerſal bankruptcy, complete the ſubjugation of Europe to the unbounded power of the French Directory, and be quickly followed by the extinction of Royalty, the deſtruction of every Conſtitution, and that general diſorganization which for a century at the leaſt would conſign the Univerſe to Anarchy.

Of theſe three intereſts, the firſt is conjectural and uncertain: the other two are immediate and direct.

As a member of the Empire the King of Sweden ſhould dread the ſhame and danger of ſuffering the Germanic body to be diſſolved, and a Democracy, which would render his German poſſeſſions extremely precarious, eſtabliſhed in its place.

That Prince has therefore the ſtrongeſt intereſt in the negotiations at Raſtadt, and peace can only be deſirable to him, ſhould the French, by his meditation, accede to the integrity of the Empire, reſtore the Biſhopric of Baſil, and ſecure the tranquility of Switzerland by withdrawing their own troops from the Pays de Vaud, and the Ciſalpines from the Valteline,

CHAP. IX.

DENMARK.

THE intereſt of Denmark in the negotiations at Raſtadt is more direct than that of Sweden. To her the effects of Peace are infinitely more important. She cannot be ignorant that Holſtein is revolutionarily prepared in a manner the moſt active and the moſt dangerous. Her wiſe neutrality has procured her conſiderable advantages, but ſhe has incurred the evil of laying open her dominions, eſpecially thoſe in Germany

to

to the French propaganda, which has not failed to make a conſiderable progreſs.

The ſafety of Denmark depends either on the integrity of the Empire, or a general war with the Democrats of France.

The firſt alone would be inadequate, long to retard the æra of her ruin. Should France, dreading a general confederacy, content herſelf with the Meuſe for a boundary, ſhe will but prepare with the more activity during a ſhort peace, acceded to with reluctance, to cultivate thoſe ſeeds of diſorganization ſhe has ſown along the Rhine, and even beyond it, as well as in Switzerland, in Italy, and in Turkey. As ſoon as thoſe ſeeds begin to vegetate ſhe will renew the war.

Hamburg is of all others the moſt important ſource of uneaſineſs to Denmark. Should a peace concluded at Raſtadt, confirm to France the boundary of the Rhine, the Empire will be diſſolved. Hamburg will then perhaps form an indemnity for one of the great powers of Germany: an event that will give an active and dangerous neighbour to the German dominions of Denmark, which towards the Elbe are open and defenceleſs. The Prince who ſhall then uſurp that City, will either ruin her commerce by a military government, or by the poſſeſſion of the Elbe, attempt to render that commerce excluſive at the expence of Altona and Gluckſtadt.

Perhaps protected by France, Hamburg will continue free. She will then be a Democratic Colony, and focus of the propaganda, whence miſſionaries will ſpread through Hanover, Pruſſia, Mecklenburg, and Holſtein. Hamburg will then be the place from whence the dæmon of Revolution will ravage the North of Germany.

Perhaps the King of Denmark will take advantage of the ſyſtem of partition to uſurp Hamburg and Lubec. But theſe two cities, rich, populous, and republican, will not eaſily be held in ſubjection. After having ruined him by expenſive wars, they will re-conquer their liberty, and democratize his dominions. Denmark, however, has no claim to a ſhare in the ſyſtem of partition. She has remained neutral and unmoleſted, and cannot therefore demand an indemnity.

Laſtly, perhaps the King of Denmark ſolicited by theſe two Hanſeatic Cities, and purſuing a ſyſtem of moderation and of juſtice characteriſtic of his Councils, will declare himſelf the protector of Hamburg and of Lubec. In that caſe he will be at war with the powers intereſted in the partition, who, being ſupported in their pretenſions by France, may eventually cruſh him. Or France, ever conſiſtent in her revolutionizing ſyſtem, will perſiſt in her protectorſhip, pre-

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ſerve her influence in Hamburg, and render it more ſubmiſſive to her will than it could have been to his. Againſt no evil therefore will this palliative defend him.

Should France, in order to avoid a general war accede to the integrity of the Empire, peace will be concluded at Raſtadt, and the German Plenipotentiaries not riſing above the ſphere of preſent and ſurrounding intereſt, will believe they have accompliſhed wonders; not foreſeeing that France adopts a moderation repugnant to her principles, ſolely in order to remove every obſtacle to her grand project of invading England; a project, which if ſucceſsful, would involve Europe in univerſal ruin and bankruptcy.

Here then a maritime and commercial intereſt, no leſs important than her territorial danger opens itſelf to Denmark. A Decree of the Councils and Directory of France has already given a fatal blow to her trade. What will be the reſult ſhould the French annihilate the power of England, diſmember her dominions, rob her of her colonies, deſtroy her navy, and plunge her in democratic anarchy. Theſe turbulent and inſatiable Republicans will then rule the ſea with ſtill more tyrannic ſway. Not a flag will then wave but by their permiſſion. Every maritime power will become tributary to them, and none will be ſecure from their depredations. They will regard the toll collected at the Sound as a feudal right. They will domineer in Copenhagen, in the Baltic, and in the Elbe. They will oblige all the powers of the North to deliver to them excluſively, the materials of naval architecture, and Democracy will complete by ſea what her armies have begun by land.

The ſafety or deſtruction of Denmark does not then alone depend on the negociations of Raſtadt. That kingdom has other moſt important intereſts, not only in the failure of an Engliſh invaſion, but in preventing the attempt. Denmark as a maritime and commercial power muſt compel France to reſcind her tyrannical Decree againſt the free navigation of neutral veſſels, whether by a moſt active armed neutrality, or by uniting with England, Ruſſia, and Sweden, to render the projected invaſion abortive.

Ruſſia, Sweden, and Denmark muſt be the *forced* mediators of the negociations at Raſtadt. The Plenipotentiaries of the Pope, of Naples, Ciſalpinia, Sardinia, Tuſcany, Switzerland, America, Spain, Portugal, and England, muſt be admitted to its ſittings. In lieu of a mere Congreſs of the Empire, it muſt be a Congreſs of the Univerſe, and a ſacred armiſtice during its whole continuance eſtabliſhed. Its reſult muſt be a general peace, ſtipulating the

reſpective

reſpective topographic intereſts, and guaranteeing the exiſtence of all the powers that compoſe it.

In fine, Denmark can only be ſaved by a general war or a univerſal peace.

CHAP. X.

ENGLAND.

NO power is more ſeriouſly threatened by the revolutionary ſpirit, no power can feel more fatally the malignant influence of the French Revolution, or be more ſpeedily cruſhed or ſaved in conſequence of the Congreſs of Raſtadt, than England.

Without tracing either the cauſes or conſequences of a dreadful war which has eluded the calculations and deceived the hopes of all Europe, we cannot but admire that balance of ſucceſs which has preſerved the ſcales between France and England equal, conſtantly rendering the one invincible by land, the other by ſea. Both theſe nations have made conſiderable conqueſts on their own elements; each, when the others appeared exhauſted and diſcouraged, diſplaying more energy and reſources, becauſe they alone know the real force of patriotiſm, and conſequently with them alone it is an univerſal ſpring of action.

We ſhall ſoon perceive whether the Swiſs, who are in like manner attached to their country and repreſentative government, whereby the ſubject is identified with the ſovereign, are equally ſuſceptible of patriotiſm. If they are not, this want of virtue, with the ſame ſpring of action, muſt be attributed to the defects of a fœderal conſtitution, which by the diviſion of individual, abſorbs the general intereſt. Of this Holland and the Germanic body furniſh us a ſtriking example.

In this ferocious conflict between the French and Engliſh, the glory of the former has been more brilliant as well as more difficult to acquire. The French have diſplayed greater courage, the Engliſh more addreſs. While the latter had an excellent navy, the former have had every thing to create. Had

not

not the French been neceſſitated to ſuſtain an univerſal war, that employed all their talents, and all their population, they would in a ſhort time have equalled, perhaps ſurpaſſed, the Engliſh, both in number of ſhips and ſailors. Of this two recent events are a ſufficient proof.

Louis XIV. whoſe ambition aſpired to univerſal glory, willed to have a navy; and a navy was ſpeedily created. Louis XVI. wanted ſhips to ſuccour the Americans; and in two years he increaſed their number to eighty. But as Louis XVI. then waged againſt England a war of coalition, he experienced all the misfortunes uſually reſulting from combined plans againſt an enemy whoſe intereſt, whoſe will, and whoſe mode of action were but one. In 1779, the deſcent on England failed by the dilatory movements of Spain. At another time the defection of Holland fruſtrated their operations. Avarice and diſunion cauſed the loſs of a deciſive battle, and all the efforts of the laſt King of France were unavailing.

In the preſent revolutionary war the French navy has been diſorganiſed. Twenty ſhips given up at Toulon have weakened, and two naval engagements deſtroyed it. All the efforts, the ability, and the courage of the French, were directed againſt the neighbouring nations who threatened to deſtroy their liberty. Their victorious arms have ſpread depredation and terror far and wide. They have abandoned to the Engliſh the empire of the ſea, yet have not remained wholly inactive themſelves. Their privateers have occaſioned conſiderable loſſes to the Engliſh commerce as well in the Indian as the American and European ſeas. One of their ſquadrons has deſtroyed the Newfoundland fiſheries. They have reconquered Corſica; they have driven the Britiſh from the Mediterranean: they have reinſtated their navy at Toulon; their Breſt fleet is recovering, and they have acquired a new one at Venice and Corfu: In fine they are now moſt ſeriouſly meditating a deſcent on England.

It would be very imprudent to regard this project as chimerical. Should the war be renewed, its execution is certainly impoſſible. But ſhould the French only have England to contend with, they will by perſeverance accompliſh their intentions. The mechanical part of a navy may be compaſſed by money and population; the technical part is taught by practice, by glory, and by rewards.—The French are poſſeſſed of a bold enterpriſing ſpirt, which renders them ſuſceptible of every ſpecies of inſtruction and of labour. Theſe reflections cannot eſcape the Engliſh government, and

muſt occaſion it much diſquietude. England, having experienced in her own troops, particularly at Toulon and Dunkirk, the invincibility of the French by land, has beheld her allies ſucceſſively abandon her after having exhauſted her by ample ſubſidies. The Congreſs at Raſtadt is calculated to rob her of her laſt reſources, by depriving her of the means of cauſing a diverſion. The influence reſulting from this Congreſs on the fate of England is deciſive.

Should peace be made between France and the Empire, the Britiſh fleet, already driven from the Mediterranean, will not have a ſingle port in Europe. They will be excluded from the trade of Bremen, Hamburg, the Baltic, and the North. Privateers will be multiplied in all the ports that ſtill continue neuter. Their manufactures, already languid will entirely fail. The commodities of their immenſe colonies will be intercepted, or rot in their warehouſes, while the unavoidable expence of numerous ſquadrons will ruin the country.

The oppoſition to Government, the revolutionary ſpirit, the diſcontents of multitudes of artificers deprived both of work and bread, the decay of commerce, the diſtruſt which failures and partial bankruptcies will produce in mercantile tranſactions, the embarraſſment of the Bank, the activity of the French in fomenting diſcord throughout the three kingdoms, the neceſſity of maintaining a numerous army to protect the coaſts from inſult, the encreaſing expenſiveneſs of theſe diſburſements, the danger of keeping the whole nation armed amid the diſcord and innovation which agitates it: this combination of real calamities is ſufficient to exhauſt the reſources and the courage of the nation which derives all its ſtrength from its riches and its commerce, even ſhould the French not employ more deciſive meaſures againſt it.

What will be the conſequence, if the French, directing all their ſtrength and induſtry towards their navy, obſtinately determine to accompliſh a deſcent?

And here we muſt tear off the veil of illuſion, and prove the deſcent to be poſſible. Thoſe floating citadels, on which England relies, are ſubject to the caprice of the element on which they move. Already have we beheld a ſquadron eſcape two Engliſh fleets, and carry the troops commanded by General Hoche to Bantry Bay, whence it was only driven by the winds, having had upwards of four days free from any obſtacle to effecting a deſcent. Had it ſucceeded, Ireland

land would have been loſt. She would have been ſeparated from England, and thenceforth become its enemy.

Already have we beheld a flotilla of four frigates caſt forth upon the coaſt of Wales the ſcum of the banditti of France, without being able yet to diſcover the object of that hideous expedition, which ſpread terror even to the capital itſelf, becauſe the teleſcope of fear magnified the object to one party, and that of deſire to the other. Theſe two trials have been made—the one without, the other at the very mouth of the Britiſh Channel, and they ſucceeded.

Every naval man muſt know, that this Channel confined between two high lands, has a conſtant current running at the rate of three leagues an hour, both at ebb and flow; that there the winds are conſtant and periodical, from eaſt to weſt, and from weſt to eaſt; that their variations are trifling and of ſhort duration; and conſequently that a ſquadron can never block up a port on a fixed ſtation, becauſe it will be carried off by currents and by winds, eſpecially when both are in the ſame direction; that it requires the greateſt ſkill, and the moſt laborious exertions, to be continually tacking ſo as to keep always to windward, and not be carried away by the currents from the intended ſtation: that it is neceſſary frequently to return to port for water, to put the ſick on ſhore, and to repoſe and reanimate the health of the crew*.

It is well known to ſeamen, that in the narroweſt parts of the channel, to croſs from one coaſt to the other, with the aſſiſtance of wind and tide, requires but a few hours; that one night is ſufficient for the paſſage; that the channel is frequently covered with fogs, which may favour both the departure and the arrival: This every ſeaman knows; none of them doubts that a ſhip leaving the coaſt of France for a fixed deſtination in England may eſcape the cruiſers.

It will be objected, that what one ſhip may accompliſh cannot apply to an expedition which demands a great aſſemblage of ſoldiers, cannon, horſes, ammunition, proviſions, tranſports and ſhips of war. This objection, though it may appear to have weight, is merely plauſible.

There are two modes of making a deſcent on England; one by a complete army, brought over in merchantmen convoyed by a numerous fleet, endeavouring by main force to gain

* During the war of 1778, the ſquadrons of Johnſtone and Carteret remonſtrated againſt the unprofitable and fatiguing ſtation of the Channel, proceeded from murmur to revolt, and obliged their commodores to return to port.

gain the Engliſh coaſt, to repulſe the fleets which would obſtruct their paſſage, and the troops which would oppoſe their landing; and afterwards to protect, by its formidable artillery, the eſtabliſhment of this army, till maritime aſſiſtance were no longer needful either for its eſtabliſhment or ſubſiſtence.

This is not phyſically impoſſible to execute; but the ſuperiority of the Engliſh is ſo great, both in ſkill and naval force, that every probability is againſt the ſucceſs of ſuch an attempt.

1ſt. There is no French port in the Channel where ſuch a fleet could be collected. It muſt therefore be divided among ſeveral ports, as was very badly arranged in 1779 between Havre, St. Maloes, and Breſt.

2dly. An incloſed road or a ſafe anchorage would be requiſite, where theſe divided bodies might rendezvous under convoy of a great fleet of war, in order to ſet ſail together, and there is not one ſuch on the coaſt of France, even Cherbourg is inſufficient.

3dly. The preparations muſt be very ſlow and very expenſive. The project will be known; the enormous preparations will be a guide to the cruiſers and ſquadrons of the Engliſh; and the neceſſary paſſage of veſſels along the coaſt between the place of rendezvous, and the other ports will be eaſily intercepted.

4thly. The part of the Engliſh coaſt menaced by the known point of departure, will be fortified with greater care, and reinforced with more troops and artillery.

5thly. The winds that are favourable at the point of departure will be contrary to the junction of the fleet which muſt convoy it.

6thly. The Engliſh fleet being acquainted with the preparations, may chuſe whether to attack the French fleet before or after this junction with the convoy, by which it will be embarraſſed. In either caſe, ſhould the French fleet be beaten, the expedition will fail, whether the convoy remain in the ports, or be deſtroyed after the defeat; and every probability indicates that the French would be beaten.

7thly. If, before or during the engagement, the convoyed army ſhould reach the coaſt of England, and attempt a landing, its fate will depend on the iſſue of the naval action, and it will find on ſhore ſo much the more reſiſtance, as the Engliſh will rely on the proximity of the fleet.

8thly. Say what they will, ſhould the French be unſuc-

ceſsful, ruined by ſo great an effort, ſtripped of their laſt naval forces, they will not again attempt ſo raſh an enterpriſe, and will terminate with ſhame and diſgrace, a war by which they have acquired ſo much glory, and all their laurels will be faded; their colonies, as well as thoſe of their allies, will become a prey to their haughty enemies; and perhaps the powers on whom at Raſtadt they will have impoſed too ſevere conditions, will take advantage of their diſaſter and attack them anew.

The other mode to attempt a landing in England is partial; it may either be executed from many points at once, or in ſucceſſion. It neither requires large tranſports nor ſhips of the line to eſcort them. The preparations extending from Holland to Breſt threaten more points, attract leſs notice, are leſs expenſive, and more practicable.

Gun-boats, bomb-boats, frigates, and corvettes, conſtitute all the naval force, and can alone be uſeful againſt the batteries on the coaſt. *Chaſſemarées* and boats with decks may eaſily convey the troops, the cannons, and their carriages as ballaſt, together with ammunition, and eight days proviſions. There are upwards of 1500 of theſe *chaſſemarées* on the French coaſt of the channel, between Breſt and Dunkirk, and almoſt as many from Dunkirk to Eaſt Frieſland. Each of theſe boats, for a paſſage of 24 hours, may carry 100 men with one piece of cannon, its carriage and ammunition in the hold. Theſe boats run aground without danger; and the diſembarkation is performed with facility. They are excellent ſailers: the men are bold, and the maſters are perfectly acquainted with the Engliſh coaſts. In three days time 200 of theſe boats may very eaſily be brought together at any part of the coaſt. The troops may be collected in the ſame ſpace of time, at a given point. The embarkation of diſmounted artillery, of ſome horſes with their forage, ammunition, dry proviſions, and medicines, may be completed in three hours, and the diſembarkation in the ſame.

Forty gun-boats of the new model, each carrying two twelve-pounders and four horſes, make the advanced guard, and may even be drawn aſhore by means of their falſe keels. They cover the ſhore by means of their fire, and ſecure an undiſturbed landing. Ten ſand-bags per man, as many palliſades and pick-axes, afford the means of entrenchment.

This fleet may eaſily convey to England 10,000 foot and 500 horſe; and the time of departure depending on their own choice, it is almoſt impoſſible for cruiſers to intercept them.—

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One diviſion of gun-boats may remain with the troops; the others, with the *chaſſe-marées*, may return to the point of departure, and be every night employed in bringing proviſions for the entrenched camp, which the enemy's ſhips, drawing too much water, and not daring to expoſe themſelves to the red-hot ſhot of the camp batteries and gun-boats, cannot approach.

On the ſouthern and eaſtern coaſt of England, which is very much indented, are an infinity of points, ſuſceptible of ſuch a deſcent, of the importance of which the Engliſh themſelves perhaps are not aware. And this method of landing may be employed at once on many parts of the Britiſh coaſt, with equal ſecrecy, celerity, and ſucceſs.

It will be objected, that a corps of 10,000 men is a mere handful, which cannot reſiſt the numerous army the Engliſh will bring againſt them. This might be true, if that multitude could immediately be brought to act againſt the French before they were entrenched. But that cannot take place: and once entrenched, they muſt be regularly beſieged.

A like number of men, in the entrenchments of earth at Fort Kehl, ſtopped during two months an Auſtrian army, not only numerous, but at that time victorious, better trained to war than the Engliſh, and provided with able engineers, good beſieging artillery, and excellent cannoneers. The Engliſh cannot flatter themſelves with the idea of carrying, at the firſt onſet, entrenchments lined with 10,000 French inured to war, and a formidable artillery.

Once engaged in the delays of a ſiege, without experience in this kind of war, without ſkilful generals, engineers, ſiege artillery, fearing ſimilar expeditions on many other parts of the coaſt which they dare not leave unprotected; the patriotiſm of the military will cool, the expence increaſe, trade be annihilated, and individual bankruptcies, unavoidable failures of payment, the conſternation of the towns, of the country, and of manufacturers; and, above all, the diſcontent of the people and the revolutionary ſpirit, will hurry on diſorder and confuſion. Then will the reſource of the Engliſh, even before a defeat, be a humiliating and dear bought peace, ſhould the French, who have not virtue to ſet bounds to their victories, have the moderation to conſent to it.

Let us ſuppoſe the moſt favourable caſe for England, that the French be repulſed in the firſt attempt; this will ſurely not take place at the moment of the deſcent. Every man who underſtands tactics, knows that it is impoſſible to prevent a landing. It will only take place after the ſiege of their entrenchments,

trenchments, which will have been forced, and themſelves put to the ſword or taken priſoners. What is the loſs of 10,000 men to France, who will at leaſt have coſt England an equal number? France will correct her plans and begin anew.

We muſt conclude, 1ſt. That a deſcent in a maſs on England or Ireland is ſubject to enormous difficulties and great inconveniences, but that it is not phyſically impoſſible; that an army of from 60 to 80,000 men, once landed in England, may ſubſiſt there, without wanting to be victualled by ſea; that from the diſpoſition of the Engliſh nation, from the aſcendancy which democracy is gaining throughout Europe, it will find partiſans and reſources in a country, rich, abundant, and entirely open; that ſuch an army is ſufficient to march to London, reduce England to ſubjection, deſtroy royalty, and change the conſtitution.

2dly. That one or more partial deſcents, are much more eaſy to accompliſh, have nearly the ſame effect, and form the advanced guard of the grand deſcent, by ſecuring a footing in the country.

3dly. That the threat alone of a grand deſcent, keeps all England in alarm, and ruins it by fatiguing cruiſes, by arming the coaſts, and by a ſtanding army. And that England cannot ſupport this ſtate of perplexity during ſo long a period as France can continue to hold out the phantom.

4thly. That the threat of a grand deſcent can only ceaſe by a general war againſt France, which might occupy elſewhere, the forces deſtined for this project, or rather this phantom, or by an univerſal peace. That it is at Raſtadt that one or the other muſt be decided. That thus the fate of England wholly depends upon the reſult of the negotiations at Raſtadt.

It is proved under the chapter on Denmark, that the intereſt of the maritime powers requires that the project of a deſcent on England, not only fail, but that it ceaſe to exiſt. The continental powers have the ſame intereſt: The univerſal bankruptcy which would follow it, all the ſpecie of Europe in the hands of a nation greedy and uncontrouled, all the power by land and ſea united in it, would leave no bounds to its ambition and rapacity, which have always been known to increaſe in proportion to its ſucceſs. The fall of every throne, the annihilation of all political, civil, and religious conſtitutions, would be the fatal reſult. Democracy would devour all Europe, and finiſh by devouring itſelf.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

SPAIN.

SPAIN, ſince the epocha of the French revolution, has paſſed through every gradation of debaſement. Situated at the extremity of Europe, deſtitute of neighbours who might ſupport her, conſtantly defeated, panic ſtruck by the ſucceſſes of the French, and ſtill more by the revolution—it was natural for her to abandon the confederacy, and make a ſeparate peace.

To diſcover through what motives this branch of the Houſe of Bourbon became allied with the murderers of the Chief of her family againſt England, we muſt grope amid the chaos of court intrigue, and the dark cavern of the human paſſions. It was a ſtep at once repugnant to the intereſts of Spain, and to the maxims of ſound policy.

Spain had declared war againſt France, without foreſeeing that ſhe would require an army by land. She had been puniſhed for it, by her defeats. Yet this firſt leſſon did not correct her improvidence. Before ſhe engaged in a war againſt England, ſhe ſhould have calculated that the navy of France being deſtroyed, the whole weight of the war muſt fall upon herſelf: that to ſtruggle with ſo formidable an enemy, ſhe only poſſeſſed an inert and inexperienced navy; that her vaſt colonies were open and defenceleſs; that her galleons, returning with cargoes of ſilver, would be expoſed to plunder, or, being unavoidably delayed, might occaſion her finances to be embarraſſed.

What advantage could ſhe expect from the iſſue of the war, even ſuppoſing the events to be wholly favourable to herſelf and her ally? Did ſhe expect to become miſtreſs of Portugal and Gibraltar? But theſe expeditions cannot ſucceed without the aid of a French army. Such an army, when ſtationed in Spain, muſt be fatal to her. It would annihilate all the advantages of both theſe conqueſts, either by introducing into Spain a moral and religious diſorganization, or by violently deſtroying, in ſpite of the Court, the incoherent alliance of the two nations, through mutual antipathy, and the indignation

indignation of Spaniſh prejudices againſt French immorality.

Theſe two expeditions would be ſlow, expenſive, and uncertain. Their immenſe diſburſements would fall on Spain alone. The French muſt even be compenſated by new ceſſions, which in all probability would open the Spaniſh colonies on the continent of South America to the fatal effects of French activity. Should even her colonies remain entire, and the compenſations be made at the expence of Portugal, France would demand a part, if not the whole, of the Braſils. What eligible neighbours for the Spaniſh Court!

Does ſhe expect, by combining their naval ſtrength, to give ſucceſs to the invaſion of England? Not a nation in Europe has a ſtronger intereſt than Spain in the failure of a project which would give France the empire of the ſeas, and make her miſtreſs of the world. Spain may often experience humiliations, and even real injuries, from the haughty Engliſh government; but England can never form a project to deſtroy her commerce, or conquer her colonies. She has an intereſt, on account of her own mercantile relations, to treat her with mildneſs; and temper her ſuperiority with moderation.

It is not the ſame with France. Though ſhe ſucceed in conquering and diſorganizing England, either ſhe will ſubjugate Spain like Holland and Switzerland, or if Spain, when it is too late, would ſhake off the yoke, ſhe will make her feel all the weight of her vengeance. The leaſt ſhe can expect is, that France will ſeize her commerce with the Indies, and fix ſtations of her own in Mexico and Peru. Then will the revolutionary ſpirit, whoſe progreſs is independent of the policy of France, and which often oppoſes and fruſtrates the meaſures of her government, without even ſuffering that government to direct it, begin its apoſtolic labours among the oppreſſed Indians and diſcontented coloniſts. Their active democracy will murder their viceroys, break all their connections with the mother country, carry on an excluſive commerce with France in the European manufactures; and the empire of the Indies will be loſt.

Spain herſelf will be catechumeniſed like her colonies. Democracy will ſhake the Spaniſh throne, and daſh to pieces her two and twenty crowns. This fine country will be divided into as many confederate or diſtinct republics as it is now compoſed of provinces. Such is the ſyſtem the French have diſplayed in Italy. Such is the true policy of the *parent-republic*. Deſtruction to kings, democracy to their territories, the formation of ſmall republics, and the preventi-

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on of great national confederations, that Frenchmen may alone enjoy univerſal and uninterrupted dominion.

To them ſuch a ſyſtem will be extremely advantageous. For thoſe republics will become their tributaries, and thus, by diminiſhing their internal taxation, cauſe the whole country to abound in wealth.

Spain is at preſent thrown out of her political orbit, and muſt deſire to return to it. The alliance of her King with the French Republic is burdenſome, monſtrous, and dangerous. Her diſputes with England are trifling; the grievances detailed in her manifeſto prove it. By England the vanity of the Spaniſh Monarch might be wounded; by France his very exiſtence is endangered.

The ſafety of Spain depends then on that of England, and conſequently on the congreſs of Raſtadt. It depends on a general war or an univerſal peace.

CHAP. XII.

PORTUGAL.

PORTUGAL, the ſatellite of England, like all the powers of the ſecond order, is hurried on by the vortex of her planet in the general commotion of Europe. The violent conduct of France to this power, the violation of the law of nations in the perſon of her ambaſſador, the inſolence of the Directory in negociating with her Court, the rigorous conditions they impoſed,—all theſe motives ought to irritate the national honour of the Portugueſe, who formerly poſſeſſed ſo great a ſhare of it, and lay on them an indiſpenſable obligation never to yield but in the laſt extremity.

The ſtorm that threatens Portugal is furious, but there exiſt many chances in her favour. She ought at leaſt to wait the reſult of the congreſs of Raſtadt to decide. 'To ſeize the preſent with celerity is the true policy of the ſtrong; to gain time is the only reſource of the weak.' Spain alone is unable to ſubjugate Portugal, while defended by an army of 40,000 men, and by double that number of militia, whoſe

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ſelf-love is equally lofty with the proud and high-ſpirited Spaniards.

It is not even the intereſt of the Spaniſh Court to undertake alone an expedition againſt Portugal, that would abſorb all her military ſtrength, without affording a certainty of ſucceſs. Should ſhe unfortunately complete that conqueſt, ſhe would excite the jealouſy of France, and France would at leaſt exact the ceſſion of Brazil. Should ſhe fail, which is far more probable, exhauſted in the conteſt, ſhe would lie at the mercy of the French. Should this war, once engaged in, continue for any length of time, as it probably would, France would *forcibly* join her unwelcome auxiliaries to the Spaniſh army, nor would Spain dare refuſe her deſtructive aid.

The intereſt of Spain, then, is to act with caution towards Portugal, to ſeize every political means of temporizing, to avoid an open rupture that might force her into a war with this her natural ally, to reſtrain as long as poſſible the petulance of the French, and oppoſe to it her mediation, whereby the diſputes between Portugal and France may be terminated without a blow.

The French Directory have long threatened to march an army through Spain, to the conqueſt of Portugal. She has now devoted to it a diviſion of that of Italy. Under this pretext, Gen. Angereau has been deprived of the brilliant command of the army of the Rhine, to put himſelf at the head of that of the Pyrenees.

But France is not yet relieved from all her embarraſſments on the reſt of the continent, nor will ſhe be relieved from them till the concluſion of the congreſs at Raſtadt, whoſe reſult will either be peace to the empire, or a general war. The affairs of Rome afford new objects to her policy. Thoſe of Switzerland employ an important diviſion of her Italian army. The projected invaſion of England engroſſes the bulk of her forces. The Directory dare not leave either the interior or the metropolis of France in a defenceleſs ſtate. It does not therefore appear that this is a favourable ſeaſon for ſending an army two hundred leagues from her frontiers, without the means of maritime communication.

The Court of Spain cannot, without equal repugnance and terror, behold a French army traverſe her dominions, to attack Portugal. The Directory are deſtitute of money for its ſupport, and it muſt therefore be paid by Spain. That Court would be obliged to join them with her own troops, who would quickly be poiſoned by the contact of theſe revolutionary

lutionary ſoldiers. The Spaniards would either adopt the opinions of their preaching gueſts, or their indignation would be rouſed at their principles and their conduct. The Court of Spain would incur a riſk either of the complete diſorganization of her army and the defection of her democratized ſubjects, or the indignation of the people, who, remembering their long-accumulated grievances, of which the unfortunate war with England is not the ſmalleſt, would perhaps unite with the Portugueze to rid themſelves of theſe odious auxiliaries. The Court would then be ſituated between two oppoſing revolutions, and muſt fall a victim to the one or to the other.

Spain, then, has the moſt important intereſt in fruſtrating by every ſecret means, the projected expedition againſt Portugal. France, on the other hand, is forced to ſuſpend the execution of her threats, at leaſt till the concluſion of the congreſs of Raſtadt. The danger therefore is not inſtant, and need not drive Portugal to meaſures that might debaſe, but could not ſave her. She ought to foreſee, that ſhould the projects of the French againſt England ſucceed, ſhould they annihilate this powerful rival, and become maſters of the ſea, they will then reſume the ſubordinate object of her deſtruction.

The Colony of Cayenne, which is now the priſon of the unfortunate of all parties whom the Directory and the Councils condemn to exile, till they themſelves perhaps ſhall people it in their turn, is continually increaſing on the continent of South America.

The French have already ſtipulated, in the conditions of peace ſigned at Paris (though not ratified) a great augmentation of territory at the expence of the Portugueze colony of Brazil. The Provinces of Para, Maragnon, and Siarra, which they have once poſſeſſed, lie convenient for their ambition, and would give them the rich and new-diſcovered mines of Rio-Negro. This danger is very imminent. It may involve the loſs of Brazil, and without Brazil Portugal would ſink into nothing.

To avoid ruin in Europe, and the loſs of her territories in America, Portugal has but one ſyſtem to purſue. She muſt exhibit the greateſt firmneſs, recruit her army, fortify her frontiers, perſevere in her alliance with England, put her navy in the beſt condition, ſtrengthen her means of defence, eſpecially on the frontiers of Brazil towards Guiana, break into the neſt of exiles in Cayenne, ſeize that colony while the Engliſh are yet maſters of the ſea, and bring back to

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Europe thoſe exiles, whoſe appearance would cauſe conſiderable uneaſineſs, and perhaps more evil, to the Directory of France. This expedition, undertaken with ſuddenneſs and ſecrecy, could not fail to ſucceed. It would ſave Brazil, and excite the aſtoniſhment of Europe.

But this we cannot expect. All the nations who have, or ought to have, combated France, ſeem to behold a Meduſa's head, and are robbed of every power. It is difficult to defend ourſelves with ſucceſs when we know not how to attack with advantage.

Another plan which Portugal ought to obſerve is, to avoid all hoſtility with Spain, as well by ſea as by land, as well in Europe as againſt her colonies; and this, were it from no other motive, in order to looſen the bonds of her alliance with France, cauſe a diſtruſt that might burſt them aſunder, and reſtore Spain to her natural policy.

Whatever ſyſtem Portugal may purſue, whether awaiting patiently her fate, or exhibiting energy and courage, her future lot depends on that of England, and conſequently, on the reſult of the Congreſs of Raſtadt; on a general war, or univerſal peace.

CHAP. XIII.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

THE United States, notwithſtanding their ſimilarity of principles and opinions, notwithſtanding the intereſt they have taken in the revolution of France, the ſervices they have rendered her during the whole courſe of the war, the marked preference they granted to her commerce, and even her privateers, were viewed as enemies from the moment they wiſhed to become neutral, and have not eſcaped the declamations, the incendiary manœuvres, the inſults of her envoys, the decrees of her councils, nor the plunder of her navy.

The extraordinary commiſſioners whom they ſent to Paris to terminate their differences are in diſgrace with the Directory,

tory, and their negociation retarded; while their ſhips continue to be boarded and plundered, in order to force them to break their treaties with England, and to ſhut their ports to her commerce. It is eaſy however to prove that the advantages of their trade with England, entirely outweigh thoſe derived from France. Should unavoidable circumſtances, therefore, compel them to abandon their ſyſtem of neutrality, their intereſt muſt determine them to declare for that country with whom they have ſo much analogy, and who, being no longer their miſtreſs, has forgot her animoſity.

It appears very impolitic in France to exaſperate the peaceful Americans, and thus make them acquainted with their ſtrength.—Beyond the reach of attack by land, ſhould deſpair convert them into warriors, they may become the ſcourge of Europe. The Antilles, and the Colonies of the different powers are entirely at their mercy. They may eaſily ſtarve and conquer them. They may put an end to the Newfoundland fiſhery. They may devaſtate the coaſts of Europe by their privateers. Maritime war has charms for two great paſſions of human nature, avarice and the love of adventure. The preparations, the expences, the forces it requires, are of ſmaller magnitude than thoſe by land, and their effects more lucrative and rapid.

The Americans have proviſioned, and conſequently ſaved the Colonies of France. That ſervice alone, ought, in the eyes of the Directory, to have obliterated the frivolous grievances complained of, which if duly weighed were not injurious, but rather the juſt procedures of a prudent and pacific neutrality.

If the Americans are compelled to form a navy, and to mount their veſſels with cannon, in order to make their flag reſpected, they will ſoon become warriors. They will ceaſe to be a paſſive nation. Their own ſafety will render them conquerors. The Gulph and Continent of Mexico, the Antilles and Newfoundland, will ſucceſſively fall into their hands without reſiſtance, and they will be well compenſated for the inſults that have ſo imprudently been offered them.

The intereſt of the Americans in order to ſupport their pacific ſyſtem and their flouriſhing commerce, demands the re-eſtabliſhment of peace, on juſt and honourable conditions between France and England; and that if the one muſt have a decided ſuperiority, it ſhould be that power whoſe government is eſtabliſhed on a baſis peaceful to its neighbours, and eſpecially to commercial nations.

The ſecurity then of America depends on that of England.

England. She ought to dread the correlative effects of the threatened invasion. During the early part of the French revolution, the wishes and inclinations of the Americans were favourable to its success. But since the French have become ambitious conquerors, and greedy plunderers, every thing is changed. They have alienated from them every nation. And if England is conquered and disorganized, America will be compelled to cringe to the power of the French.

The fate of the United States depends then upon England, and consequently on the result of the Congress of Rastadt; on a general war with the French, or a universal peace.

CHAP. XIV.

HOLLAND.

IN reflecting on the position of the Batavians, it appears doubtful, whether they should be considered as a nation constituting a separate body-politic, or as an appendage, a mere department of France. Their government is influenced by French councils. They enjoy the tranquillity of slavery, under the protection of a French general and a French army. Flushing is in the hands of that republic. And as a proof of their joint right, or rather of their sovereignty, they have on the 5th of February last established a Custom-house there, whose clerks are paid by France.

The Dutch are ruined by a community of political interests and commercial concerns with the French Republic. They have lately sacrificed a fleet, ordered from their ports by France, unwisely and unseasonably. They pay their own army which is kept in subjection by that of France.—They pay besides the army of France itself, which occupies all their forts.

This pretended liberty cost them a hundred millions of livres, paid as a contribution to France; besides Dutch Flanders, Maestricht, many other towns to the left of the Meuse, Demerary, Essequibo, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and all their East India commerce, which fell a prey to the English.

The Dutch Republic was completely democratised on the 22d of February, 1798. That revolution was violently effected by the minority, as happens every where. The deputies

puties who had the courage to remonſtrate, or abandoned their poſts through delicacy, that they might not yield to force, have been treated as criminals and traitors to their country. Their Directory, ſimilar to that of France, has been proclaimed through all the Provinces amid the acclamations of terror, or the huſh of deſpair.

Is there a true Batavian who does not ſhudder with indignation at being compelled to continue under the tyrannic yoke of ſuch a liberty? Is there a Batavian but, on a fair compariſon, regrets the Stadtholderſhip he compulſively ſwears to hate? Can a nation be free that is not independent? Are the Batavians independent? Can they declare war or peace, remain neuter, or carry on a branch of trade without the conſent of the French Directory? Can this commercial nation, to whoſe very exiſtence neutrality is neceſſary, voluntarily ceaſe to eſpouſe the quarrels of France? Is ſhe not compelled to ſubmit to every law of the Directory in oppoſition to her own intereſts? Has ſhe not, even lately, in obedience to their orders, and with injury to herſelf, prohibited all Engliſh manufactures?

Does not the fate of the Batavian, like that of the French Republic, reſt upon her Directory and councils? Is not the intereſt of the nation there, as well as in France, ſacrificed to this execrable oligarchy? Is not the lot of the Batavians precarious like that of the French, excepting that in France it depends on a nation who can change it when they pleaſe, while in Holland it is at the mercy of their conquerors? Is not Holland a democratic republic, ſolely becauſe France is ſuch? Should France receive a King, muſt not Holland immediately ſubmit to a Stadtholder? Then what are the Batavians? Mere apes and beaſts of burthen to France.—What a miſerable exiſtence!—Not daring to complain of their fate, deſtitute of power to ameliorate their condition, they groan in ſecret, and breathe their ardent vows in favour of their enemies againſt their imperious allies.

Should the expedition againſt England be completely ſucceſsful, ſhould this rival power of France againſt whom Holland unites her forces be deſtroyed, Holland will be ruined and annihilated. She will then have but one favour to aſk her conquerors, to ceaſe exiſting as a nation, and be incorporated in the grand republic: ſtill foſtering a hope, that ſome future avenger may ſpring up among them, when the exceſſes of the French ſhall have revolted all Europe, and when the æra ſhall have arrived that their crimes meet due puniſhment from the reſentment of their numerous enemies.

Amid

Amid the dreadful evils produced in Holland by the French Revolution, it has however delivered the Batavians from that abſurd federaliſm which divided the intereſts and the wills of her ſeven provinces. The union of the whole republic in one national and indiviſible body, is an immenſe benefit which may one day prove the ſalvation of the Batavian people. It was even impolitic in France to favour an union, which in happier times may give that nation a concentric force, they did not poſſeſs before, and which never can exiſt in a federal conſtitution.

Whatever form of government futurity ſhall prepare for this nation, ſhe ought to have the wiſdom to preſerve her national indiviſibility. It would even be the intereſt of a Stadtholder, ſhould that office be revived, thus to govern a united people.

The preſent, though not the future intereſt of Holland, appears connected with that of France, becauſe her fate is involved in it. She wiſhes England to be humiliated, that ſhe may be compelled to reſtore her conqueſts. Yet ſhe would be far more certain of that reſtitution, were ſhe detached from France by the re-eſtabliſhment of the Houſe of Orange.

But muſt not the Batavians fear, ſhould the French ſucceed in deſtroying the power of the Engliſh, and become abſolute maſters of the ſea, that they would demand a part of the reſtored poſſeſſions, as for inſtance, the port of Trincomale in Ceylon, ſo uniformly coveted by the French, as a neceſſary naval ſtation between the iſle of France, and the Coromandel Coaſt, or Bengal?

Should even the French have the generoſity to reſtore them all their colonies, yet does not their eſtabliſhment at Fluſhing, their keeping poſſeſſion of the keys of Holland, Maeſtricht, Breda, and Dutch Flanders, their opening the Scheldt, and their re-eſtabliſhing the port of Antwerp, prove them the moſt dangerous enemies of Holland, both with regard to commerce and to war?

In alliance with the Engliſh, the Batavians may continue free and independent. In alliance with France, they will neither be the one nor the other. But it will be objected, that they are unable to change their deſtiny; that they have neither the power to quit the alliance with France, to declare themſelves neuter, nor to unite with other nations, even by a mere treaty of commerce. This is too true; and this renders their fate the more deplorable, the more inſupportable to her trueſt citizens.

It is only by a general war, productive of advantage to the enemies of France, that the Batavians can regain their colonies, their frontier towns, the port of Flushing, and their independence. It is true, they will, in that case, probably receive a Stadtholder. But the nation would be independent and free under her proper chief, order would spring up anew, commerce would again flourish, true citizens would breathe the air of freedom and of joy, and this happy revolution would only be productive of evil to a few miserable and outrageous democrats, who have been elevated by their turbulence, and the most audacious criminality, to the principal affairs of the state, of which none were so unworthy.

The fate then of the Batavians depends also on the result of the Congress of Rastadt, on a general war or universal peace.

CHAP. XV.

FRANCE.

WHAT shall we say of this nation before whom the universe trembles, who destroys all the foundations of society, who treat all human institutions as puerile futilities, who hurried on from paradox to paradox, even to the denial of every first principle, have torn asunder the most sacred ties of nature, of religion, of marriage, and of filial and paternal love, as the chains of slavery, who preach the same dogmas by their armed missionaries, and at once plunder and revolutionise every nation?

To follow the disgusting career of crimes and horrors, that have stained these ferocious demagogues, would be to write a satire on mankind, and belongs but to the inflexible pen of history. To celebrate their victories and their heroes, would be a hateful flattery, that would outrage even the genius of poetry.

Let us view the French nation in their present existing point of view. Let us examine their conformation, their aggrandisement,

aggrandiſement, their political and moral influence on the univerſe, the ſolidity or inſtability of their actual mode of exiſtence, their external and internal dangers. And let us endeavour thence to foreſee, what will be the ultimate reſult of their preſent relative poſition.

One great virtue has unfolded itſelf in France by this revolution, the exaltation of the mind. Surrounded on every ſide by enemies, the French have on every ſide preſented an undaunted front. On every ſide they have diſplayed heroic courage, amazing wonderful talents, and a genius for reſource. All the continental armies have fled before their warriors. They have ranged over the face of Europe in triumph, where French banners never waved before. The powers around, in conſternation at their ſucceſſes, their boldneſs, and their indefatigable perſeverance, have each ſucceſſively made a ſeparate peace. That concluded by the Emperor was ſigned at the gates of Vienna by the title of King of Bohemia and Hungary.

CONGRESS OF RASTADT.

IT remains to make peace with the Germanic body. The numerous Plenipotentiaries of this political phantom are aſſembled in Congreſs at Raſtadt, and domineered by two Plenipotentiaries of France, who anſwer in dry, laconic notes the humble and diffuſive remonſtrances of the Deputies of the Empire. The tranſactions of Raſtadt are a mere political illuſion. A double negociation counterworks every thing there diſcuſſed. Each of the powers concerned have a political agent at Paris, who treats ſeparately of the individual intereſts of his maſter, to the injury of the common cauſe. It was once ſaid, that at the Council of Trent, the Holy Ghoſt arrived in a Portmanteau. It is the ſame at Raſtadt. The courier of Paris brings with him the political ſpirit that muſt decide on the fate of Germany.

Even were the Congreſs diſſolved without coming to any concluſion, every thing would be the ſame. And this is what the moſt feeble members of the Germanic body ought to deſire, that at leaſt they might have the conſolation to proteſt againſt the ſyſtem, and that their ruin may not be ſanctioned by the juridical form of a pacific Congreſs.

The part performed by the German Plenipotentiaries at Raſtadt is ſo debaſing even to the primary powers, whoſe arrangements

arrangements are made independently of its deliberations, that it is aſtoniſhing it ſhould not yet bhave been diſſolved.

The French have not only dictated the conditions of peace, but they have executed them before that peace is concluded. The poſſeſſion of Mentz, of the Tete-de-pont of Manheim, of Kehl, of Duſſeldorf, and probably ſoon of Ehrenbreiſtein, form a road to peace, becauſe this formidable line paraliſes the courage of thoſe powers who might be tempted to reſume their arms and arreſt the courſe of French ambition. The Germanic body reſembles a dying man, whoſe relations are dividing the ſucceſſion with a foreign robber they are unable to repel or to eject.

The French Directory, in order to precipitate the concluſion of this peace, have juſt enforced it by an irreſiſtible argument in the rapid revolution of Switzerland. Nothing could have been more ſudden or leſs foreſeen. A Lemanic republic was fabricated at Paris in an inſtant. The ariſtocracy of Bern, at once feeble and deſpotic like that of Venice, was totally unable to reſiſt. The revolutionary ſpirit of democracy ſeized all the Cantons in a moment. Democracy has triumphed without an obſtacle. This Helvetic revolution brings the revolutionary ſpirit to the heart of Germany, and every ſovereign ought ſeriouſly to reflect on the example.

It required ſix or ſeven years of experimental progreſs for France to create a democratico-repreſentative government. They have again been feeling their way in the formation of the Ciſalpine and Ligurian republics. But now they have perfected themſelves in the revolutioniſing art.—The democratic revolutions of the Batavian, Lemanic, and Trans-Jurane republics, are *chefs-d'œuvres* of audaciouſneſs and rapidity.

The French Directory may now partition Germany, as a ſurveyor divides an eſtate or a field into portions nearly equal. They may cut out a republic under the name of a neighbouring river or a mountain for each diviſion, and they may ſend forth emiſſaries, who ſetting off from ſome point in its vicinity will inſtantly execute their orders. To municipalize, to departmentize, to eſtabliſh proviſorily, an executive directory, and national guards; to form primary aſſemblies for the election of repreſentatives in both councils, to take poſſeſſion of their public finances and the eſtates of the clergy; to confiſcate every ſpecies of property belonging to ariſtocrats, that is, to the rich; to claim the protection of France, who has promiſed it to every nation that dares aſpire

after liberty: Theſe meaſures are now eaſy, ſudden, and dreadful to all nations. It is a firſt principle of human nature to hate bonds, however ſoft, however juſt, however neceſſary.—Man loves independence, and he loves novelty.

Theſe plans are ready prepared at Paris, and are well known. The impulſe is already given, by ſeducing examples, ſlow and ill employed obſtacles, and ſovereigns panic-ſtruck, paralized, and diſunited. Should peace be concluded at Raſtadt on the conditions dictated by France, a few years will be ſufficient to eſtabliſh univerſal democracy. It will begin its progreſs by Germany, where it has already taken the deepeſt root.

The Congreſs of Raſtadt can only be conſidered as a mere form of repreſentation, its peace as made entirely at the expence of the empire, the Rhine as the boundary of the French republic, and Germany may take care of herſelf.

ITALY.

IT remains for France to regulate the affairs of Italy. She has now a pretext, whether accidental or premeditated, ſpeedily to decide the fate of Theocratic Rome. Her exiſtence muſt be inſupportable to the worſhippers of Reaſon, to Theophilanthropiſts, and Atheiſts. Were the Pope an antique, the Commiſſaries would convey him to Paris and diſplay him in the national Muſeum. But they will only ſtrip him of his dignity and his riches. The Romans will form a petty republic, at the inſtigation of the Gallo Ciſalpines, and in their turn will ſtimulate the Neapolitans and Sicilians to form two other democratic republics.—The King of Sardinia, the Duke of Parma, and the Grand Duke of Tuſcany, will afterwards diſappear, and make way for ſimilar political inſtitutions.

Italy will be diſtracted by the federal-ſyſtem, by wars between all theſe little ſtates, poor, reſtleſs, and jealous; tributary as well as dependent on the great parent-republic; till ſome man of genius unite the whole nation then regenerated and rediſciplined, ſhake off the yoke of France, and make her repent her revolutionary mania.

Such probably is the yet ſecret plan of the Directory with regard to Italy. Such is the future fate we may predict to that fine country. A general war with France alone can change this unavoidable, this concatenated ſeries of events reſulting from each other: this alone can reinſtate Italy in her former ſituation.

PORTUGAL.

PORTUGAL.

FRANCE has yet to terminate her diſpute with Portugal, in order to deprive England of the reſources of her commerce and the aſylum of her ports, eſpecially of Liſbon. If Portugal were adjacent to the Pyrenees, her ſubjugation would be ſudden and eaſy. But her diſtance raiſes obſtacles which will be multiplied by the repugnance of Spain to behold a French army traverſing her provinces and living at her expence in order to deſtroy the neighbouring kingdom.—In the chapters of Spain and Portugal are detailed the very important intereſts of theſe two countries in the prevention of that fatal project.

But no conſiderations can alter the plans of the French Directory. If they have reſolved on this expedition, the French army will traverſe Spain, the troops of that country will unite with it, the Court of Portugal will be panic-ſtruck, and ſubmit to every demand. The French general will enter Liſbon in triumph, return to Paris loaded with an immenſe booty, leave in Portugal and Spain the germs of a democratic revolution, and Portugal will remain tributary to the French republic.

Though the probability of this chain of events is almoſt demonſtrable, yet were there a man of genius at the head of the Portugueſe army, who could take every advantage of the topographical impracticability of his country, ſhould the ancient honour of this ancient nation, once ſo warlike, be awakened; ſhould they receive a ſeaſonable aid from England; they may continue the war for a length of time; conteſt, foot by foot, their mountains and numerous fortreſſes; ruin the French army; eſtabliſh a jealouſy and diſtruſt between that and the Spaniſh troops; and, by an example of firmneſs, draw over the Spaniards to fight under their banners againſt their dangerous allies. They may cauſe unexpected and unaccuſtomed diſgraces to tarniſh the warriors of France, and make the Directory repent their imprudence in attempting at once two grand expeditions at the two extremities of Europe, and in carrying on a war at ſo remote a diſtance from their frontiers at the very time when they are engaged in an invaſion of England; that principal object of their policy, whoſe ſucceſs muſt be followed by the reduction of Portugal, while the accompliſhment of this latter expedition can have no influence whatever on the projected deſcent deſcent on England.

ENGLAND.

IT ſtill remains for France to attempt an expedition againſt England. The Directory, by means of extravagant declamations and accuſations, have ſucceeded in irritating the nation againſt the Engliſh. Their avarice, which conſiders all the gold of Europe as accumulated in England, combines with the national hatred. The plan is laid, and will take place. Immenſe preparations continue to be made with extreme expence and profuſion. Should the enterpriſe be given up, the public treaſure is exhauſted, the Directory is loſt.

Buonaparte, the Scipio of France (deſtined perhaps to a ſimilar fate) is charged with the deſtruction of the modern Carthage. Accuſtomed to ſucceſs, the French do not even foreſee the poſſibility of misfortune. In France no one doubts the event of this important expedition. It is a *coup de main* they are haſtening to accompliſh, becauſe they are weary of a ſeven years war. It is conceived to be the ſeal of an univerſal peace, the baſis of their democratic republic, and the end of all the calamities, which have never ceaſed to overwhelm France, from the moment of the revolution. It is the golden fleece, the crowning of all their victories, the price of all their blood that has flowed, the ſummit of their national glory.

This expedition, then, will take place, and probably about ſpring. Its facilities and its obſtacles have been detailed in the chapter on England.—Should it ſucceed, the French Republic will be abſolute miſtreſs of the univerſe. All the governments of Europe will exiſt but at her pleaſure.—They will all be her tributaries, and the French nation will have no enemies but itſelf, its pride, avarice, luxury, and immorality, its diſcord, inconſtancy, and extravagant democracy —It will have gone through, in a few years, all the gradations which the Roman republic paſſed in many ages, to arrive at the ſummit of power and a precipitate decline. Then this Coloſſus, too heavy for its chalky pedeſtal, will totter, and be broken to pieces in its fall.

Should this expedition, however, be unſucceſsful, which is very poſſible; ſhould the invincible Britiſh fleet gain a deciſive victory over the French, Spaniſh, and Dutch fleets, whether combined or ſeparate; ſhould the Engliſh nation, proud, and energetic as the French, equally animated by patriotiſm and national diſlike, repulſe the French army ſoon after

after it has landed, ſhould they deſtroy it, force it to reimbark with loſs, or cut off its communication with the ſea, ſhould they weaken, harraſs, or reduce it to famine, and render this great expedition abortive, which, on a great ſcale, can only be once attempted, and may partially or altogether fail in the execution, then France is totally ruined; all her laurels withered; her allies will abandon and turn againſt her; the other powers of Europe will attack her on every ſide; ſhe will have loſt her warriors, and the reputation of her arms; ſhe will be without money; and internal diſcord will complete her deſtruction.

Another danger peculiar to the Directory and its two ſubmiſſive Councils, will reſult from the deſpair and vengeance of thoſe troops, who will regard themſelves as ſacrificed to the temerity and ambition of this deteſted oligarchy. Theſe ſoldiers, now the ſole ſupport of its tyrannic power, will turn againſt it, and be urged on by the general wiſh of the nation. It is at Paris they will ſeek the rewards and the plunder promiſed them in England. The generals themſelves will either be the firſt victims of the excuſeable fury of the troops, or will partake of their indignation and their revolt.

It is not even neceſſary, in order to haſten this military exploſion againſt the preſent government, that the deſcent on England ſhould terminate by a cataſtrophe diſgraceful to the French. Its being retarded too long, or abandoned, after being ſo emphatically announced, is ſufficient. The aſſemblage of ſo many idle ſoldiers, whom they will be unable to pay, when their treaſures ſhall be waſted by this expenſive deluſion, will equally excite their indignation, and urge them to the ſame exceſſes.

The Directory appears to foreſee this danger, and we may conſider the decree lately paſſed, re-inſtating the national guards, as a precaution againſt the inſurrection of the armies. Yet it was for moving this conſtitutional decree that the unfortunate exiles of the 18th Fructidor (4th Sept. 1797) were declared traitors to their country.

That revolution was brought about by the bayonet, and by the bayonet will the preſent government be deſtroyed.

The chimerical *milliard* in land, with which the troops were imprudently flattered and appeaſed, has already been converted, by a decree, into annuities for life. But can it be believed they will be ſatisfied with an exchange of real and immoveable property, into an arbitrarily diſtributed penſion, during life, to be paid, like other penſions and annuities, with deductions, delays, or unprofitable effects?

Beſides,

Beſides, if the thouſand millions of livres be not reſerved in landed eſtates, upon what will this enormous maſs of annuities be charged? And what will be the effect, ſhould they be able to fulfil the decree? Inſtead of making this valuable claſs of brave warriors, cultivators of land, and fathers of families, they will convert them into a maſs of lazy annuitants, celebatiſts by neceſſity, and conſequently either uſeleſs or dangerous, while the country will be overburdened with inhabitants. The nation ought not to have been deceived, much leſs the ſoldiers, The latter will revenge themſelves, and their aſſemblage for the expedition againſt England, and the return of the other armies on account of the continental peace, will furniſh them with the opportunity.

This is the dangerous game the Directory are playing in their project for the invaſion of England!

INTERNAL DANGERS.

LET us next examine the internal dangers by which France is threatened. The whole nation hates and deſpiſes the preſent Government; but they are reſtrained by fear of a new ſyſtem of blood, to which the government would have recourſe againſt a general inſurrection. Partial revolts are continually ariſing in all the departments, but without plan, without ſkilful leaders, without connection. They are uniformly diſcovered, and always ſuppreſſed by the maſſacre of their authors. Yet they continually ſpring up anew. This proves there exiſts a general fermentation, a general indignation in the people.

Democracy reigns only in the moſt miſerable and moſt turbulent part of the nation. Men of property, induſtrious artificers and huſbandmen, hold it in abhorrence. And though this ſect is fortunately a minority, their activity ſupplies the place of numbers, and multiplies their force. It furniſhes ſpies, informers, executioners, aſſaſſins, miſſionaries, declaimers, and preaching politicians. It is moſt turbulent and moſt furious in the primary aſſemblies, where it ſilences or drives away all good citizens, becomes abſolute maſter of the elections, and has long ſent members taken from its boſom to compoſe both the Councils.

Democracy infects the armies which are not as in the ancient republics choſen from among the citizens, but a mixture of all nations. Moſt of the generals are devoted to it, or at leaſt find no ſecurity but in appearing ſo. It is by this democratic influence that the armies are alienated from the nation,

and

nd have hitherto ſhewn no attachment but to the government, by whom they have been purchaſed.

The French ſoldiers are, therefore, as much dreaded by their countrymen, as by the nations with whom they are at war. They ſeem in their native country to be living in a hoſtile territory. They are fed gratuitouſly; they accuſe every man of ariſtocracy; they pillage, threaten, and inſult, and at Paris more than elſewhere, diſplay their licentious ſeverity. But when the greater part of them ſhall return to their homes, when diſoccupation and diſcontent ſhall make them acquainted with the murmurs of their countrymen, when they ſhall again have a common intereſt, they will turn their backs on a government that deludes them with ample promiſes and ſcanty recompenſes; and after having been the inſtruments of oppreſſion, they will become the means of deliverance.

This æra, however, appears very remote, while Frenchmen are moving rapidly along the torrent of revolution. And by what will the preſent government be ſucceeded? By a government equally vicious, which will be followed by another and another, till, from change to change, the nation ſhall diſcover that they are too numerous, too fond of glory, luxury, pleaſure, and enjoyment, to exiſt for ever under a ferocious ſyſtem of democracy, that produces only exacerbation, frenzy, turbulence, faction, and crimes; deſtroys ſecurity both of innocence and property, tears aſunder every ſocial tie, inſolently and barbarouſly tyranniſes in the name of liberty, overthrows many times in a year its contemptible demagogues, raiſes others ſtill more deteſtable, recruits the population of France exhauſted by its convulſions, by war, and by maſſacres; by emigration, baniſhment, and tranſportation, with the ſcum of all the nations of the world; diſguiſes political equality under the moſt diſguſting appearances of a ſavage fraternization; deſtroys and plunders with the moſt barbarian licentiouſneſs in the name of the country, and holding up to the preſent generation an example of every vice, gives their riſing progeny a ferocious and inſocial education.

The French will, at length, be weary of being the ſcourge and terror of other nations, when they might become the object of their attention and future hopes. All theſe evils ſpring from their preſent government, from its reſtleſsneſs, its miſtaken policy, its ambition, its incapacity, and above all, from the neceſſity to its exiſtence of diſturbing every ſtate and every city with its democracy, both in their interpal and external relations.

The uneaſineſs of the Government is evident in the continual

tinual marches and counter-marches of troops acroſs the Republic, in the enormous expences of ſecret corruption of ſpies and of informers, in the choice of commiſſaries of the executive power, and its agents in foreign countries, in the intolerable perſecution of the unfortunate relations of Emigrants, who remain in France, in the election of men accuſed or convicted of crimes, by whom they are ſurrounded, and whom they employ; in fine, all the ſprings and movements of their gloomy tyranny.

Their falſe policy is demonſtrated by their mania for republicaniſing all around them, for uniting nations once divided by federaliſm, and for placing in the hands of the peaceful thoſe arms they will one day turn againſt France. It is demonſtrated by the hazardous meaſures of a war with Portugal, and of invading England, and by ſacrificing in direct violation of the French conſtitution itſelf, the liberty of an ancient republic which they conſign to the deſpotiſm of the Auſtrian monarch: while, by their aggrandiſement, they render that potentate formidable to the new republics they have themſelves founded in Italy. It is demonſtrated by the union of the Helvetic League in one ſingle body, to which they thereby give a force of concentration, what will one day prove dangerous to France, while the latter might have found in the federal weakneſs of Switzerland, a pledge of ſecurity for one third of her Eaſtern frontiers.

Their ambition is evident, in the abuſe they make of their victories to incorporate in the republic by violence, nations on the left bank of the Rhine, who ſhew the ſtrongeſt repugnance to the aſſociation; in the violation of the ſuſpenſion of arms by ſeiſing Mentz, Manheim, Ehrenbreitſtein, and the Biſhopric of Baſil: in the department created at Corfu, that key-ſtone of new revolutionary projects againſt the Turk and his allies; in the avarice, the inſolence, and the rigorous ſeverity with which they treat all nations, particularly their good allies the Americans; in their piracies on neutral ſhips, ſanctioned by a decree no leſs injurious to themſelves; in fine, in all thoſe abuſes of power, whoſe unavoidable effect is ultimately to produce a general inſurrection of all nations againſt France.

Their incapacity is proved by the enormity of their expences, which compel them continually to that very ſtock-jobbing *agiotage* againſt which they complain, and which they ſometimes pretend to perſecute: expences which make them dependent on their contractors, whoſe rapid fortunes and ſhameleſs luxury diſcovers to an indignant nation the gulphs that have ſwallowed up their treaſures. It is proved by the impoſſibility of giving account of the enormous contributions

butions collected in Holland, in Italy, and in Germany, which, if well managed, might have ſufficed for the whole war, and ſpared the ſpecie they have ſent out of the country: by the prodigious number of their decrees, laws, and contradictory proclamations, all deſtitute of effect; by the deſtruction of the ancient worſhip purſued with ſo much fury, and to which they have ſubſtituted Pagan feaſts, not only puerile and inſignificant, but holding up the vileſt proſtitutes to popular adoration, as the type of the Deity: in fine, by the national corruption of manners, and univerſal immoralization, &c. &c. . . . . !!

The victories of the nation, and her military glory, are the work of the French ſoldiers, and of the ſpirit, the courage, the patriotiſm of the nation. All the calamities that attend that military glory, without being compenſated by its advantages, ariſe from the defects of their government. The conſtitution is eſſentially good; but it is neither known nor obſerved. There ought to exiſt no longer in France, either ariſtocracy or democracy. Nothing ought to exiſt, but their country and its citizens. This nickname of democracy, is the watchword of Jacobins, of Sans-Culottes, of Terroriſts. It is ever the ſame ſect, makes the ſame advances, and produces the ſame effects.

A principal danger that threatens France, is the too great extenſion of her boundaries. The Germans, whom ſhe has grafted in her ſtock, have an avowed deteſtation for this union. Never will their ſimplicity accord with the metaphyſical ſubtilties, the ſhameleſs immorality of Paris. They will ever be Germans at heart, and frequently muſt they be treated as enemies. In the wars with Germany, they will always take part againſt France, at leaſt in inclination. We may declare almoſt as much of the unfortunate Belgians they have ſo heavily oppreſſed, and of the Batavians, who are rather the ſubjects than the allies of France. Savoy, and the county of Nice pant but to diſſolve the bond of fraternity by which they are enchained.

Every wiſe political ſpeculator, every man ſkilful in military affairs, every one who loves juſtice, even in France, have proteſted againſt this extenſion of territory. The German Plenipotentiaries at Raſtadt ſhrewdly obſerved, that the Rhine was no barrier againſt invaſion; for Germans could paſs it every where, when and how they pleaſed.

All the politicians of France obſerved, that ſo great an extent of territory would oblige that country to keep up too ſtrong an army; would render the republic too military, cauſe it too many wars, and expences, and might one day

hold

hold out to ambitious generals a temptation, and facilitate the means to overturn the republic.

Men eminent for military ſkill ſaid, the ancient frontiers of France were complete and perfect, being protected by two lines of impregnable fortreſſes. That if political reaſons rendered it neceſſary to extend their limits, it was abſolutely according to the rules of tactics, to take the Meuſe for a boundary, becauſe the extent of defence between Maeſtricht and Luxemburg was concentrated, narrow, and eaſy; but that to carry their defenſive lines to the banks of the Rhine was tactically dangerous.

The Advocates of Juſtice exclaimed, that it would infringe the rights of man, violate the principles of the conſtitution, and trample on the national oaths, to force the inhabitants of other ſtates to be incorporated in the French republic, without conſulting them, and contrary to their inclination. That it was contrary to good faith, and ridiculous, to proclaim a renunciation of conqueſt, at the very moment when they were moſt groſsly abuſing the right of ſuperior ſtrength. But theſe advocates were the leaſt attended to.

Were the people really conſulted in the aſſemblies; that people who is continually declared to be the ſovereign, while they are compelled to obey an arbitrary will; were the people aſked, "Will you retain your conqueſts, though in "ſwearing to the conſtitution you have renounced all wiſh "to conquer? You are now to receive and incorporate in "your boſom nations who abhor this union, whom you will "often be compelled to treat as ſlaves rather than as bre-"thren, and in conſequence of this injuſtice, be obliged to "continue the war, and have a general war excited againſt "you?" The nation would have unanimouſly replied, "Our "choice is juſtice, our ancient boundaries and peace."

The greateſt danger that threatens France, that which will neceſſarily produce a deciſive revolution, though it is not yet foreſeen by what ſteps it will arrive, is the irremediable diſorder of the finances. This evil attaches to the democratic form of adminiſtration, in every branch of public economy. The confuſion of powers, the multitude of perſons of all conditions employed, the default of payments, the impunity attending it, the neceſſity of doing every thing by contractors, the anticipations of revenue, all the ancient vices of finance, have ſwelled and multiplied by the folly of their legiſlators.

The taxes, according to the acknowledgment of the financiers of the republic, do not exceed 616,000,000 livres. They have now re-eſtabliſhed the immoral tax of lotteries. They have already dared to propoſe the gabelle. They have attempted to renew the farming of tobacco. They will,

perhaps,

perhaps, for a ſhort period, draw inconſiderable tributes from ſome reſiſtleſs European nations; but that ſource will ſoon be exhauſted, it will ſoon become a bitter ſpring.

Should the total of their revenues amount to 8, or even 900,000,000 livres, they will always in time of peace, and excluſive of extraordinary expences, want more than 200,000,000 to balance the receipt and the expenditure. But we muſt alſo obſerve, that the immenſe arrears of taxes, which amounted at the end of 1797, to thirteen hundred millions, proves that they are very ill paid. We may add that above a third of their amount does not arrive in the national treaſury, but remains in the Departments, to defray the departmental and municipal expences, &c. For theſe are in fact ſo many ſtates within the ſtate. In finance the Republic is federal.

How can they ſupply this deficit? And what will be the effect ſhould France, by her unwiſe policy or the ambition of her Directory, be engaged in a general war?

The government acknowledges, that the preparations for the Engliſh Invaſion form already an extraordinary expence of 200 millions. In 1779, the ſhadow of a ſimilar deſcent, which only employed 30,000 men and a ſpace of three months, coſt 80 millions extraordinary. The preſent is more than treble in proportion to the time, the number of men, and the veſſels employed. The government has therefore deceived itſelf, if it does not calculate on 200,000,000 per month.

Should the enterprize ſucceed, England will reimburſe theſe expences, and a very large maſs of ſpecie beſides will go from England to France. But the Directory will enjoy no greater financial eaſe. The waſte of money will be more conſiderable, yet economy and a balance in their finances will never be re-eſtabliſhed. Many individuals will grow too rich: the ſtate will ſtill be poor. The French will by this ſucceſs be led into a courſe of new conqueſts, and new wars, which will end in effecting their ruin.

On the other hand, ſhould this enterpriſe prove abortive, whether it be prevented by the rupture of the Congreſs of Raſtadt, and followed by a general war, or by a junction with England, of the northern powers and America, whom the privateering of France, and her impolitic decree againſt the free navigation of neutral veſſels, have irritated, and who are ſo deeply intereſted in the preſervation of the Engliſh conſtitution and naval power, and in preventing the French, in particular, from becoming maſters of the ſea, or whether the Engliſh repel and fruſtrate the project, France will be ruined and loſt, and the Directory, and the councils, her

acolytes

acolytes and high prieſts, will ſpeedily ſink beneath the national vengeance.

France, then, is not ſecure from the calamities ſhe accumulates ſo unjuſtly and even ſo imprudently on the reſt of Europe; nor from thoſe ſtill greater evils that menace her. Her imperious and incendiary conduct raiſes terror and indignation among all nations. She will one day reproach herſelf for it, even ſhould ſhe not become its victim. She herſelf is expoſed to many dangers, from which ſhe can only be ſecured by the greateſt wiſdom and moderation. She has the advantage over the reſt of Europe of being ſole miſtreſs of her own fate. Good ſenſe bids her change her policy, and, to inſure her own ſafety, give peace to the univerſe.

It is not, however, by exciting their fears, that we can influence the French nation. It is by their generoſity, by their magnanimity, by that very elevation of ſoul which has exalted them above all the people of Europe, that they are to be invoked.

Theſe, then, are the conditions impoſed on the French by their glory, by univerſal juſtice, and by their own conſtitution:

1. To reſtrain the inquietude of the Ciſalpines, and, by amicable meaſures, reſtore tranquility to the reſt of Italy.

2. To reſtore to the Helvetic league the biſhopric of Baſil, which they have no right to retain, and to emancipate their deciſions. To grant ſimply her good offices to the Lemanic republic, ſince ſhe alone has favoured and excited that inſurrection. To withdraw her projected Transjurane conſtitution, and her 30,000 men, ſince 30,000 men are ſufficient to ſubjugate the Swiſs.

3. To abandon the boundary of the Rhine, and exchange it for the Meuſe: and on that baſis of moderation conclude peace with the empire. And to engage not to interfere in the diſputes that may ariſe out of the peace of Campo-Formio, or the ſeizing of Saltzburg and part of Bavaria by the Emperor.

4. To grant Portugal the ſame moderate conditions of peace ſhe has concluded with the Court of Naples: that is, perfect neutrality.

5. To reſcind her tyrannical decree againſt the free navigation of neutral veſſels, equally prejudicial to her own commerce and that of England, and which ſo ſeverely exaſperated the neutral powers.

6. To announce to all Europe an unlimited armiſtice by land and by ſea, to continue till the perfect concluſion of the definitive treaty between herſelf, Spain, and Holland, on the one hand, and England on the other.

7. To

7. To demand and accept the mediation of the maritime powers for mutual reſtitution and indemnities, between herſelf, Spain, and Holland, on the one hand, and England on the other; and for the concluſion of a definitive and univerſal peace.

Doubtleſs no nation in Europe, either preſent or future, can ever imagine that, in the preſent triumphant ſtate of the French, fear or weakneſs have led them to this juſt moderation. On the contrary, they will be perſuaded that, faithful to their conſtitutional principle and their oaths, they are deſirous to exhibit to other nations an example of generoſity and of juſtice. All the world will admire this extraordinary nation. They will gain univerſal love, obliterate all their errors, ſilence all their enemies, ſecure their liberty and their conſtitution, and lay the foundation of their own happineſs in that of the univerſe. After having conquered Europe, the French have nothing left but to conquer themſelves. If they neglect that victory, they will reſemble all other nations; if they achieve it, they will be a nation without a parallel.

But the Directory will object, that France has made great diſburſements, that ſhe is without money, and that ſhe muſt be indemnified.

A highwayman was taken. The Judge aſked him why he robbed. He anſwered, he had exhauſted an ample fortune, and he could no longer live without robbing. He was hanged.

This apologue applies to the Directory, and to the Directory alone. The French nation have been puniſhed for their faults by thoſe faults themſelves. They are great, noble, and ſuſceptible of every virtue. In many reſpects they deſerve to be happy: they will be ſo. They will be the fabricators of their own fate: they will puniſh the criminals who have miſled them; will adopt a wiſe conſtitution, juſt laws, and a ſtable government. Then will they enjoy the tranquillity of which the diſturbances they have cauſed, have robbed the univerſe.

CONCLUSION.

THIS ſpeculative Sketch affords a haſty idea of the political ſituation of the fifteen Powers, who by their reciprocal relations, their intereſts, their manners and commercial connections, are conſtituted a kind of body politic, named, by Voltaire, the Great *European Republic*. One individual member of that aſſociation at this deciſive epocha excites againſt itſelf the united wiſhes and intereſts of the fourteen others, whom it has terrified by its ambition, its avarice, and

and above all, its diſorganiſing fury. Unfortunately there exiſts no tribunal to judge and puniſh the crimes of nations. War, horrid war! is the laſt and only reſource of countries that are oppreſſed. And it is only by becoming oppreſſors in their turn, that they can arreſt the military and revolutionary progreſs of the conquering nation. It is impoſſible even for philanthropy to reflect on the preſent political criſis without breathing out her univerſal good will to man in curſes againſt human nature.

The war, which the major part of Europe waged againſt France, at the beginning of the revolution, was unjuſt, impolitic, and imprudent. Had the confederates even ſucceeded in reſtoring the unfortunate Louis XVI. to the throne, he himſelf would have been puniſhed by his allies for the rebellion of his ſubjects. For they had already agreed on the partition of his frontier domains. In this horrid war every thing has been miſcalculated as well as the individual intereſt of each of the Belligerent powers. Philoſophy, juſtice, and philanthropy, poured out their vows for the French nation, and had it fallen, liberty would have been baniſhed from the ſurface of the globe. Deſpotiſm would have exterminated even the liberty of thought.

But the victories of France have produced the contrary and more fatal extreme. And the ſtrongeſt barrier muſt neceſſarily be oppoſed to it, to reſtore the reign of moderation; the ſole permanent baſis of ſocial order and exiſtence. The liberty of thought is become a mad phrenſy that has changed the nature of every principle. Cuſtoms, manners, civil laws, moral obligations, religion, the Deity himſelf, every thing has been confounded by theſe innovators, with thoſe prejudices and abuſes, which ſeparating men at a diſtance from each other, were condemned by reaſon and by nature. The French have overturned every thing. The paſſions have felt that they were uncontrouled by any reſtraint, and have acquired new ſtrength by every victory. Vengeance, ambition, avarice, and immorality, have every where purſued and infamiſed their triumphs.

Liberty is the firſt gift of nature, and equality the ſecond. Society modifies theſe innate and natural rights. She meaſures them by her political ſcale, ſhe ſupports and repreſſes them by the laws. The people conſtitute the ſocial body. They make the laws either directly or indirectly. They are the Sovereign. But as all cannot exerciſe the ſovereignty over all, the ſocial body delegates its power. And thus are formed all our political inſtitutions from deſpotiſm down to democracy. Both extremes of the ſocial order are equally vicious.

ous. In the firſt the people aré too little, in the ſecond they are too much.

Power renders man corrupt. And the more that power is multiplied, the greater is the number that are depraved. Deſpotiſm preſents one tyrant, democracy a million. A monarch muſt die, but the people ſuffer no demiſe. The Deſpot repoſes and ſleeps at frequent intervals. He may repent, he may correct his conduct. None of theſe changes happen to demagogues. The turbulence that has raiſed them to the higheſt offices, beſieges them when they are in poſſeſſion, and ſoon effects their downfall.

Is democracy then the true ſyſtem of liberty and equality? No: For it elevates and abaſes too ſuddenly and too great a number of individuals to preſerve the ſocial level. All Frenchmen agree they are now leſs free than they were under the ancient monarchy. All agree their government itſelf is not free; all are convinced it cannot be permanent.

It is preciſely theſe three paſſive opinions that ſuffer democracy to continue, becauſe it ſub ues them by an active tyranny. It requires either a deciſive reſolution, or a great and unavoidable cataſtrophe to change this ſtate of anarchy; for ſuch we may juſtly call the government of the multitude. If a deciſive reſolution produce not a great national event, the cataſtrophe will certainly take place. But it is better it ſhould ariſe from internal cauſes than from external force.

The French revolution is not yet concluded. It cannot be concluded as long as the democratic ſyſtem impreſſes it with its characteriſtic violence, fluctuation, and verſatility. It will be concluded when the nation ſhall be well convinced by fatal experience, that to make uſe of its ſovereignty is either impoſſible, or pernicious to the people; that it ought to be conſtitutionally delegated, ſacred, and irrevocable, as long as its depoſitary, the executive power conforms to conſtitutional laws and cauſes them to be obeyed; that the maxim which calls inſurrection the moſt ſacred of duties, is an abominable and atrocious dogma, giving birth and impunity to crimes; that a national repreſentation ought always to be near the executive power, to watch over the preſervation of the conſtitution, over peace and war, taxation, receipt and expenditure, and more particularly over the execution of the laws, the ſecurity of perſons and property, and above all, the public morals; but that it ſhould neither oppoſe nor uſurp the governing power, nor be continually enacting new laws, rendered contemptible by their multiplicity.

To charge the repreſentative body with the enaction of laws, is confounding objects the moſt diſtinct. Doubtleſs the legiſlature of a nation ought to be ſeparated from its repreſentation.

ſentation. The beſt laws have been made by a ſingle legiſlator or a ſmall number of wiſe men. It is the duty of the executive to ſuggeſt, according to its wiſdom and experience, the neceſſity of every new law. The repreſentative body ought then to debate its utility and its dangers. A legiſlative body, compoſed of a very few members, ſhould prepare it; and the repreſentative body ſhould cauſe it to be ſanctioned by the nation collectively in their primary aſſemblies. The ſame ought to be the mode of periodical reviſion and reform, whether of the conſtitutional acts or of the ancient decrees.

It has been proved by hiſtory, that a nation may long exiſt with glory, happineſs, and proſperity, without a conſtitution, without any thing but a government. In fact, it would be far better to live without the former than be robbed of the latter.

But when, after experiencing a great revolution, a nation renews its ſocial contract, it firſt creates a conſtitution, and by means of that conſtitution it forms a government. Whatever be its denomination that government ought to be firm, active, and reſpected. A wiſe conſtitution, ſanctioned by the people, is their ſupport and protection; the laws are their ſtrength, and the repreſentative body their guardian.

The French have but a ſtep to arrive at this degree of perfection, the higheſt, whoſe attainment we have reaſon to hope or expect in human inſtitutions. To arrive at this they require but a wiſe reform in their conſtitution of 1795, which ſhould be made deliberately, gradually, and by a legiſlative body well compoſed, of but few members, and above all, in the calm of tranquillity.

They ought to eſtabliſh the Government or Executive as ſpeedily as poſſible; to inveſt it with high authority, make it obedient to the law, and ſuperior to every other power. It muſt be conſtituted for a long term, and cloathed with majeſty and luſtre. As long as the executive power ſhall be drawn from the repreſentative body, and not poſſeſs a character of ſuperiority, it will want dignity and ſtrength. As long as it is elective it will be upon a level with thoſe it ought to command, too changeable, too eaſily overthrown. In fine, as long as it ſhall be divided, a defect not provided againſt in the conſtitution, and which had nearly cauſed a civil war, this diviſion will end in the tyranny of the boldeſt or the moſt artful.

France will diſcover, that conſtitutional monarchy is the government which beſt combines nature and reaſon. It is the moſt ancient, the moſt ſimple, the wiſeſt, and in fine the moſt free, for a populous, rich, and induſtrious nation.—Woe to the Prince who ſhould refuſe an offer of ſuch a monarchy,

narchy, woe to the nation that ſhould prefer to ſuch a government democratic anarchy. The French feel all theſe arguments. They will apply them. They will, of their own accord, re-eſtabliſh on a ſolid baſis conſtitutional monarchy, which will be their only ſource to riſe above the chaos with which they are already diſguſted.

This example will be uſeful to other nations and to ſovereigns, becauſe on either ſide experience will produce a reconciliation between the rights of the one and the power of the other; between neceſſary prejudices and the prudence of wiſdom. Princes and nations ought, for their own welfare, to oppoſe the ſtrongeſt barrier to that democratic diſorganization which the armies of France ſend before them into the field.

Let them behold the Batavians ruined by the falſe liberty which the French have ſold them for 100,000,000 florins, and their moſt important fortreſſes. Let them behold Italy irreparably plundered of her moſt valuable riches, and torn by anarchy and civil war; Switzerland diſorganized and loaded with contributions, the miſerable inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine bathing in tears the tri-coloured ribbands that chain them to a nation they abhor, and which tear them from their native country, their national cuſtoms and manners, their religion and their principles.—Theſe are the fruits of democratic perturbation, theſe the exceſſes into which it has precipitated a once generous nation!

This torrent ſhould be oppoſed with a wall of braſs. The ſhame and calamities with which the French menace all Europe, can be repelled by arms alone. Should peace be concluded at Raſtadt on the conditions ſo imperiouſly dictated by the Directory, Europe is ruined. All the nations of Europe, then, ought to confederate anew, not to conquer, but to compel the French to return to the principles of their conſtitution.

This confederacy ought to be compoſed of the nations who ſtill retain their freedom, againſt that power which perſecutes and threatens them all. Spain, Italy, Holland, and Switzerland are chained to the car of the conqueror. Turkey is a nullity. France muſt be oppoſed by an offenſive and defenſive alliance between Pruſſia, Auſtria, the Empire Ruſſia, Sweden, Denmark, and America: and, if poſſible, the King of Naples, Switzerland and Turkey ſhould be induced to accede to it.

This league ſhould annul every thing that has been done at Raſtadt. It ſhould abſolutely oppoſe the invaſion of England by a direct mediation, or by a war if neceſſary. It ſhould im-

poſe on the belligerent powers a rigorous armiſtice, and attack with their forces the party that refuſes to comply.

The congreſs of Raſtadt muſt ceaſe to be a contemptible convention, where the members the Germanic body are on the point of ſigning the national opprobrium and the deſtruction of the empire. It ſhould be adjourned to a town more ſecure from the inſults of the French. It ſhould become a congreſs of the whole world. It ſhould debate with frankneſs and ſincerity the intereſts of the fifteen powers deſcribed in this ſpeculative ſketch; and their political exiſtence ſhould be ſecured on a juſt and ſolid baſis. It ſhould terminate in univerſal peace.

With regard to the French nation, they are at preſent abſolute maſters of their own fate and of that of the world. They may adorn themſelves with the moſt brilliant glory, and merit the gratitude and admiration of all nations; or they may, by perſiſting in a ſyſtem of conqueſt and revolution, deluge the world with calamity, and produce their own ultimate ruin. On their choice of this alternative depends the deſtiny of the univerſe.

FINIS.

BIBL CANT ACAD

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24 Jun 1973